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ABSTRACT

This volume is part of a series of monographs from Australia devoted to outlining an alternative approach, based on neo-Marxist concepts, to policy studies in education. The opening essay in this volume argues that real and significant educational reform will not come about through a revolution in decision-making and managerial technology, but rather through a greater consensus about basic values and a greater understanding of the relationship among schools, society, and the realization of human potential. The essay begins by raising a series of fundamental issues regarding the nature and scope of educational policy and discussing four paradigms of policy analysis. This is followed by a discussion of five specific theories of policy making commonly found in the literature on policy sciences, in order to show how these theories are rooted in the functionalist paradigm. In opposition to this dominant view, the rest of the essay defines and discusses radical humanism and critical theory as reformation and concludes with a prologue to a critical analysis of educational policy. Three readings by different authors follow: (1) "Problem Setting in Policy Research," by Martin Rein and Donald A. Schon; (2) "Why Educational Policies Often Fail: The Hyperrationalization Hypothesis," by Arthur E. Wise; and (3) "Schools for Democracy?" by A. H. Halsey. An annotated bibliography is included. (TE)

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A critical reformulation of educational policy analysis

John J. Prunty

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

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ESA842 Policy development and analysis

A critical reformulation of educational policy analysis

John J. Prunty

Deakin University

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Course team
Lawrence Angus
Richard Bates (chairman)
Diana Macmillan (course developer)
John Prunty
Peter Watkins

Consultants
Greg Andrews
Ray Barrett
David Bennett
Modesta Blasi
Gary Dowsett
Gay Hawkins
Gary Maloney
Michael Middleton
Liz Newell
Richard Smith

The course includes:
David Bennett, *Federal Education Policy Initiatives from Menzies to Fraser*
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Series introduction

The series of monographs of which this volume is a part is devoted to providing an outline of an alternative approach to policy studies in education. The dominant tradition in policy studies has clearly been that of functional analysis based upon essentially economistic conceptions of education. Moreover, policy development has been seen largely as something done by experts and imposed by administrators on a somewhat recalcitrant education system. It is our view that such a conception of policy development and analysis seriously misrepresents the nature and activities of education systems.

While there can be little doubt that a conception of education as a *production* system is widespread, and that such a conception implies that industrial corporate management techniques are appropriate, it is becoming clear that education is also a *cultural* system that involves not only the learning of basic life skills but also systems of meaning, aspiration, and purpose through which notions of personal and social identity are articulated.

Education systems display both the diversity of approach to these issues evident in the wider society and also a degree of autonomy from other institutions. These characteristics ensure that education systems have become, as Bowles and Gintis suggest, laboratories in which competing solutions to the problems of personal liberation and social equality are tested, and the arena in which social struggles are fought out.

Collectively these monographs attempt to explore some of the dimensions of these struggles in Australian education. Beginning with a formulation of a critical theory of policy development and analysis, the series continues with a historical examination of various federal initiatives on educational policy. An analysis of the equality debate follows and then an analysis of the current crisis in relations between youth, schooling, and work. Two further monographs add practitioner perspectives on policy formation in the areas of schooling and gender, and community participation in schooling. We hope, in the future, to add further monographs on such issues as examinations, certification, and credentiation; curriculum policy; the role of minors in policy formation. Each will be set within the context of the struggle to create an equitable, just, and humane education system as a contribution to the development of a society that exhibits these qualities more strongly.



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

Introduction

Educational policy-making is an exercise of power and control directed towards the attainment or preservation of some preferred arrangement of schools and society. Whether a particular policy has to do with the nature of school curriculum, pedagogy, the role of the community in school decision-making, disciplinary procedures, or the content and criteria of HSC examinations, some desired state of affairs is envisaged, and the requisite resources and authority are garnered in the service of this ideal.

Often the rhetoric of educational policy is about change and improvement of schooling practices or educational results. Nearly always the reality is much at variance with professed intentions, and in case after case the resiliency of established practices is documented in the literature (Sarason 1971; Popkewitz 1978, 1979, 1983; Smith, Prunty & Dwyer 1981; Popkewitz, Tabachnick & Welhage 1982). We shall be arguing in this monograph that such resistance to change is partially a result of the perspectives and procedures that constitute the present state of the policy sciences. We shall be making the case that real and significant educational reform will not come about through a revolution in decision making and managerial technology, but rather through an emancipation of human consciousness. Fundamental change will not be achieved through the application of better administrative theory, or tighter, more effective techniques of control. Real change will come about through the achievement of a greater consensus about basic values and a greater understanding about the relationship between schools, society, and the realisation of human potential. In this regard, we take exception to the dominant traditions of educational research and policy analysis and explore the insights and possibilities of an alternate perspective known as critical theory. It is our aim in this volume to extend the seminal work of educational theorists such as Young (1971), Bernstein (1977), Bourdieu & Passeron (1977), Apple (1982), Bates (1982), and Giroux (1983) by applying the critical-theory perspective to the analysis of educational policy. In this respect we venture onto an intellectual landscape with few paths and signposts. The magnitude and complexity of the issues we address in this monograph has us approaching this task with a profound sense of respect. What reluctance we may have in exploring such new social terrain is overcome when we consider the importance of educational policy in human terms, and for the future of society.

We begin this essay by considering the nature and scope of educational policy, and acquaint the reader with a variety of concepts and terminology currently in use. Here we set the stage and raise a number of issues that we take up in the remainder of the essay. Next, we begin our consideration of the conduct of policy analysis with a journey into the rather abstract realm of social-science paradigms—the broadest points of view about how we are to make sense of policy making and other social acts. Subsequent to this discussion of paradigms, we examine five specific theories of policy making commonly found in the literature of the policy sciences. Here it will be shown that overwhelmingly these theories are rooted in the functionalist paradigm, a perspective that is fundamentally at odds with educational change. After this critique of traditional policy perspectives, we suggest an alternative approach to policy studies in education based

upon a radical-humanist paradigm. Here we draw upon many of the ideas being developed under the rubric of critical theory, and examine their relevance for the analysis of educational policy. In so doing, we shall place the issue of justice at the forefront, urging the policy researcher to consider the school's part in socialising young people into a more equitable society.

The nature and scope of policy analysis

This section is divided into three parts. In the first, we consider the meaning of the concept 'policy'. In the second, we turn our attention to the term 'policy analysis', and examine how it is used in the literature. Finally, we characterise a variety of activities that constitute the research agenda of the policy analyst.

Policy

If there is one generalisation to be made about the present state of educational policy analysis, it is that the field is marked by a lack of consensus on basic terms of reference. We can begin to savour some of this confusion by examining the meaning of the very central concept of 'policy' itself. Sampling a number of interpretations of this term, we find Dror (1968, p. 14) viewing policy as the 'general directives, rather than detailed instructions, on the main lines of action to be followed' by an organisation or institution. Others, such as Jenkins (1978), attend to the more procedural and pragmatic aspects. Hence, policy is:

> A set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve.
>
> (Jenkins 1978, p. 15)

Many recognise that values are an integral part of policy. Thus for Easton:

> The essence of a policy lies in the fact that through it certain things are denied to some people and made accessible to others. A policy, in other words, whether for a society, for a narrow association, or for any other group, consists of a web of decisions and actions that allocates values.
>
> (Easton 1953, pp. 129-30)

Similarly, Lasswell & Kaplan (1950, p. 71) see policy as a 'projected program of goal values and practices'. A number of authors prefer to steer clear of formal definitions of policy, and instead offer circuitous explanations of the concept. Thus Bauer (1968) reserves the term 'policy' for decisions with a wide range of implications, in contrast to those of a trivial or routine nature.

Also shunning definitions of 'policy' is Mann, who prefers instead to describe 'policy problems': '(1) they are public in nature, (2) they are very consequential, (3) they are complex, (4) they are dominated by uncertainty, and (5) they reflect and are affected by disagreement about the goals to be pursued' (Mann 1975, p. 11). It is this ambiguity about what policy is that has led Dye (1978, p. 3) to remark that 'public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do'. Perhaps the collective wisdom is best expressed this way: 'policy is rather like the elephant—you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it' (Cunningham 1963, in B. Smith 1976, p. 12).

Despite the difficulties in defining policy, we can help clarify the term

by examining a variety of *types* of policy. Anderson (1979) provides a useful discussion of a number of kinds of policy, which we shall briefly summarise. Firstly, we should note the differences between substantive and procedural policies. *Substantive* policies pertain to 'what government is going to do' (p. 126), such as introducing a new science curriculum or changing the school-leaving age. *Procedural* policies involve 'who is going to take action or how it is going to be done' (p. 126). In the examples above, procedural policy might range from administrative fiat to direct participation by the citizenry in bringing about change. We would suggest that an understanding of procedural policy is especially important for identifying the bases of power and control that shape the substantive content of policy.

Secondly, policies can be distinguished on the basis of whether they are distributive, regulatory, or redistributive. *Distributive* policies are those in which resources are allocated to assist particular groups, and where those seeking benefits are not in direct competition with each other. A compensatory education program designed to help migrant children with language skills would be an example of a distributive policy. *Regulatory* policies 'involve the imposition of restrictions or limitations on the behavior of individuals and groups' and 'reduce the freedom or discretion to act of those who are regulated' (Anderson 1979, p. 128). In school settings, policies about discipline, dress, and appearance, the professional conduct of teachers, and even curriculum requirements are instances of regulatory policy. *Redistributive* policies involve 'deliberate efforts by the government to shift the allocation of wealth, income, property, or rights among broad classes or groups of the population' (Anderson 1979, p. 130). Examples of redistributive educational policies would include affirmative action in the admission and hiring of minorities in higher education in the United States. In Victoria, recent government action to cut back the funding of the most affluent private schools in order to assist less wealthy schools is another redistributive policy decision.

Thirdly, policies may also be differentiated on the basis of whether the changes they embody are real or merely rhetorical. *Material* policies 'actually provide tangible resources or substantive power to their beneficiaries or impose real disadvantages on those who are adversely affected' (Anderson 1979, p. 131). In contrast, *symbolic* policies 'distribute advantages or disadvantages which have little real impact on people. They do not deliver what they appear to promise' (Anderson 1979, p. 131). In the United States, policies and legislation prohibiting segregation in the public schools were, in many instances, more symbolic than material. Closer to home, one might question whether the decentralisation of the Victorian Education Department promised by the Liberal Government in the late 1970s was primarily a material or a symbolic policy.

Describing types of policies, as we have, serves to highlight the issues of power, control, legitimacy, privilege, equity, justice, and, above all, values so embedded in the concept of policy. These shall be recurrent themes throughout the pages ahead.

Policy analysis

Just as there is little agreement on how to define policy, there is also no consensus on what to call the systematic investigation of policy. The term we have settled upon, 'policy analysis', is widely used in the literature (e.g. Ukeles 1977; Boyd 1980; Carley 1980). However, we should point out

that many similar and synonymous terms are popular as well. These include 'policy sciences' (e.g. Lerner & Lasswell 1951; Dror 1971; Reynolds 1975), 'policy research' (e.g. Etzioni 1971; Coleman 1972; Rein & White 1977), 'policy studies' (Nagel 1975; Fry & Thompkins 1978; R. Smith 1982), and in some instances 'applied sociology' (Gouldner & Miller 1965; Lazarsfeld & Reitz 1975). Since most of these terms are associated with particular communities of scholars, theoretical schools, or professional journals, we must from the outset dissociate ourselves from any particular school of thought that might be implied by the label 'policy analysis'. For to carry with us such latent meanings could hinder our task of both seeing policy in a new light and casting shadows of doubt on the domain as it has been practised over the last three decades.

The residual ambiguities about the meaning of 'policy' complicate the task of specifying what 'policy analysis' is. Depending upon which author one reads, the proper stance of the policy analyst can appear to be quite different. Below we shall sample a number of different ways that policy analysis has been characterised.

Harold Lasswell is generally credited as the founder of the policy sciences (Lerner & Lasswell 1951). The way he came to see the field, after more than a decade and a half of work in the policy sciences, is illustrated below:

> The policy sciences study the process of deciding or choosing and evaluate the relevance of available knowledge for the solution of particular problems ... Since an official decision or a private choice is a problem-solving activity, five intellectual tasks are performed at varying levels of insight and understanding: clarification of goals; description of trends; analysis of conditions; projection of future developments; and invention, evaluation, and selection of alternatives. The policy sciences integrate philosophy, history, science, prophecy, and commitment.
>
> (Lasswell 1968, pp. 181–2)

One of the most contentious issues in the policy sciences centres around the 'advocacy' role of the analyst. Dye (1978) believes that policy analysis and policy advocacy are two distinct activities:

> Whether one chooses to study public policy for scientific, professional, or political reasons, it is important to distinguish *policy analysis* from *policy advocacy*. *Explaining* the causes and consequences of various policies is not equivalent to prescribing what policies governments *ought* to pursue. Learning *why* governments do what they do and what the consequences of their actions are is not the same as saying what governments *ought* to do, or bringing about changes in what they do. Policy advocacy requires the skills of rhetoric, persuasion, organization, and activism. Policy analysis encourages scholars and students to attack critical policy issues with the tools of systematic inquiry. There is an implied assumption in policy analysis that developing scientific knowledge about the forces shaping public policy and the consequences of policy designs is itself a socially relevant activity, and that such analysis is a prerequisite to prescription, advocacy, and activism. In short, policy analysis might be labeled the 'thinking man's response' to demands that social science become more 'relevant' to the problems of society.
>
> (Dye 1978, p. 7)

James Coleman, whose work in the United States has had an enormous

impact upon educational policy, takes exception to Dye with respect to 'scientific knowledge' generally and 'advocacy' in particular:

> For policy research, the ultimate product is not a 'contribution to existing knowledge' in the literature, but a social policy modified by the research results ... Those stages of policy research that lie in the world of action, formulation of the research problem, posing conditions for communication of the research results back into the world of action, and making policy recommendations based on the research results, should be governed by the investigator's personal values and appropriately include advocacy. Those stages that lie within the disciplinary world, execution of the research and statement of the research results, should be governed by disciplinary values and do not appropriately include advocacy.
>
> (Coleman 1972, pp. 6, 14)

Most conceptions of policy analysis have this activity couched in scientific precision. However, this view is not shared by all. Wildavsky (1979) views policy analysis as an 'art and craft' and offers this bit of experience to back up his position:

> At the Graduate School of Public Policy in Berkeley, I discouraged discussions on the meaning of policy analysis. Hundreds of conversations on this slippery subject had proven futile, even exasperating, possibly dangerous. For whenever my colleagues and I began our courses by asking 'What is a policy analysis?' or, a choice that proved to be worse, 'What is a problem?' student anxiety rose alarmingly. The classroom crackled with tension. It was as if students felt the faculty were withholding something vital—the strange and simple secret of analysis (which we must have known because students couldn't learn it) ... [Yet] students did learn to do analysis; and if our observation and their job experience were any guide, students not only *felt* but *were* more competent. What was it, then, that could be learned but not explained, that all of us could sometimes do but that none of us could ever define (at least to anybody else's satisfaction)? Our inscrutable ineffable friend, policy analysis. Cold comfort; those who can't say what it is, teach, and those who can do policy analysis, still can't say how it was possible to do it.
>
> (Wildavsky 1979, p. 2)

Among the many and diverse interpretations of policy analysis in the literature, there are few that define the practice in moral and ethical terms. Fay is one notable exception: 'a policy science is an elitist and anti-democratic programme designed to eliminate just those features of political decision-making which the critical model deems essential' (Fay 1975, p. 108). We take Fay's point seriously, and as we later work towards a critical educational policy analysis, we shall be specific about 'those features ... which the critical model deems essential'. In the interim, however, we should not let the differences of opinion or uncertainties about policy analysis foreclose further consideration of the term. While policy analysis is bound to remain a rather vague topic, we believe that a degree of clarity may be gained by considering the scope of activities in which the policy analyst engages. We now turn to these in concluding this section.

The scope of policy analysis

We should begin by acknowledging that policy analysis is a multi-faceted activity. Thinking about policy analysis as a unitary and one-dimensional

form of research is partly responsible for the confusion that surrounds the term. The work of Gordon et al. (1977) is especially helpful in coming to terms with the kinds of activities performed by policy analysts. In Figure 1 we present a diagram that illustrates these multiple dimensions.

Figure 1. Categories of policy analysis (Gordon et al. 1977, p. 27)

Analysis for policy		Analysis of policy		
Policy advocacy	Information for policy	Policy monitoring and evaluation	Analysis of policy determination	Analysis of policy content

In this typology, policy analysis is seen to include two major orientations: analysis *for* policy and analysis *of* policy. Under the 'analysis for policy' heading is included 'policy advocacy', which 'denote[s] any research that terminates in the direct advocacy of a single policy, or of a group of related policies, identified as serving some end taken as valued by the researchers' (Gordon et al. 1977, p. 27). The second type of analysis in the 'for' category is called 'information for policy'. Here the 'researcher's task is to provide policy-makers with information and perhaps advice. It assumes a case for action, either in terms of the introduction of a new policy, or the revision of an existing one' (Gordon et al. 1977, p. 27). Applicable to either analysis 'for' or 'of' policy is the type called 'policy monitoring and evaluation', which 'can be aimed at providing direct results to policy-makers about the impact and effectiveness of specific policies' or 'be used for feasibility analysis in future policy design' (Gordon et al. 1977, p. 28). 'Analysis of policy determination', as we shall later show, is by far the most common concern of the policy analyst. This domain of inquiry considers 'the inputs and transformational processes operating upon the construction of public policy' (Gordon et al. 1977, p. 28). One final type in the 'analysis of policy' category addresses 'policy content', and as such is 'conducted for academic advancement rather than public impact' (Gordon et al. 1977, p. 28). Frequently such analyses focus on the values and social theories underpinning the policy process.

While the typology of Gordon et al. (1977) may be useful in clarifying the multi-dimensional quality of policy analysis, and hence reconciling differences about the place of advocacy versus scientific knowledge, there is considerably more complexity to policy analysis than is intimated in these multiple facets. For instance, while Gordon et al. (1977, p. 28) note that 'attempts to analyse the policy process are inescapably based upon explicit models of the policy system', it is also the case that such models are themselves based upon differing philosophies of science and theories of society. As a result the '*explicit* models of the policy system' may well contain *implicit* assumptions regarding the nature of science and the nature of society. Any serious approach to policy analysis has, therefore, to devise a way of making such assumptions explicit, therefore clarifying not only the model of the policy system involved but also the underlying philosophy of science and theory of society. One of the most helpful, systematic, and comprehensive analyses of such assumptions is that presented by Burrell & Morgan (1979) in their discussion of paradigms in social science, to which we now turn.

Paradigms of policy analysis

The term 'paradigm' has come into popular usage in the last two decades, largely as a result of the work by Kuhn (1962) in the philosophy of science. Far from being a precise concept, as Masterman (1970) has indicated, it none the less serves a useful function in making sense of how researchers conceptualise what they are doing and what kinds of results they obtain. Some of the meanings of paradigm that Masterman identifies in Kuhn's work include: 'a "philosophy", or constellation of questions . . . a whole tradition . . . an analogy . . . a source of tools . . . a standard illustration . . . an organizing principle which can govern perception itself . . . a general epistemological viewpoint . . . a new way of seeing . . . something which defines a broad sweep of reality' (Masterman 1970, pp. 62, 63, 65). The importance of paradigms is that they permit one to see the world by providing an interpretive framework, but they also restrict what one is able to see by focusing on only a part of the whole. Kuhn's (1962) book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* argues that major breakthroughs in science occur when 'paradigm shifts' take place—when the world is viewed from a totally new perspective. What we propose to do in this section is to take a close look at a number of paradigms in use in the social sciences and the study of organisations. In this task we anchor much of our discussion in the works of Burrell & Morgan (1979) and Morgan (1980), which contain some vivid insights into the nature of paradigms, theories, and models.[1]

Burrell & Morgan (1979) begin their search for the paradigmatic dimensions of the social sciences with the statement: 'all theories of organisation are based upon a *philosophy of science* and a *theory of society*' (p. 1, emphasis added). These two dimensions are most important. They become the parameters of the analytical framework that we shall describe in the following pages. This will allow us to understand the conduct of social inquiry in general, and educational policy analysis in particular. We address each of these two dimensions in turn.

Assumptions about the nature of science

Burrell and Morgan argue that social science can be approached from either a subjective or an objective vantage point. They submit further that the salient premises of subjectivism and objectivism can be ordered along four dimensions: *ontology*; *epistemology*; *human nature* and *methodology*. We show this analytical scheme in Figure 2.

In any scientific endeavour, there is very little that we can be certain about. Hence the social scientist (and natural scientist as well) must always make assumptions about the phenomenon being studied as well as the way it is being investigated. Burrell and Morgan call attention explicitly to these assumptions. Firstly, there are *ontological* assumptions, 'which concern the very essence of the phenomena under investigation' (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 1). The authors identify two such ontological positions: realism and nominalism. The first of this pair is by far the most prevalent in social and educational research. In a realist ontology, the investigator assumes that 'the social world external to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures' (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 4). This version of reality is objective and

independent of the person perceiving it. The 'nominal' position, in contrast, assumes that there is no given reality, but that reality is something constructed by persons, and is intimately tied to their consciousness.

Figure 2. A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 3)



The second assumption about the nature of social science is *epistemological*, pertaining to 'the grounds of knowledge—about how one might begin to understand the world and communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings' (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 1). The two polar epistemologies identified by Burrell and Morgan are positivism and anti-positivism. Positivism (sometimes referred to as 'logical positivism' and 'logical empiricism') has its roots in the physical and biological sciences, and is complementary with a realist ontology. The positivist assumes that the social world is ordered, and that the work of the scientist is to discover the underlying principles that govern social life. The success of a positivist research effort is measured by its ability to predict and control social behaviour on the basis of theory. Anti-positivism, as the title would suggest, is diametrically opposed to positivism, and as such

> is firmly set against the utility of a search for laws or underlying regularities in the world of social affairs. For the anti-positivist, the social world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood from the point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied . . . One has to understand from the inside rather than the outside. From this point of view social science is seen as being essentially a subjective rather than an objective enterprise. Anti-positivists tend to reject the notion that science can generate objective knowledge of any kind.
>
> (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 5)

The way one views social science necessarily includes assumptions about human nature. Burrell and Morgan make the case that most of these assumptions centre around the relationship between persons and their

environment. Two such views, determinism and voluntarism, represent the extremes on a continuum of images of *human nature*. Determinist models regard humans as 'products of the environment . . . [and] conditioned by their external circumstances' (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 2). Often these deterministic assumptions are implicit and lie buried in positivist epistemology. Sometimes they are quite explicit, as with the theories of B. F. Skinner, and such educational practices as 'behaviour modification'. At the other extreme is voluntarism, a presupposition that 'attributes to human beings a much more creative role: with a perspective where "free will" occupies the centre of the stage; where man is regarded as the creator of his environment, the controller as opposed to the controlled' (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 2).

The fourth dimension of Burrell and Morgan's scheme has to do with *methodology*, or 'the way in which one attempts to investigate and obtain "knowledge" about the social world' (p. 2). The authors suggest that two particular methodologies cluster into the configuration of assumptions associated with ontology, epistemology, and human nature discussed above. One of these methodologies is called nomothetic, which stresses

> the importance of basing research upon systematic protocol and technique. It is epitomised in the approach and methods employed in the natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testing hypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour.
>
> (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 6)

Anyone who has been subjected to batteries of standardised tests, attitude surveys, questionnaires and the like has firsthand experience with nomothetic methods. In contrast, the ideographic methodology

> is based on the view that one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It thus places considerable stress upon getting close to one's subject and exploring its detailed background and life history. The ideographic approach emphasises the analysis of the subjective accounts which one generates by 'getting inside' situations and involving oneself in the everyday flow of life—the detailed analysis of the insights generated by such encounters with one's subject and the insights revealed in impressionistic accounts found in diaries, biographies and journalistic records. The ideographic method stresses the importance of letting one's subject unfold its nature and characteristics during the process of investigation.
>
> (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 6)

From this point on we shall refer to these clusters of assumptions collectively as *subjectivism* and *objectivism*. These perspectives represent major points of difference and debate in the academic community, although it should be noted that the objectivist approach has been the overwhelmingly favoured position among social scientists and policy analysts. We shall be taking exception to this prevailing view.

Assumptions about the nature of society

Alongside of the subjectivist and objectivist assumptions about the nature of social science, Burrell and Morgan juxtapose two conflicting perspectives about the nature of society. These are termed the *sociology of regulation* and the *sociology of radical change*. In constructing their case, the authors re-examine a debate that welled up in the 1950s, and which

had all but dissipated by the late 1960s. The controversy, known as the 'order–conflict' debate, had to do with whether the nature of society was better understood in terms of stability or change, integration or conflict, functional co-ordination or disintegration, consensus or coercion. Dahrendorf (1959) characterised these polar assumptions as follows:

> The integration theory of society, as displayed by the work of Parsons and other structural-functionalists, is founded on a number of assumptions of the following type:
> 1. Every society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of elements.
> 2. Every society is a well integrated structure of elements.
> 3. Every element in a society has a function, i.e., renders a contribution to its maintenance as a system.
> 4. Every functioning social structure is based on a consensus of values among its members . . .
>
> What I have called the coercion theory of society can also be reduced to a small number of basic tenets, although here again these assumptions oversimplify and overstate the case:
> 1. Every society is at every point subject to processes of change; social change is ubiquitous.
> 2. Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous.
> 3. Every element in a society renders a contribution to its disintegration and change.
> 4. Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by others.
>
> (Dahrendorf 1959, pp. 160–2)

This debate ended with the 'conflict' assumptions being integrated within the 'order' perspective, with the reasoning that both concepts were merely 'two sides of the same coin', and not mutually exclusive. Burrell and Morgan submit that the debate ended prematurely, and that part of the reason for this was semantic. These authors consider the two sets of assumptions to be distinct. To avoid the confusion stemming from the use of language, the authors have relabelled the central polar issues *regulation* and *radical change* and they describe the essential features of each accordingly:

> We introduce the term '*sociology of regulation*' to refer to the writings of theorists who are primarily concerned to provide explanations of society in terms which emphasise its underlying unity and cohesiveness. It is a sociology which is essentially concerned with the need for regulation in human affairs; the basic questions which it asks tend to focus upon the need to understand why society is maintained as an entity. It attempts to explain why society tends to hold together rather than fall apart.
>
> (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 17)

Regarding the counter-assumption about the nature of society, Burrell and Morgan tell us:

> The '*sociology of radical change*' stands in stark contrast to the 'sociology of regulation', in that its basic concern is to find explanations for the radical change, deep-seated structural conflict, modes of domination and structural contradiction which its theorists see as characterising modern society. It is a sociology which is essentially concerned with man's emancipation from the structures which limit and stunt his potential for development. The basic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of man, both material

> and psychic. It is often visionary and Utopian, in that it looks towards potentiality as much as actuality; it is concerned with what is possible rather than with what is; with alternatives rather than with acceptance of the *status quo*.
>
> (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 17)

The basic elements that define the kinds of problems that social scientists choose to investigate, as well as the perspectives they bring to bear to these problems are summarily arrayed in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The regulation–radical change dimension (adapted from Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 18)

The sociology of REGULATION is concerned with:	The sociology of RADICAL CHANGE is concerned with:
(a) The status quo	(a) Radical change
(b) Social order	(b) Structural conflict
(c) Consensus (voluntary and spontaneous)	(c) Modes of domination
(d) Social integration and cohesion	(d) Contradiction
(e) Solidarity	(e) Emancipation
(f) Need satisfaction (individual or system)	(f) Deprivation (social systems obstruct human fulfilment)
(g) Actuality	(g) Potentiality

Burrell and Morgan's four paradigms

If the preceding framework is viewed two-dimensionally, with the 'subjectivist-objectivist' assumptions about the nature of social science represented vertically, and the 'radical change - regulation' assumptions about the nature of society arrayed horizontally, a 2 x 2 matrix is produced. Each quadrant, shown in Figure 4, depicts a distinct paradigm within which a wide variety of social theories are grounded. We shall briefly examine each paradigm in sequence, and later return to carefully scrutinise two of these with particular significance to the conduct of educational policy analysis.

Figure 4. Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 22)



Functionalism

Functionalism, undergirded by assumptions of objectivism and regulation, has its philosophical foundations in the realism of Aristotle, and the Anglo-French rationalism of John Locke and Rene Descartes. In the modern era, systems theory continues this tradition. Functionalism is by far the most prevalent paradigm in use in the social sciences and, as we shall see in the following section, policy analysis is steeped in this tradition. Morgan (1980) characterises the common features of the variety of theories issuing from the functionalist paradigm as follows:

> The *functionalist* paradigm is based upon the assumption that society has a concrete, real existence, and a systemic character oriented to produce an ordered and regulated state of affairs. It encourages an approach to social theory that focuses upon understanding the role of human beings *in* society. Behavior is always seen as being contextually bound in a real world of concrete and tangible social relationships. The ontological assumptions encourage a belief in the possibility of an objective and value-free social science in which the scientist is distanced from the scene which he or she is analyzing through the rigor and technique of the scientific method. The functionalist perspective is primarily regulative and pragmatic in its basic orientation, concerned with understanding society in a way which generates useful empirical knowledge.
>
> (Morgan 1980, p. 608)

We shall have considerably more to say about functionalism when we later focus our critique of traditional policy analysis on this highly endorsed point of view.

Interpretivism

The interpretive paradigm is defined by subjectivist assumptions concerning the nature of social science, and regulative assumptions about the nature of society. The philosophic basis of the interpretive paradigm owes much to the 18th-century writings of the Irish Bishop George Berkeley and the German Immanuel Kant. While a variety of social perspectives emanate from the interpretive paradigm (e.g. phenomenology, hermeneutics, and ethnomethodology), each shares some essential features with the others, as Morgan describes:

> The *interpretive* paradigm . . . is based upon the view that the social world has a very precarious ontological status, and that what passes as social reality does not exist in any concrete sense, but is the product of the subjective and inter-subjective experience of individuals. Society is understood from the standpoint of the participant in action rather than the observer. The interpretive social theorist attempts to understand the process through which shared multiple realities arise, are sustained, and are changed. Like the functionalist, the interpretive approach is based on the assumption and belief that there is an underlying pattern and order within the social world; however, the interpretive theorist views the functionalist's attempt to establish an objective social science as an unattainable end. Science is viewed as a network of language games, based upon sets of subjectively determined concepts and rules, which the practitioners of science invent and follow. The status of scientific knowledge is therefore seen as being as problematic as the common sense knowledge of everyday life.
>
> (Morgan 1980, pp. 608–9)

Radical humanism

The radical-humanist paradigm has its intellectual origins in the post-Kantian tradition of German idealism, represented by Johann Fichte, Georg Hegel, Karl Marx and Ludwig Feuerbach in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the French existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre in the 20th century. Radical humanism stands in direct opposition to the functionalist paradigm with its subjectivist assumptions about reality and its social construction, and its commitment to radical social change. Like other paradigms, radical humanism contains a variety of social theories including existential phenomenology and critical theory. Morgan (1980) points out the elements common to all the particular theories within the radical-humanist paradigm:

> The *radical humanist* paradigm, like the interpretive paradigm, emphasizes how reality is socially created and socially sustained but ties the analysis to an interest in what may be described as the pathology of consciousness, by which human beings become imprisoned within the bounds of the reality that they create and sustain. This perspective is based on the view that the process of reality creation may be influenced by psychic and social processes which channel, constrain, and control the minds of human beings, in ways which alienate them from the potentialities inherent in their true nature as humans. The contemporary radical humanist critique focuses upon the alienating aspects of various modes of thought and action which characterize life in industrial societies. Capitalism, for example, is viewed as essentially totalitarian, the idea of capital accumulation molding the nature of work, technology, rationality, logic, science, roles, language and mystifying ideological concepts such as scarcity, leisure, and so on. These concepts, which the functionalist theorist may regard as the building blocks of social order and human freedom stand, for the radical humanist, as modes of ideological domination. The radical humanist is concerned with discovering how humans can link thought and action (praxis) as a means of transcending their alienation.
>
> (Morgan 1980, p. 609)

We shall return shortly to the radical-humanist paradigm, for we shall be arguing that this 'way of seeing' is a much more viable alternative than functionalism for the variety of research activities that fall under the rubric of 'policy analysis'.

Radical structuralism

The radical-structuralist paradigm is most closely associated with the later writings of Karl Marx, subsequent to his epistemological schism with Hegelian idealism in the mid-1840s, when his social and political theory incorporated a scientistic, objectivist, and determinist set of assumptions. Within the radical-structuralist paradigm are included a variety of latter-day Marxist positions including the Russian social theories of Lenin, Bukharin, and Kropotkin, and the Mediterranean Marxism of Althusser and Colletti. Radical structuralism shares with functionalism an objective orientation to social science, and holds a common commitment with radical humanism to pervasive social change. Morgan (1980) summarises the underlying unity of the theories within the radical-structuralist paradigm:

> The reality defined by the *radical structuralist* paradigm, like that of the radical humanist, is predicated upon a view of society as a potentially

> dominating force. However, it is tied to a materialist conception of the social world, which is defined by hard, concrete, ontologically real structures. Reality is seen as existing on its own account independently of the way in which it is perceived and reaffirmed by people in everyday activities. This reality is viewed as being characterized by intrinsic tensions and contradictions between opposing elements, which inevitably lead to radical change in the system as a whole. The radical structuralist is concerned with understanding these intrinsic tensions, and the way in which those with power in society seek to hold them in check through various modes of domination. Emphasis is placed upon the importance of praxis as a means of transcending this domination.
>
> (Morgan 1980, p. 609)

In the preceding discussion we have tried to provide a framework that will enable us to penetrate below the surface of the policy process. As we return now to the substantive issues of educational policy analysis, we shall apply this paradigmatic perspective in examining the theories and models that guide the policy analyst.

Functionalism and systems theory as orthodoxy

The kinds of theoretical structures available to the educational policy analyst are at once many and few. Yeakey (1983) in a recent article on policy analysis describes nine such models. In view of our earlier discussion of Gordon et al.'s (1977) identification of five distinct policy-analysis activities, it may seem a bit perplexing to discover that all of these theories are concerned primarily with the single facet of 'policy determination'. Furthermore, not one of the theories described by Yeakey is specifically 'educational'. This is not to be critical of Yeakey, for in spite of numerous titles appearing on the topic of educational policy analysis, one will search in vain to uncover a single distinctively educational theory of the policy process. While apparently not troubled by this state of affairs, Yeakey none the less does provide some explanation for why this should be:

> Policy research in general and educational policy research in particular is in a nascent stage of development; far from a state of being, it is in a state of becoming . . . [E]ducational policy research has followed rather than led the policy research movement in America. Identification of key policy analysts, their disciplinary backgrounds and the disciplinary literature they cite . . . indicates rather conclusively the dominance of economists, political scientist, and systems analysts (Nelson 1977).
>
> (Yeakey 1983, pp. 274–5)

In effect, educational policy analysts have for decades been borrowing and applying conceptual and theoretical schemes from other fields and, as we shall attempt to show, to the detriment of educational change and social justice.

In this section we propose to put our paradigmatic perspective to work on theories that inform educational policy analysis. This meta-analysis will show that such theories are overwhelmingly functionalist in their assumptions. Later in this essay we shall work towards a radical-humanist perspective that will extricate policy theory from the grip of functionalism, consider a wider scope of policy-analysis activities, and put *education* into the policy picture.

Each of the following five subsections considers a particular theory frequently occurring in the policy literature. These are: *rational-comprehensive theory, incrementalism, political systems theory, group theory*, and *elite theory*. While this inventory is by no means exhaustive, we believe it is a fair and representative sampling of current thought about policy. Our selection of theories comes from three separate authors, each of whom surveys the field broadly, and whose work enjoys a substantial circulation. These choices include Thomas Dye's (1978) *Understanding Public Policy*, James Anderson's (1979) *Public Policy-Making*, and Carol Yeakey's (1983) 'Emerging policy research in educational research and decisionmaking'. Each author examines between seven and nine policy theories, and six of these are common to the discussion of all three writers. We have selected five of these overlapping half-dozen models for the analysis that follows.[2]

Rational-comprehensive theory

Rational-comprehensive theory is perhaps 'the best-known theory of decision-making, and also perhaps the most widely accepted' (Anderson 1979, p. 9). According to the rational-comprehensive model, the policy decision-maker aims to maximise the ratio of values a policy achieves to those it sacrifices, and as such 'rationality is interchangeable with the concept of efficiency' (Dye 1978, p. 28). Rational-comprehensive theory is highly normative—that is, more prescriptive of the way policy *should* be made than descriptive of how it *is* actually made. The 'five sequential activities undertaken by the idealised "rational man" ' are summarised by Carley (1980), a contemporary proponent of rational models:

1. A problem which requires action is identified and goals, values, and objectives related to the problem are classified and organised.
2. All important possible ways of solving the problem or achieving goals and objectives are listed—these are alternative strategies, courses of action, or policies.
3. The important consequences which would follow from each alternative strategy are predicted and the probability of those consequences occurring is estimated.
4. The consequences of each strategy are then compared to the goals and objectives identified above.
5. Finally, a policy or strategy is selected in which consequences most closely match goals and objectives, or the problem is most nearly solved, or most benefit is got from equal cost, or equal benefit at least cost.

(Carley 1980, p. 11)

The rational-comprehensive model is a specific example of the broader 'systems' approach that grew out of US military and space-operations planning and which has been transplanted and applied to the solution of social problems (Hoos 1972). Quade's (1968) description of systems analysis bears unmistakable resemblance to the rational-comprehensive approach outlined above:

> Systems analysis . . . can be characterised as a systematic approach to helping a decision maker choose a course of action by investigating his full problem, searching out objectives and alternatives, and comparing them in light of their consequences, using an appropriate framework—insofar as

possible analytic—to bring expert judgement and intuition to bear on the problem.

(Quade 1968, p. 2, cited in Carley 1980, p. 36)

Numerous criticisms have been levelled at the rational-comprehensive model of policy decision-making. Many of these have to do with the limitations in data-gathering capability and the inaccuracies in social-scientific prediction. Other criticisms suggest that the bureaucratic organisational structure in which most policies are made are too fragmented to co-ordinate rational decision making. Furthermore, an organisation's prior commitments and 'sunk costs' often preclude consideration of a full range of policy alternatives. However, we find the most scathing criticisms of the rational-comprehensive model to centre on the issues of *power* and *values*. As Dye (1978) indicates, these occupy a dubious position in the rational-comprehensive approach:

1. There are no *societal* values that are usually agreed upon, but only the values of specific groups and individuals, many of which are conflicting.
2. The many conflicting values cannot be compared or weighted; for example, it is impossible to compare or weigh the value of individual dignity against a tax increase.
3. The environment of policy makers, particularly the power and influence system, renders it impossible for them to see or accurately weigh many societal values, particularly those values which have no active or powerful proponents.
4. Policy makers are not motivated to make decisions on the basis of societal goals, but instead try to maximize their own rewards—power, status, reelection, money, etc.

(Dye 1978, p. 31)

We locate rational-comprehensive theory in the functionalist paradigm. The objectivist assumptions about the nature of science are most visible in its separation of facts from values and its inclination to subject values to mathematical arbitration. The vision of an orderly social world that reason alone can comprehend is indicative of the sociology of regulation that underwrites this model of the policy decision-making process. Rational-comprehensive theory is hardly alone in its objectivism and regulatory predilections, as we shall see in examining the following theory.

Incrementalism

The incremental theory of decision making originates in the work of the economist Charles Lindblom (Lindblom 1959, 1964, 1968; Lindblom & Braybrooke 1963). Incrementalism (also called 'disjointed incrementalism' and 'the science of muddling through') takes as its point of departure many of the criticisms and shortcomings of the rational-comprehensive model discussed in the previous section. Yeakey (1983) states that incrementalism is 'perhaps the more favored of the decision models because of the political expediency it affords in reaching consensus among the various parties with only modifications rather than changes in existing programs' (p. 265). The essential features of incremental theory are listed by Schoettle (1968):

1. Choices are made in a given political universe, at the margin of the status quo.
2. A restricted variety of policy alternatives is considered, and these alternatives are incremental or small changes in the status quo.

3. A restricted number of consequences are considered for any given policy.
4. Adjustments are made in the objectives of policy in order to conform to given means of policy, implying a reciprocal relationship between ends and means.
5. Problems are reconstructed or transformed in the course of exploring relevant data.
6. Analysis and evaluation occur sequentially, with the result that policy consists of a long chain of amended choices.
7. Analysis and evaluation are oriented toward remedying a negatively perceived situation, rather than toward reaching a preconceived goal.
8. Analysis and evaluation are undertaken throughout society; that is, the locus of these activities is fragmented or disjointed.

(Schoettle 1968, p. 151, cited in Yeakey p. 265)

While incrementalism does in fact take into consideration, and compensate for, many of the shortcomings of rational-comprehensive theory, it too has drawn significant criticism. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni (1967), for one, criticises the conservative, 'regulation' assumptions of Lindblom's theory:

> Decisions by consent among partisans without a societywide regulatory center and guiding institutions should not be viewed as the preferred approach to decision-making. In the first place, decisions so reached would, of necessity, reflect the interests of the most powerful, since partisans invariably differ in their respective power positions; demands of the underprivileged and politically unorganized would be underrepresented.
>
> Secondly, incrementalism would tend to neglect *basic* societal innovations, as it focuses on the short run and seeks no more than limited variations from past policies. While an accumulation of small steps could lead to a significant change, there is nothing in this approach to guide the accumulation; the steps may be circular—leading back to where they started, or dispersed—leading in many directions at once but leading nowhere. Boulding [1964, p. 931] comments that, according to this approach, 'we do stagger through history like a drunk putting one disjointed incremental foot after another'.
>
> In addition, incrementalists seem to underestimate *their* impact on the decision-makers. As Dror [1964, p. 155] put it, 'Although Lindblom's thesis includes a number of reservations, these are insufficient to alter its main impact as an ideological reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces'.
>
> (Etzioni 1967, p. 387)

While incrementalism might appear to be a significant departure from the rational-comprehensive model, it is very clearly a variation on the same theme. Incrementalism differs from rational-comprehensive theory only to the extent that it recognises some of the limitations to reason. It accepts that the social world is concretely real and objectively knowable, albeit in smaller, less comprehensive units. In Lindblom's conservative objectivism we find another theory of policy decision-making that falls squarely into the functionalist paradigm. Indeed, Lindblom (1959, p. 88) locates his 'root method' in 'operations research', which Hoos (1972, p. 3) identifies as one of the 'components and companions' of systems analysis. We shall next explore further this 'systems' genre of functionalism.

Political systems theory

This approach to policy analysis is an application of general systems theory by political scientists. Mitchell (1968) traces the intellectual

heritage of political systems theory from its origins in biology, physical science, and engineering. The sociology of Talcott Parsons, according to Mitchell, is the immediate theoretical progenitor of political systems analysis for:

> Parsons, especially, has developed the technical idea of a social system, and it has been through his work that several political scientists have come to employ the approach in the study of politics. Almond (1956; 1966), Easton (1957; 1965a; 1965b) and Mitchell (1962) have based much of their conception of the political system on Parson's own expositions in the realm of politics (1960).
>
> (Mitchell 1968, p. 473)

The functionalist paradigm's articulatory pinnacle is the Parsonian conception of a 'social system'. This view carries with it intact all of the objectivist underpinnings from the natural sciences, upon which it is modelled. Further, the regulatory assumptions about society are unmistakable in Parsons & Smelser's (1956) view that 'any social system is subject to four independent functional imperatives or 'problems' which must be met adequately if equilibrium and/or continuing existence of the system is to be maintained' (p. 16). Of these offspring of Parsonian functionalism, David Easton has done the most to champion the cause of political systems theory. One needs only to examine a copy of Mann's (1975) *Policy Decision-Making in Education* to find a contemporary illustration of an Eastonian application to educational policy, not to mention the ghost of Talcott Parsons.

Political systems theory is recognisable by its lexicon and outlook, which construe policy as 'outputs' and values as 'inputs'. While political systems theory contains all of the key elements of general systems theory, it also has a decidedly political shading, as can be seen in Anderson's description:

> Public policy may be viewed as the response of a political system to demands arising from its environment. The *political system*, as defined by Easton, is composed of those identifiable and interrelated institutions and activities in a society that make authoritative decisions (or allocations of values) that are binding on society. *Inputs* into the political system from the environment consist of demands and supports. The *environment* consists of all those conditions and events external to the boundaries of the political system. *Demands* are the claims made by individuals and groups on the political system for action to satisfy their interests. *Support* is rendered when groups and individuals abide by election results, pay taxes, obey laws, and otherwise accept the decisions and actions of the authoritative political system made in response to demands. These authoritative allocations of values constitute public policy. The concept of *feedback* indicates that public policies (or outputs) may subsequently alter the environment and the demands generated therein, as well as the character of the political system itself. Policy outputs may produce new demands, which lead to further policy outputs, and so on in a continuing, never ending flow of public policy.
>
> (Anderson 1979, p. 17)

In our reading of the literature on policy theory, we find rather uncritical acceptance of political systems theory. Its primary asset seems to be its comprehensive consideration of the environmental context of political action. Some shortcomings of this perspective, however, are noted by Yeakey:

> Its utility is limited by its highly general nature. Further, it relates little as to how decisions are actually made and policy is developed within Easton's (1965b) 'black box' called the political system. Interactions both across and within systems must be considered and it could also be important to account for stances and positions adopted by political actors which have no immediate and tangible policy output.
>
> (Yeakey 1983, p. 267)

There are numerous additional problems with political systems theory, but we shall need to postpone considering them until the next section. For the present it will suffice to say that political systems theory is yet another model of the policy process anchored in the assumptions of the functionalist paradigm.

Group theory

This model of policy determination was first articulated by the political scientists David Truman (1951) and Earl Latham (1956, 1965). Group theory corresponds quite closely to common beliefs about pluralism and the political process, where individual concerns become aggregated as group interests, which are then represented collectively as demands upon the government. The role of government in policy making, according to Latham (1965), is to serve as a mediator of conflict, and impartial enforcer of the policies forged from struggle, compromise, and arbitration:

> The legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, and records the terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of statutes. Every statute tends to represent compromises because the process of accommodating conflicts of group interests is one of deliberation and consent. The legislative vote on any issue tends to represent the composition of strength, i.e., the balance of power, among the contending groups at the moment of voting . . . Administrative agencies of the regulatory kind are established to carry out the terms of the treaties that the legislators have negotiated and ratified . . . The judiciary, like the civilian bureaucracy, is one of the instrumentalities for the administration of the agreed rules.
>
> (Latham 1965, pp. 35-6, 38-9)

Group theory is not without its detractors. Yeakey summarises some of the concerns and reservations about group theory:

> Group theory, while exaggerating the importance of groups, understates the independent and coercive role that key public and private individuals play in the policy process. And it is misleading to explain politics in terms of such a unicausal, reductionist explanation without giving attention to the other factors, ideas, and institutions that impact upon policymaking.
>
> (Yeakey 1983, p. 268)

Anderson (1979) adds to this that many 'groups' have been created by public policy, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, 'public officials . . . may acquire a stake in particular programs and act as an interest group in support of their continuance' (p. 18). While these criticisms of group theory are substantial, we would call attention to some even more fundamental issues, which become evident when we examine the way that 'policy' is defined from a group-theory perspective. Latham (1956) states that 'what may be called public policy is actually the

equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to tip in their favor' (Latham 1956, p. 259, cited in Dye 1978, p. 24).

In spite of rhetoric such as 'group struggle', the centrality of the concept 'equilibrium' is telling of the underlying functionalist orientation and systems metaphor upon which group theory rests. The literature on systems theory indicates two predominant uses of the concept 'equilibrium'. The first, mechanical equilibrium, comes to us from the physical sciences through the sociology of Vilfredo Pareto around the First World War. The second, organic equilibrium, or homeostasis, derives from the biological sciences and has undergone sociological translation in the work of Herbert Spencer in the 1870s, and Emile Durkheim in the 1890s. These two types of equilibrium later became the basis of 'closed' and 'open' systems as the biologist von Bertalanffy (1950) was to use the terms in laying the groundwork for a general systems theory. As we examine the model of group theory shown in Figure 5, we need no particular analytical prowess to see the mechanical, closed-system functionalism underpinning this point of view.

Figure 5. A model of group theory



Thomas R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, 4th Ed. 1981, p. 27. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Group theory, while differing in specific[illegible]one the less shares a common functionalist set of assumptions with rational-comprehensive theory, incrementalism, and political systems theory. As we turn next to elite theory we find a perspective that challenges the workings of policy making in democratic and pluralistic societies suggested by group theory.

Elite theory

Elite theory had its origins in the same era that the policy sciences and systems theory were emerging. The foundation of an elite theory of policy determination was laid by Hunter (1953) in an analysis of the community power structure in Atlanta, Georgia. Here Hunter found power to be concentrated in the hands of an elite few, and wielded in a wide range of community affairs. Hunter's empirical work was complemented and expanded upon in the theoretical writings of C. W. Mills. Challenging the

popular Parsonian conception of a social system's 'value orientation' and 'normative structure', Mills' (1959) position was that such concepts were disguised 'symbols of legitimation' and subtle modes of domination (p. 46). Further, Mills saw the use of power as a means to hold together a social arrangement prone to disintegration. What has come to be called the 'elitist-pluralist controversy' began with a refutation of the notion of a power elite by Robert Dahl (1958) and empirical research into decision making in New Haven, Connecticut (Dahl 1961).

The basic position taken by adherents to pluralism (as discussed in B. Smith 1976, pp. 78–9) contains an acknowledgement that inequality exists, but also a contention that it is a random artifact of the political process and does not consistently favour any one social group or class. In a democratic society, individual political weakness is seen to be compensated for by the aggregate articulation of demands. Further, power is believed to be distributed among many groups and a balance of power to be achieved in the inter-group competition for resources. The State, according to the pluralist position, assumes a neutral role in reconciling different interests, and ensures that no single interest predominates in the long run. While recognising the presence of powerful interests, the composition of elite groups is seen to be fluid and subject to meritocratic principles of membership. Finally, pluralism holds that because of both the limits of rationality and the complexity of resolving multiple interests, policy change will take place in the form of marginal adjustments to existing policy.

The pluralist view is very clearly related to both group theory and incrementalism. Pluralism represents what Dye (1978) suggests may be 'the myth rather than the reality of American democracy' (p. 25). Dye himself is a proponent of elite theory and we refer to his work (Dye & Zeigler 1978) to examine the basic tenets of elite theory, which are stated as follows:

1. Society is divided into the few who have power and the many who do not. Only a small number of persons allocate values for society; the masses do not decide public policy.
2. The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society.
3. The movement of nonelites to elite positions must be slow and continuous if stability is to be maintained and revolution avoided. Only nonelites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to governing circles.
4. Elites share consensus on the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system. They disagree only on a narrow range of issues.
5. Public policy does not reflect demands of masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.
6. Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses. Elites influence masses more than masses influence elites.

(Dye & Zeigler 1978, pp. 6–7)

As we look closely at elite theory, we find a position that, of those we have reviewed, aligns most closely to the alternative perspective that we shall develop later. However, we would suggest that elite theory has not totally escaped the hold of functionalism. We shall now draw attention

to some of the internal contradictions and vestiges of functionalism in elite theory.

Firstly, elite theory adheres simultaneously to objectivist and subjectivist assumptions about the nature of social reality. Concepts like 'social system' and 'elite' are not taken as ontologically problematic, but rather are viewed as concrete realities existing independently of those who perceive them. At the same time, Dye makes a number of statements suggestive of a socially constructed and subjective reality. For example:

> Change and innovations in public policy come about as a result of redefinitions by elites of their own values.
>
> (Dye 1978, p. 26)

> For the most part these 'democratic' institutions . . . are important only for their symbolic value.
>
> (Dye 1978, p. 27)

Secondly, elite theory primarily represents a sociology of regulation rather than radical change. It restricts itself to explaining 'what is' rather than 'what might be'. Further, its incrementalism is not unlike Lindblom's position, and is an improvement only to the extent that elite theory helps explain the stability of public policy and broader social arrangements.

We note critically, but not harshly, the inconsistencies in elite theory; it makes a significant contribution towards identifying the kinds of issues capable of unfettering policy analysis from the shackles of functionalism. We hope to loosen these ties even further in our discussion of critical policy theory, which we take up later.

Functionalism, systems theory, and the problem of change

The preceding analysis of five typical policy theories has served to illustrate both their substantive content and their paradigmatic roots. Through this analysis we have argued that functionalism in general and systems analysis in particular constitute the underlying unity of the perspectives that guide the policy analyst. Our task now is to show how these 'ways of seeing' are fundamentally misleading.

Firstly, we must recognise that policy is about *values*. Our position is that an objectivist orientation to values is misguided. Any theory that grants a concrete and real status to values errs ontologically. Likewise, to submit that a positivist epistemology is an appropriate way of knowing values is to believe that fact and value are separate, and that the analyst's values can be suspended. In addition, carrying deterministic assumptions about human nature into the policy arena is to deny the freedom, dignity, and potentiality of the individual. Worse yet, subscribing to determinism is to serve as an accomplice to social engineers who seek to control human behaviour by concocting policies that manipulate the social and physical environment. Furthermore, if one assumes that values can be analysed through nomothetic methods, one fails to recognise who posed the questions and hypotheses; who constructed the questionnaire, survey, or personality test; and who chose the statistics that would arbitrate the significance of the values. Whose values are measured? Not the subject's!

Secondly, in our view policy is about *change*. Policies (in all but rare

instances) are made in order to improve some existing condition or prevent some potential problem. Objectivist social science is restricted to describing 'what is', albeit in a manner in which bias is unacknowledged. What 'might' or 'ought' to be is completely out of the realm of objective science (though we should note that often prescriptive liberties are taken that go well beyond scientific canons). Furthermore, if policy is about change, as we contend it is, then the sociology of regulation is inadequate for understanding the possibilities for real change. If one assumes that social arrangements are stable and orderly, and that equilibrium (the status quo) is a natural and necessary state, then the policy analyst is likely to view social change pathologically, and the persons involved as deviant. And where such deviancy occurs, the forces that arise to restore the social 'steady state' are too easily viewed as a part of a natural order. Furthermore, if one subscribes to an equilibrium metaphor, policy analysis becomes an activity oriented to discovering these equilibrating forces. In these ways legitimacy is bestowed upon processes that, we shall soon argue, are essentially coercive and not at all a part of a natural scheme. Thus possibilities of reform and meaningful and significant social change are severely constrained by such a conservative predisposition. The *objectivist* assumptions about the nature of science, and the *regulation* assumptions about the nature of society, which combine in the functionalist paradigm, render the policy theories based within this paradigm inadequate at best and harmful at worst.

Systems theory embodies all of the general problems of the functionalist paradigm plus many unique to itself. In concluding this section we would like to address some of these. To begin, Hoos (1972) is troubled by the very meaning of 'system'. She enumerates fifteen definitions, and goes on to say:

> Proponents of the systems approach, for all their claims to precision, have so far neglected to specify which of the above definitions they espouse. To judge by an almost universal predilection for the plural form, that is, the *systems* approach, one can only surmise that, in their ecumenism, they embrace all meanings . . . Lack of firm definition leads persons engaged in systems analysis to indulge in a kind of solipsismal virtuosity which, contrary to the tenets of scientific method, generally yields irreproducible results. So reified and ratified, the system is what they say it is, what they conceive it to be. This they study; this they manipulate according to the rules they have set. In this way, other systems are perforce delimited, for they can only interface with, impinge upon, interact with, but never, therefore, be identical with or part of the first system.
>
> (Hoos 1972, p. 17)

Complementing the criticism about the vagueness of the term 'system' is the fundamental question of whether systems theory is actually a theory. Rapoport (1968), a proponent of systems analysis, argues that systems theory 'is best described not as a theory in the sense that this word is used in science but, rather, as a program or a direction in the contemporary philosophy of science' (p. 452). Our own preference is to think of 'systems' as a metaphor. Indeed it has descended lineally from biology, and in the modern era has been most strongly influenced by von Bertalanffy and his influential work 'An outline of general systems theory' (1950). Hoos (1972) states some of the later reflections of the man credited

with founding the modern-day systems approach. Von Bertalanffy's thoughts, some two decades after his classic writings were published, contain perhaps the most poignant criticisms of all:

> Bertalanffy has tempered his endorsement of the systems approach by a few thoughtful caveats. He warns against 'incautious expansion to fields for which its concepts are not made'; dangers of distortion of reality through 'forcible imposition' of mathematical models; detriment to scientific progress of a return to 'vague analogies'. But the warnings are too general to serve as useful guidelines and too weak to stem the flood of enthusiasm for quantitative methods and the systems approach. By its attribute of being all things to all people, the methodology has provided a vehicle for all who would ride. Perhaps not to so complete a *reductio ad ultimum* as the *Report from Iron Mountain* [1967] but far along the road to hastening such negative utopianism as Huxley's *Brave New World* and Orwell's *1984*, von Bertalanffy saw the system orientation as serving and hastening 'the process of mechanization, automation, and devaluation of man'.
>
> (Hoos 1972, pp. 40–1)

Systems theory, modelled as it is after the natural sciences, willingly embraces the distinction between theory and practice and has spawned a whole flurry of policy decision-assisting technologies. Grouping broadly under the rubric 'Management-Information Systems' (MIS), these include Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT), Management by Objectives (MBO), Social Indicators (SI), Planning Program Budgeting Systems (PPBS), and Cost-Benefit Analysis. In a chapter titled 'Policy analysis is what information systems are not', Wildavsky (1979) states some of the general problems with the technical application of systems theory:

> Objectives are kept vague and multiple to expand the range within which observed behavior fits. Goal substitution takes place as the consequences actually caused by programs (say an increase in client's self-esteem) replace the objectives originally sought. Displacement of goals becomes the norm as an organization seeks to make the variables it can control—its own efforts and processes—the objectives against which it is measured. This is how organizations come to justify error instead of creating knowledge. On all sides theoretical requirements are abandoned, by considering inputs or outputs alone, until there seems to be no error (and hence no truth), and it is impossible to learn from experience.
>
> Social indicators assume the prior existence of a model of society without which SI's are meaningless. Managing by objectives alone (MBO) is better seen as a misguided effort to violate an analytic theorem—treating objectives apart from resources—than as a mode of analysis. The trouble with experts is not only that they may not know what they ought to know, but that they may pretend to know things that are actually unknown. Routines and rote formulas, such as PERT, risk becoming the problem for which they were supposed to be the solution. Instead of discovering critical paths, they assume them, becoming the chief obstacle to undertaking a quest everyone now believes is over. Swallowing one's own entrails is not a recommended method of nourishment.
>
> The question never is whether a theory is there (it always is), but whether it is only a veneer to mask error or an actual hypothesis whose testing uncovers error.
>
> (Wildavsky 1979, p. 35)

Management information systems have widespread support in educational institutions. In a passage reminiscent of Callahan's (1962)

Education and the Cult of Efficiency, Hoos (1972) calls attention to some of the consequences of the systems approach in the schools:

> In the field of education, cost-benefit analysis and program budgeting pass for the new look in planning. Public school administrators, who traditionally have been the subject of criticism and the object of calumny for what they have and have not done, have long occupied a low position on the professional totem pole. Their activities and 'inventory' always highly visible, they have long been vulnerable to attack. It is small wonder that they have been attracted by the polemics about 'sophisticated' and 'systematic' tools. Cowed into believing that their ways are inefficient, that establishment of and adherence to 'performance standards' will endear them to legislative budget-makers and the public at large, school administrators have become easy prey to the persuasive propaganda. Professional planning societies' meetings and journals are now replete with technical refinements on educational models; input-output analyses of school systems abound. Many of them are in essence 'technical' explorations of conventional wisdom with considerable emphasis on a few knowns, elaborate statement of limitations and margins for error, tables and appendixes in abundance—all in evidence of doggedly persistent application of the method.
>
> The imposition of program budgeting has become the prime cause for the transformation of the educational establishment into a counting house, where busy number work has replaced the once-honored thinking cap. Required to justify their activities and, possibly, their very existence in terms of objectives achieved, public school officials are engaged in cost-benefit juggling which will affect the course of public education for years to come. In this endeavor, they are aided by grants from the federal government as well as from private foundations, the provision being 'to improve planning and budgetary procedures', and abetted by the 'intellectual carpetbaggers', always game to apply their 'technical expertness' to green fields.
>
> (Hoos 1972, p. 149)

We have by no means exhausted all the kinds of problems brought about by technical applications of systems theory. As our attention now turns to the radical-humanist paradigm, we shall see that many of these problems have become central foci of criticism. Indeed they provide justification for our development of a new perspective in educational policy analysis.

Radical humanism and critical theory as reformation

Our analysis of theories of policy and decision making has drawn considerable attention to the functionalist paradigm. At this juncture we focus attention on the radical-humanist paradigm and a set of assumptions about science and society in complete opposition to those that prevail in functionalism. In so doing, we will have very little to say about the interpretive and radical-structuralist perspectives. We base our reservation about the appropriateness of these paradigms upon the elements each shares with functionalism. In the case of the interpretive paradigm, its regulatory assumptions and concern for understanding 'what is' are seen as inadequate in a policy arena that is oriented to 'what ought to be'. The radical-structuralist paradigm is deficient, we believe, because of its positivistic determinism and disregard for subjectivity and human consciousness. Extended discussion of these issues may be found in Fay (1975), Bernstein (1978), Burrell & Morgan (1979), and Held (1980).

The origins of critical theory are found in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*,

published in 1781, and in the tradition of German idealism that followed. Critical theory in its modern forms evolved during the 1920s and 1930s, all but faded into obscurity during the 1940s, and then resurfaced in the post-war era. In recent years, critical theory has been the focus of much interest and controversy in academic circles around the world. Unlike the theories of policy determination that we reviewed earlier, the scope of critical theory is considerably broader, encompassing the realms of social philosophy, theory, and practice, and embracing substantive concerns ranging from the economic system to depth psychology. Rather than being a totally unified perspective, the tenets of critical theory come to us in several schools of thought, notably via Antonio Gramsci in Italy, Georg Lukacs in Hungary, and especially through the work of a group of German scholars collectively known as the Frankfurt School. Prominent among this group were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Eric Fromm. The work of Jurgen Habermas, though removed in time from the early Frankfurt School, also stems from this tradition. While important distinctions can be made between the outlooks within and between these schools of thought, we have chosen to downplay these differences here, and instead focus our attention on the principles generally held by critical theorists, while also highlighting insights and contributions of specific authors. In this regard, our account of critical theory should not be considered comprehensive or complete. In calling the reader's attention to selected features of critical theory, we hope to lay the groundwork for a critical educational policy analysis, which we shall propose later.

The concept of 'critique' is central to critical theory. As Connerton (1976) observes, there are two meanings of the term. According to the first, critique 'denotes reflection on the *conditions* of possible knowledge: on the potential abilities of human beings possessing the faculties of knowing, speaking and acting' (p. 17). The second meaning of critique pertains to 'reflection on a system of *constraints* which are humanly produced: distorting pressures to which individuals, or a group of individuals, or the human race as a whole, succumb in their process of self-formation' (Connerton 1976, p. 18). The main body of writings in the critical-theory tradition, then, centres around knowledge, and how it liberates or constrains human potential. The Frankfurt School's criticism of knowledge and truth claims were cast in a broad context within a subjectivist perspective, as Held (1980) describes:

> Each of the critical theorists maintained that although all knowledge is historically conditioned, truth claims can be rationally adjudicated independently of immediate social (e.g. class) interests. They defended the possibility of an independent moment of criticism. They also all attempted to justify critical theory on a non-objectivistic and materialistic foundation. The extension and development of the notion of critique, from a concern with the conditions and limits of reason and knowledge (Kant), to a reflection on the emergence of spirit (Hegel), and then to a focus on specific historical forms—capitalism, the exchange process (Marx)—was furthered in the work of the Frankfurt theorists and Habermas. They sought to develop a critical perspective in the discussion of all social practices.
>
> (Held 1980, pp. 15-6)

While preserving some facets of German idealism, critical theory also rejected or modified positions held by Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Particularly

notable is the flat refusal to accept the assumption of an ordered and materially determined pattern of social development characteristic of Marx's later works:

> There can be no formula which lays down once and for all the relationship between the individual, society and nature. Though history cannot be seen as a uniform unfolding of human nature, the opposite fatalistic formula that the course of events is dominated by necessity independent of Man is equally naive.
>
> (Horkheimer 1968, cited in Held 1980, p. 24)

The critical theorist carries an unwavering commitment to changing the human condition. The way this is done, as Geuss (1981) indicates, is through self-conscious enlightenment:

> A critical theory is a very complicated conceptual object; it is addressed to a particular group of agents in a particular society and aims at being their 'self-consciousness' in a process of successful emancipation and enlightenment. A process of emancipation and enlightenment is a transition from an initial state of bondage, delusion, and frustration to a final state of freedom, knowledge, and satisfaction.
>
> (Geuss 1981, p. 76)

Returning to our earlier discussion of Burrell & Morgan's (1979) analysis of paradigms, we note that the subjectivist assumptions about social reality, and the sociology of radical change, are represented in the critical theorists' approach. Therefore we may locate critical theory outside the functionalist paradigm, and squarely in the paradigm labelled 'radical humanist'. As we go on to explore more substantive aspects of critical theory, we shall encounter more evidence of the assumptions of radical humanism.

A precise definition of critical theory is elusive. The critical theory approach is at once historical and at the same time anchored in the subjective experiences of the moment. It strives both to understand and reveal the workings of the broad political, economic, social, and cultural processes, and to explore the inner sanctums of human consciousness where the meanings of social life are constructed. The overarching aim of critical theory is human emancipation. This is to be accomplished by first recognising the sources of domination and repression that are obliviously accepted in daily life. Once human consciousness is freed from distorted perception, courses of action to achieve a meaningful and fulfilling life may be charted by those whose lives are constrained. In contrast to traditional theories, which claim to be objective and neutral, critical theory is manifestly political, with an a priori commitment to take sides with the oppressed and those whose interests are contravened by external sources of domination, and masked by internal misperceptions of this state. Critical theorists flatly reject any notion that theory should guide practice, seeing this as yet another form of domination. Instead, change comes about as one's awareness of the limitations and constraints upon human potential are clearly perceived.

This brief thumbnail sketch of critical theory belies the sophistication and complexity of the analysis of the individual and society developed by critical theorists over the last six decades. We would like to explore now in greater detail some of the central themes we have already touched upon, and which will later be germane to our reformulation of educational

policy analysis. We present this discussion in subsections, which correspond to the following topics: *critique of positivistic science*; *critique of technical rationality*; *domination and the ruling class*; and *consciousness, communication, and emancipation.*

Critique of positivistic science

Logical positivism is an outgrowth of the Age of Enlightenment and the notable advances in the physical sciences, as witnessed in the works of Galileo and Newton. Much of the impetus for the development of critical theory came from the problems of positivism as it gained wide currency in the social sciences. We may begin to grasp some of these concerns in Adorno's (1957) reservations:

> The widely used empirical technique of operational or instrumental definition, which delimits a category such as 'conservatism' by attaching numerical values to questions posed within the context of the survey itself, places a seal of approval on the primacy of the method over the subject-matter and on the arbitrary way in which the scientific procedure has been devised. The technique sets out to investigate an object with an instrument which, through its own construction, decides in advance just what that object is: a simple case of circularity. The refusal, for reasons of scientific integrity, to work with any concepts other than clear and unambiguous ones, becomes a pretext for putting the interests of a self-legitimizing research industry before those of the subject-matter itself. With an arrogance born of ignorance the objections of classical philosophy to the practice of definition are consigned to oblivion; what that philosophy banished as a remnant of scholasticism is still being perpetuated by unreflecting individual sciences in the name of scientific exactitude. As soon as the almost inevitable extrapolation is made from the instrumentally defined concepts to those of conventional usage, research becomes guilty of that very contamination which through its definitions it sought to eradicate.
>
> (Adorno 1957, pp. 242–3)

The problems with positivism, as critical theorists recognise, go well beyond those expressed in the foregoing passage. The idea of an equivalence of inanimate objects and human subjects is unacceptable, and has led, as critical theorists contend, to social phenomena being treated as but another category of objects. Lukacs (1971) has used the term 'reification' to characterise this concrete ontology, which the positivist assumes exists independently of the scientist or subject. Subjectivity and the social construction of meaning have no place in the positivist pursuit of scientific rigour. In this view 'what is' is what the scientist can reify and manipulate mathematically. Statistics become the ultimate extension of rationality and the final arbiter of truth. Positivism is viewed from within the critical-theory camp as an ideology, with a pervasive and repressive effect in modern Western society. We shall next examine some of these consequences.

Critique of technical rationality

Whereas critical theory is predicated upon understanding the human condition and catalysing emancipation from sources of oppression, the orientation of functionalism in general and positivism in particular is prediction and control. In Francis Bacon's exaltation of scientific method,

there was a clear awareness of the potential for human domination over nature ('*imperium hominis*'), which carried over into the social sciences as the methods of physics were increasingly emulated. The theory–practice dualism that underwrites the disciplines of physics and engineering was embraced by social scientists uncritically. Social problems, as a result, were too easily viewed as technical problems in need of technical solutions. As we reflect back upon such policy and decision-assisting techniques as PPBS, PERT, MBO, etc., we can readily see how this technical approach has taken hold of the policy field. Wirth (1966) phrased the dangers of such a vision metaphorically when he pronounced 'if the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail' (p. x). So too, if technical rationality dominates one's orientation to social and educational problems, the solutions to these difficulties are seen as achievable only by policies containing straight doses of technical rationality.

Technical rationality, the offspring of positivism, is a central target of the critique of society advanced by critical theorists. The work of Marcuse, particularly *One Dimensional Man* (Marcuse 1968), illustrates the repressive effects of this instrumental vision of means and ends:

> We live and die rationally and productively. We know that destruction is the price of progress as death is the price of life, that renunciation and toil are the prerequisites for gratification and joy, that business must go on, and that the alternatives are Utopian. This ideology belongs to the established societal apparatus; it is a requisite for its continuous functioning and part of its rationality . . .
>
> Society reproduced itself in a growing technical ensemble of things and relations which included the technical utilization of men—in other words, the struggle for existence and the exploitation of man and nature became ever more scientific and rational. The double meaning of 'rationalization' is relevant in this context. Scientific management and scientific division of labour vastly increased the productivity of the economic, political, and cultural enterprise. Result: the higher standard of living. At the same time and on the same ground, this rational enterprise produced a pattern of mind and behaviour which justified and absolved even the most destructive and oppressive features of the enterprise. Scientific-technical rationality and manipulation are welded together into new forms of social control. Can one rest content with the assumption that this unscientific outcome is the result of a specific societal *application* of science? I think that the general direction in which it came to be applied was inherent in pure science even where no practical purposes were intended, and that the point can be identified where theoretical Reason turns into social practice.
>
> (Marcuse 1968, p. 121)

Because of reified conceptions of social 'objects' and utilitarian notions of means and ends, persons are readily subjugated to organisational goals, which, in capitalist societies, means profit. The legitimating rhetoric of efficiency and effectiveness hovers as a smoke-screen over the alienation and repression of workers, who produce this profit.

Domination and the ruling class

Critical theorists contend that positivist ideology and technical rationality support a system of domination that is firmly rooted in the social and economic infrastructure of modern capitalist societies. Though taking

exception to Marx's later economic determinism, critical theorists were in agreement with Marx's conclusion that the system of production and distribution of commodities serves the interests of a few to the disadvantage of the many. Writing during the Great Depression, Horkheimer stated:

> Unemployment, economic crises, militarization, terrorist regimes—in a word, the whole condition of the masses—are not due to limited technological possibilities, as might have been the case in earlier periods, but to the circumstances of production . . .
>
> Production is not geared to the life of the whole community [to the common interest] while heeding also the claims of individuals; it is geared to the power-backed claims of individuals while being hardly concerned with the life of the community. This is the inevitable result, under the present property order, of the principle that it is sufficient for individuals to look out for themselves.
>
> (Horkheimer 1972, p. 213, cited in Held 1980, p. 43)

These concerns of Horkheimer relate primarily to material conditions. But as all critical theorists are aware, the ramifications of the economic system extend into the realm of social relations and individual consciousness as well. The obsession with productivity and profit produces tensions and conflicts that threaten the interests of capital. While in earlier eras the maintenance of stability in the industrial sector was accomplished through coercive means, the forms of subjugation and repression have become increasingly subtle in the modern era. The task of the critical theorist, then, is to analyse and reveal these covert ways in which the social and economic order is preserved. Over the decades the focus of criticism has been wide-ranging, including the legal system, language, ideology, and culture. The tenor of these analyses can be seen in Horkheimer & Adorno's (1972) assessment of the 'culture industry':

> Under monopoly all mass culture is identical, and the lines of its artificial framework begin to show through. The people at the top are no longer so interested in concealing monopoly: as its violence becomes more open, so its power grows. Movies and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce. They call themselves industries; and when their directors' incomes are published, any doubt about the social utility of the finished products is removed.
>
> (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, p. 121)

While helping to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few, the culture industry also shapes and moulds the needs and values of consumers of culture. This is particularly evident in the realm of advertising:

> The most intimate reactions of human beings have been so thoroughly reified that the idea of anything specific to themselves now persists only as an utterly abstract notion: personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth and freedom from body odor and emotions. The triumph of advertising in the culture industry is that consumers feel compelled to buy and use its products even though they see through them.
>
> (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, p. 167)

The kind of analysis that the critical theorist renders would draw attention to the power and control exerted by persons like advertising executives and movie moguls. A critical analysis would unveil the interests served in the use of this power, and reveal how human consciousness is

numbed and distorted in a way that perpetuates this dominance. Moreover, critical theory goes beyond this unmasking function, as we shall next show.

Consciousness, communication, and emancipation

From the perspective of critical theory, repression not only emanates from the socio-economic sphere, but also is mediated by human consciousness. Hence, it is necessary to explore the internal and subjective state of human existence alongside of the external and material world. The exploration of the subjective construction of reality developed along two lines. The first, evident in the work of Marcuse (1955), probed into the nature of the psyche from the framework of Freud's depth psychology. The second stream into human consciousness was developed by Habermas through his analysis of language and communication. We shall briefly consider each of these.

Freud saw the basic tension between the individual and society in the conflict between the 'pleasure principle' and the 'reality principle'. For Freud, the natural tendency of humans towards sensual gratification must be curbed in the interest of personal survival and social stability. Marcuse, however, noted that while the reality principle was germane in times of scarcity, in the abundance of modern industrial society it is but an anachronistic vestige of the past. Yet postponement of gratification and repression of instincts continues none the less. Marcuse used the term 'surplus repression' to characterise this and viewed it as sustaining the power and profitability of the economic system. About Marcuse's insight into the external and internal origins of domination, Giroux (1983) adds:

> Domination in this sense is *twice* historical: first, it is rooted in the historically developed socio-economic conditions of a given society; second, it is rooted in the sedimented history or personality structure of individuals. In speaking of domination as a psychological as well as a political phenomenon, Marcuse (1955, 1970) did not give a blank cheque to wholesale gratification. On the contrary, he agreed with Freud that some forms of repression were generally necessary. What he objected to was the unnecessary repression that was embodied in the ethos and social practices that characterised social institutions such as the school, workplace and family. For Marcuse, the most penetrating marks of social repression are generated in the inner history of individuals, in the 'needs, satisfactions, and values which reproduce the servitude of human existence' (Marcuse 1964, p. 6). As such, needs are mediated and reinforced through the patterns and social routines of everyday life, and the 'false' needs that perpetuate toil, misery and aggressiveness become anchored in the personality structure as second nature. That is, the historical character of such needs is 'forgotten' and they become reduced to patterns of habit.
>
> (Giroux 1983, p. 28)

The second approach to understanding how human consciousness is constrained is to be found in Habermas's (1970a, 1970b) theory of communicative competence. For Habermas, the spread of technical rationality not only supports elite power through the production system, it has also infected human thought and communication. In Habermas's view, 'the problem of language has replaced the traditional problem of consciousness' (McCarthy 1976, p. 471). Habermas focused attention on

what he termed 'distorted communication', which occurs when apparent consensus is reached in discourse involving unequal, or asymmetrical, power between parties. The 'ideal speech situation' is one in which genuine consensus is achieved and the communication proceeds symmetrically among equals. Habermas contends that 'work', a by-product of modern capitalism, illustrates an important context where distorted communication occurs. 'Interaction', the pre-capitalist pattern where labour was integrated into the life fabric of personal relations, provides a historical prototype of the ideal speech situation. The conditions of ideal communication, Habermas argues, are one and the same as the conditions for an ideal form of life more generally. Habermas's analysis of communication features four categories of speech acts: communicative, constative, representative, and regulative. As McCarthy (1976) describes the ideal requirements of each of these, we may see not only how distorted communication is to be avoided, but how human consciousness is to be emancipated from dominance:

1. All potential participants must have the same chance to employ *communicative* speech acts so that they can at any time initiate and perpetuate a discourse.
2. All participants must have the same chance to employ *constative* speech acts, that is to put forward or call into question, to ground or refute statements, explanations, interpretations and justifications, so that in the long run no opinion remains exempt from consideration and criticism
3. To discourse are admitted only speakers who have, as actors, the same chance to employ *representative* speech acts, to express their attitudes, feelings, intentions, etc., so that the participants are truthful or sincere in their relation to themselves and can make their 'inner nature' transparent to others.
4. To discourse are admitted only speakers who have, as actors, the same chance to employ *regulative* speech acts, to command and to oppose, to permit and to forbid, etc., so that privileges in the sense of one-sidedly binding norms are excluded and the formal equality of chances to initiate discourse can in fact be practised.

(McCarthy 1976, p. 484)

In Habermas's view, truth can only be determined when these conditions of ideal speech and interaction are operating. Likewise, ' "truth" cannot be analysed independently of "freedom" and "justice" ' (McCarthy 1976 p. 485). In formulating his position of communicative competence, Habermas has taken a major step in rejoining fact and value, thought and action, means and ends, subject and object, and theory and practice—false dualisms sundered by the technical rationality of positivism. 'Praxis' is the concept used by critical theorists to express this unity.

Mindful of Habermas's concept of ideal speech and interaction, we may briefly summarise the approach of the critical theorist in Fay's (1975) words:

> [Critical theory] names the people for whom it is directed; it analyses their suffering; it offers enlightenment to them about what their real needs and wants are; it demonstrates to them in what way their ideas about themselves are false, and at the same time extracts from these false ideas implicit truths about them; it points to those inherently contradictory social conditions which both engendered specific needs and make it impossible for them to

> be satisfied; it reveals the mechanisms in terms of which this process of repression operates; and, in the light of changing social conditions which it describes, it offers a mode of activity by which they can intervene in and change the social processes which are thwarting to them. A critical theory arises out of the problems of everyday life, and is constructed with an eye towards solving them.
>
> (Fay 1975, p. 109)

To this point we have addressed a number of key themes contained in the literature of critical social science. We acknowledge the cursory and selective nature of this discussion, but hope to have provided sufficient treatment of the topic so that the reader may assess the adequacy of our contention that a critical approach to educational policy analysis is preferable to the functionalist positivism that dominates the field at present. We now consider some of the specifics of this critical alternative.

Prologue to a critical analysis of educational policy

Before constructing our final argument, it might be well to review some of the points we have made so far. We began this monograph by noting dissension in the academic community about such fundamental concepts as 'policy' and 'policy analysis', and about what constitutes the proper scope and range of phenomena on which the policy analyst should focus attention. Next, we distanced ourselves from the particulars of policy analysis and entertained a metatheoretical discussion of organisational paradigms and considered a wide range of assumptions that a researcher might hold in approaching the subject of policy. From this paradigmatic basis, we next turned our attention to five theories that appear with some frequency in the literature of education and the policy sciences. Our analysis of these theories has shown that each is concerned primarily with the narrow dimension of policy determination, and all conspicuously lack any educational terms of reference. Further, our analysis indicated that the theoretical orientation to policy is overwhelmingly based upon the assumptions of the functionalist paradigm and is unduly influenced by systems analysis. We argued that functionalism and systems theory are inappropriate perspectives for the analysis of educational policy because their assumptions are inherently inimical to understanding or acting upon the educational problems that policies are meant to remedy. In the previous section, we laid the groundwork for a critical theory of policy analysis, and the task we take up in these concluding remarks is to consider the educational implications of such a perspective and to suggest how a critical analysis of educational policy might proceed.

Putting education into 'educational' policy analysis

While the absence of education from educational policy analysis may be understandable, it cannot be tolerated. To engage in the wholesale purchase of general theories of policy is to accept the assumption that immutable principles govern policy making in educational organisations that equate with those in any other organisational context. Worse yet, this is to legitimate as 'natural' the kind of rationality that has constrained our whole approach to educational problems, if not caused many of them in the first place (Hoos 1972; Wise 1977). Furthermore, leaving education

out of educational policy analysis is to gloss over and trivialise the unique part played by schools in shaping the future of children and society. As Bates (1982) notes, 'educational organisations, above all, are committed to the maintenance, transmission and re-creation of culture. Culture is, in fact, the prime resource of educational practice' (p. 9). Viewed in this way, schools are concerned with two functions in the socialisation of children, which may be distinguished on the basis of 'fact' and 'meaning':

> The beliefs, languages, rituals, knowledge, conventions, courtesies and artifacts—in short the cultural baggage of any group, *are the resources from which the individual and social identities are constructed.* They provide the framework upon which the individual constructs his understanding of the world and of himself. Part of this cultural baggage is factual. It is empirical, descriptive and objective. Another part of this cultural baggage, perhaps the greater part, is *mythical.* It is concerned not with facts but with *meaning.* That is, the interpretative and prescriptive rules which provide the basis for understanding and action.
>
> (Bates 1982, p. 10, emphasis added)

Until fairly recently, neither the way in which schools organised knowledge and meaning, nor the social consequences of these constructions were treated problematically. In the late 1960s and early 1970s this began to change. The widely accepted belief that success and failure in schools were impartially arbitrated by meritocratic principles was increasingly seen as a myth. Rather than serving as a vehicle for social mobility, schools were seen to lock in place a social order that favoured a dominant elite. Across the world, scholarly inquiry turned critical attention to the articulation between schools and the broader society. In the two subsections that follow, we will examine some of the insights gleaned in these studies.

The schools' message systems

The nature of knowledge and how it is controlled by schools has received considerable attention by a community of scholars adhering to a 'new sociology of education' (see Bates 1978, 1980a, 1981a, 1981b). Basil Bernstein was one of the early and most influential contributors to this new perspective. Bernstein's (1971) analysis of the knowledge-control nexus led him to see this as mediated by three message systems in the school: pedagogy, curriculum, and evaluation. As the author describes them:

> Formal educational knowledge can be considered to be realized through three message systems: curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. Curriculum defines what counts as valid knowledge, pedagogy defines what counts as a valid transmission of knowledge, and evaluation defines what counts as a valid realization of this knowledge on the part of the taught.
>
> (Bernstein 1971, p. 47)

We find Bernstein's notion of message systems to be particularly useful in illuminating the relationship between schools and society. While considerable attention has been given to each of these message systems in the literature, a systematic and thorough review of these efforts is beyond the scope of this monograph. None the less, we would like to draw attention to some of the recent thinking about curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation.

Michael Young's (1971) seminal work on the *curriculum* message system focused on the 'selection and organization of knowledge by those in

positions of power' (p. 31). Of particular significance to Young was the stratification of knowledge:

> If knowledge is highly stratified there will be a clear distinction between what is taken to count as knowledge, and what is not, on the basis of which processes of selection and exclusion for curricula will take place. It would follow that this type of curricular organization presupposes and serves to legitimate a rigid hierarchy between teacher and taught, for if not, some access to control by the pupils would be implied, and thus the processes of exclusion and selection would become open for modification and change . . . A further point is that access to control by pupils or students implies that alternative definitions of knowledge are available to them.
>
> (M. Young 1971, p. 36)

Much of Young's subsequent work has been devoted to understanding the nature of high-status knowledge—particularly science (M. Young 1974, 1975, 1976). A continuing theme in these analyses is the way science is construed as an activity far removed from everyday life, and as such is largely an exercise in alienation. Others have examined knowledge and control in the curriculum message system. These include Bernstein's (1971) analysis of 'classification' and Apple's (1979) ideological critique of curriculum.

Pedagogy, the second message system, has been another topic examined in relation to knowledge and broader social arrangements. Bernstein's (1971) concept of 'framing' specifically addresses the teacher-learner relationship: 'frame refers to the degree of control teacher and pupil possess over the selection, organization and pacing of the knowledge transmitted and received in the pedagogical relationship' (Bernstein 1971, p. 50).

Bernstein proposes a highly complex analytical scheme in which framing is to be viewed in tandem with the classification of curricular subjects in terms of how discrete or blurred are the boundaries that separate them. Framing and classification are further integrated into two 'knowledge codes'. An 'integrated code' is indicated by weak classification and framing. A 'collection code' is marked by strong classification and framing. Descending from the abstract to the very specific, Bernstein identifies the social effects of knowledge and control eventuating from a collection code:

> I suggest that the frames of the collection code, very early in the child's life, socialize him into knowledge frames which discourage connections with everyday realities, or that there is a highly selective screening of the connection. Through such socialization, the pupil soon learns what of the outside may be brought into the pedagogical frame. Such framing also makes of educational knowledge something not ordinary or mundane, but something esoteric which gives a special significance to those who possess it. I suggest that when this frame is relaxed to include everyday realities, it is often and sometimes validly, not simply for the transmission of educational knowledge, but for purposes of social control of forms of deviancy. The weakening of this frame occurs usually with the less 'able' children whom we have given up educating.
>
> (Bernstein 1971, p.58)

Bernstein's theoretical position is supported by the empirical work of Anyon (1980) and Connell et al. (1982), whose data illustrate how both pedagogy and curriculum vary markedly between schools differing in social class.

The literature on the pedagogical message system has also explored teachers' epistemologies as fundamental organisers of teaching practice. The work of R. Young (1981a, 1981b) suggests that these are based upon positivism in general, if not more specifically on 'psychometric psychologism' (Esland 1971, pp. 89–90). From perspectives such as these, we can begin to glimpse some further links between consciousness, schooling, and society.

The third message system of the school, *evaluation*, is firmly entrenched in the ideology of a meritocracy. Herein, evaluation is justified on the basis of a need to impartially allocate the rewards and social positions earned through academic achievement. The controlling effects of assessment are multiple. Evaluation controls what counts as knowledge, as teachers increasingly 'teach for tests' and are themselves evaluated by students' scores. Besides controlling curricular content, evaluation is also seen as perpetuating disadvantage, as Broadfoot (1979) describes in summarising several 'conflict theory' interpretations of assessment practice:

> Each [conflict theory] requires a consideration of assessment mechanisms as important instruments in the reproduction of *inequality* rather than as the tollgates to equality. Each requires that the form and/or the content of assessment be identified as biased towards the social and cultural traditions of the dominant social groups whilst operating as key agencies of control by legitimating such bias under the guise of objectivity. There is a common emphasis on legitimation which, as expressed in the dominant ideology of assessment as we know it, is so effective as to allow such assessment to be seen as an essential aspect of the educational process, and to keep it from even entering the arena of educational debate.
>
> (Broadfoot 1979, p. 101)

For Hextall & Sarup (1977), the pernicious effects of evaluation are ultimately traceable to the way assessment controls consciousness:

> Alienation resides in the pupil beginning to work with the notion of evaluation (exchange) in mind. It is not that the pupil is necessarily working for himself when writing his essay, or doing his experiments, and then becomes alienated when he presents his product to be exchanged in the market of record-cards or mark-sheets. Rather, he is alienated in beginning work with the perception in mind of treating his labour as a commodity. As Ollman [1971] expresses it, pupils 'see labour . . . as an activity which is responsible for only the part of value that is returned to them as wages'. Labour is truncated to exchange-value. Parts of the being of pupils (and teachers) are split off and undergo their own transformation. This means that only certain aspects of ourselves are emphasized and developed at the cost of our wholeness. Thus man turns his labour into a commodity. He treats his labour as a form of private property to be disposed of through exchange. He becomes an unfree person.
>
> (Hextall & Sarup 1977, p. 159)

Perhaps we may summarise this discussion of the three message systems of the school with Bernstein's (1971) opening remarks to 'On the classification and framing of educational knowledge': 'how a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control' (Bernstein 1971, p. 47).

The school's role in cultural and economic reproduction

As Apple (1982) indicates, critical research into the relationship between education and the broader society has tended to emphasise *cultural*

reproduction (e.g. M. Young 1971; Carnoy 1974; Sharp & Green 1975; Whitty & Young 1976; Bourdieu & Passeron 1977), *economic reproduction* (Spring 1972, 1976; Carnoy 1972; Jencks et al. 1972, 1979; Bowles & Gintis 1976), or *some combination of the two* (Dale et al. 1976; MacDonald 1977; Bernstein 1977; Karabel & Halsey 1977; Apple 1979, 1982). Inasmuch as a theoretical synthesis is not yet at hand, we would like to briefly highlight some of the general features of each of these perspectives.

The conceptual lattice-work of *cultural reproduction* theory is constructed around 'culture ... power [and] ... the form and content of knowledge and symbols found in education and the relations of domination and exploitation' (Apple 1982, p. 5). The work of Bourdieu and Passeron, a highly articulated framework, may be useful in illustrating a cultural perspective. The ability of a powerful elite to impose its definition of culture, and in so doing insure its position of dominance, is central to the meaning of the concept 'symbolic violence':

> Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.
>
> (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 4)

These authors maintain that the basis of power of the ruling class is firmly rooted in the broader economic and political system, and it is through their manipulation of cultural symbols that the elite are able to mask and legitimate these sources of power. Since the legitimacy of privilege is no longer sustainable by ascriptive criteria such as birth and inheritance, Bourdieu and Passeron view the perpetuation of advantage as being achieved through the accumulation of 'cultural capital'. The school tenders this symbolic currency in a manner by which those with elite cultural backgrounds are favoured by the educational system, and non-elites are excluded from the rewards accruing to 'achievement'. Language, for example, is shown to work against lower class children:

> The influence of linguistic capital, particularly manifest in the first years of schooling when the understanding and use of language are the major points of leverage for teachers' assessments, never ceases to be felt: style is always taken into account, implicitly or explicitly, at every level of the educational system and, to a varying extent, in all university careers, even scientific ones. Moreover, language is not simply an instrument of communication: it also provides, together with a richer or poorer vocabulary, a more or less complex system of categories, so that the capacity to decipher and manipulate complex structures, whether logical or aesthetic, depends partly on the complexity of the language transmitted by the family. It follows logically that the educational mortality rate can only increase as one moves towards the classes most distant from scholarly language ...
>
> (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 73)

The vicious circle of complicity between schools and society in limiting human consciousness is addressed in Bourdieu and Passeron's concluding remarks:

> Thus, in a society in which the obtaining of social privileges depends more and more closely on possession of academic credentials, the School does not only have the function of ensuring discreet succession to a bourgeois estate which can no longer be transmitted directly and openly. This privileged instrument of the bourgeois sociodicy which confers on the privileged the

> supreme privilege of not seeing themselves as privileged manages the more easily to convince the disinherited that they owe their scholastic and social destiny to their lack of gifts or merits, because in matters of culture absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being dispossessed.
>
> (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 210)

In contrast to cultural reproduction theories that attend to the symbolic organisation of school life, theories of *economic reproduction* define their problem as 'the relationship between education and the individual or class composition of the occupational structure, as well as . . . economic power' (Apple 1982, p. 6). Arguably, the most influential research into the school's role in economic reproduction is Bowles & Gintis's (1976) *Schooling in Capitalist America*, which we shall draw upon in illustrating an economic-reproduction perspective. Central to the work of Bowles and Gintis is what they refer to as the 'correspondence principle', and describe thus:

> The educational system helps integrate youth into the economic system, we believe, through a structural correspondence between its social relations and those of production. The structure of social relations in education not only inures the student to the discipline of the work place, but develops the types of personal demeanor, modes of self-presentation, self-image, and social-class identifications which are the crucial ingredients of job adequacy. Specifically, the social relationships of education—the relationships between administrators and teachers, teachers and students, students and students, and students and their work—replicate the hierarchical division of labor. Hierarchical relations are reflected in the vertical authority lines from administrators to teachers to students. Alienated labor is reflected in the student's lack of control over his or her education, the alienation of the student from the curriculum content, and the motivation of school work through a system of grades and other external rewards rather than the student's integration with either the process (learning) or the outcome (knowledge) of the educational 'production process'. Fragmentation in work is reflected in the institutionalized and often destructive competition among students through continual and ostensibly meritocratic ranking and evaluation. By attuning young people to a set of social relationships similar to those of the work place, schooling attempts to gear the development of personal needs to its requirements.
>
> (Bowles & Gintis 1976, p. 131)

Bowles and Gintis's argument essentially follows the Marxist position that the profit motive underlies and pervasively influences the pattern of social relations in the United States. Earnings of workers must be less than the price paid for the goods and services they produce. The employer, in order to maintain and increase 'surplus value', exerts control over workers who have only their labour to sell. However, there is tension and antagonism built into this system as employees resist the attempts to extract surplus value from their labour, and/or the alienating work conditions imposed in the interest of productivity.

Schools contribute to economic reproduction in several ways. Firstly, schools provide the social and technical skills needed by capital to increase productive capacity. Secondly, education helps neutralise the potential conflict situation between workers and employers by socialising a docile work-force well accustomed to alienation. Thirdly, the school system produces a surplus of labour, which strengthens the employers' ability to control workers by threat of firing and replacement. To Bowles and

Gintis, the schools are merely unwitting accomplices to a fundamentally unjust economic system.

Our review of the literature in the preceding pages was prompted by the rather disturbing fact that *education* is not a part of the models and theories employed by educationists in characterising the policy process. We would like to conclude our task of 'putting education into educational policy analysis' by making just two general points. Firstly, we must recognise the unique role of schools in socialising the young and in transmitting, maintaining, and re-creating culture. Schools, more than any institution, are charged with this responsibility, and virtually no person is exempt from the school's socialising influence. We contend that an *educational* policy analysis must attend simultaneously to the workings of the school and the workings of society. Secondly, an *educational* policy analysis must be conducted with a moral and ethical stance, for the very role of transmitting values, and selecting people for, or excluding them from, social and occupational positions is far from a neutral and objective activity. Further, we must dispel the notion that curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation are impartial, and realise that values, interests, and power underlie these dimensions of schooling, and that select groups and classes benefit and suffer as a result. For the policy analyst to assume an objective stance, and to accept that the schooling process is neutral, is to tacitly legitimate a system that perpetuates inequality.

Conclusion: signposts for a critical educational policy analysis

The development of a critical approach to the relationship between schools and the structure of the broader society began with explorations of how facts and meanings were controlled in the classroom through curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation. Recently, however, the boundaries of critical analysis have been widened to include school administration (Bates 1980b; Foster 1980). This broader scope, as Bates argued, is necessary if we are to come closer to the source of control and legitimacy operating in the classroom:

> Education is increasingly recognised as a system of cultural transmission and reproduction which serves to simultaneously maintain, disguise and legitimate the interests of particular groups within the social system. Studies of the perpetuation and legitimation of specific forms of social relations via curriculum, evaluation and pedagogy are developing into a convincing picture of individual components of the process. As yet, however, studies tend to focus either on an overdetermined view of the relations between schooling and economic structure or on a limited account of teacher/pupil transactions. What is missing is any thorough analysis of the processes and structures through which the wider social relations of production and control are articulated with classroom practice. The purpose of this paper has been to suggest that the study of administrative structures, processes and ideologies from a critical perspective might provide such a link.
>
> (Bates 1980b, p. 27)

Subsequent work by Bates (1981b, 1982), Watkins (1983a, 1983b), Foster (1982, 1983), and Angus (1983) has been devoted to the development of such a critical theory of educational administration.

Policy making and analysis have not until recently (Young, Pusey &

Bates 1982) been among the issues taken up in this inchoate field. Our addressing the topic in this monograph follows naturally from these seminal studies of educational administration. We recognise the power and control exerted by the school administrator over classroom practice, and see much of this issuing from, and being legitimated by, educational policy. Hence, many educational structures and procedures are manifestations of policy, and much of the school administrator's work has to do with ensuring that policy is followed.

Our task in preparing these concluding remarks is largely one of summary and synthesis, for we need to weave together the diverse strands of discussion that have taken us through the multifarious meanings of policy, the nebulous scope of policy analysis, the abstract realm of paradigms and theories of the policy process, the funtionalist underpinnings of policy theories, the emancipatory stance of critical theory, and the morally questionable relationship existing between schools and society.

Our first order of business is to take a position on what *policy* is. While eschewing the paradigmatic affiliations of authors like Easton (1953) or Anderson (1979), we find ourselves in agreement with their assessments that policy is the 'authoritative allocation of values'. Indeed, we have argued that values form the very foundation upon which the education edifice stands. Far from possessing intrinsic, objective worth, values (like beauty) lie in the eye of the beholder. To ask what counts as knowledge and culture in the schools is also to query whose values have been validated. The *authoritative* allocation of values draws our attention to the centrality of power and control in the concept of policy, and requires us to consider not only *whose values* are represented in policy, but also *how these values have become institutionalised*. Here, the criterion of justice must be at the forefront of the policy analyst's perspective. It is, however, not enough to consider simply whether fair play has prevailed. One must also consider *results* from a moral standpoint. As we know, Russian roulette may be played by the rules. Many definitions of policy contain statements about achieving goals. We suggest that lurking behind such reified systems terminology is an image of society not yet actualised. We would submit that policy is fundamentally meliorative. Policy is made to help bring about a social ideal, usually by attending to a real or potential barrier to social progress. Consequently, the work of the policy analyst is again moral and ethical to the extent that the 'goodness' of the 'good life' implied by policy is questioned. This brings us back full circle to the basic question, Whose values have been validated? On the bottom line, *policy is the legitimation of values.*

How then might a critical educational policy analysis be conducted? Firstly, a critical analysis is overtly political.[3] The personal values and political commitment of the critical policy analyst are anchored in the vision of a moral order where justice, equality, and individual freedom are uncompromised by the avarice of a few, and where political, social and economic arrangements are such that persons are treated as intrinsically valuable—never as means to an end.

Secondly, a critical analysis strives to expose the sources of domination, repression, and exploitation that are entrenched in, and legitimated by, educational policy. The critical policy analyst would necessarily assume

an advocacy role, taking sides with oppressed groups such as the working class, the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, and women.

Thirdly, a critical analysis of educational policy would pay careful attention to Bernstein's three message systems of the school, viewing these as conduits through which the values legitimated by the policy process are imposed upon students. When a policy is analysed in terms of curriculum (what counts as knowledge), pedagogy (what counts as valid transmission of knowledge), and evaluation (what counts as valid realisation of knowledge), close scrutiny would be given to the process of validation, and specifically to the principles of inclusion and exclusion in deciding 'what counts'.

Fourthly, a critical educational policy analysis would be concerned with the 'pathology of consciousness', addressing itself to the ways in which humans unknowingly abet their oppressors. In the policy process, this would entail analysis of the attempts (or more likely, the lack of) by oppressed groups to influence the workings of the school. This would also involve consideration of the kind of reception such groups accord a school policy decision. In these situations the critical analyst would try to show how the policy process subverts and contravenes the interests of the oppressed, and how this is due, in part, to the ways in which such persons see themselves and others in society. For example, the policy analyst could show how a sense of powerlessness and anomie deters one's participation in the policy process. Or the oppressed could be helped to see how their feelings of inadequacy predispose them to concede power to 'experts' and others perceived to be more qualified than they. The critical policy analyst could also reveal how docility and deference to authority result in an unquestioning abidance by policy decisions that thwart the interests of dispossessed people. A critical approach would strive to unveil and change this 'false consciousness'.

Fifthly, the critical educational policy analyst is committed to praxis—the unity of thought and action, theory and practice. In this respect, awareness of domination leads to courses of action by the oppressed that the critical theorist, while unable to specify in advance, may none the less help catalyse. Awareness is a necessary but not sufficient condition of emancipation. Here the Habermassian conception of 'the ideal speech situation' provides the emancipatory link between awareness and change. In the context of 'policy determination', the critical analyst would seek to establish *procedural policy* that would include oppressed groups in the policy process, while insuring that symmetrical power relations and conditions of undistorted communication prevail among all parties to the policy process. Specifically, the oppressed must be on equal footing with others in their ability to initiate and continue dialogue (communicative acts), to question or support statements (constative acts), to express feelings and subjective states (representative acts), and permit or prohibit substantive or procedural discourse (regulatory acts). We would be remiss not to emphasise that this ideal speech situation must be maintained not only in the policy-making process, but also in the policy analyst's relationship with those with whom she or he works in concert, those whose well-being is ultimately at stake.

Sixthly, the critical educational policy analyst must be a savvy actor in the policy arena. While not losing sight of policy as a legitimation of

values, the analyst must steer through the complexities of a process whose obscurities are often cloaked in a lexicon of scientific precision. In all of this the policy analyst needs to realise that there are multiple activities that are properly called 'policy analysis'. More importantly, the critical policy analyst must carefully choose a stance that will best serve those whose interests and values have been subordinated to the desires of a dominant few. In addition, the critical researcher must be aware that there are fundamentally different kinds of policies, and be prepared to assess their appropriateness for a particular socio-educational problem. Hence, an understanding of *procedural* policy helps to create the conditions of undistorted communication where an equitable *substantive* policy can be formed. Similarly, appreciating the differences between *distributive*, *regulatory*, and *redistributive* policies can aid the critical analyst in anticipating the winners and losers, the empowered and the constrained, and the extent to which wrongs are righted. The role of the critical policy analyst, we have argued, properly includes advocacy, and the researcher's knowing the kind of policy that will be required to redress a social injustice all the more insures that such change can take place. Likewise, it is important for the policy analyst to recognise the difference between *symbolic* and *material* policies. Indeed the former type dovetails snugly with the critical theorist's concern with symbolic forms of domination. Assuming that a just and equitable policy statement is produced in the policy process, there is no assurance that material change will occur. In this regard, we suggest the role of the critical policy analyst must also include the activity of policy *monitoring and evaluation* if there is to be any hope of rhetoric becoming reality. Oppressors do not part willingly with their power.

Many pages have passed since we began this task of taking apart and re-assembling the practice of educational policy analysis. We must end now knowing we have not finished, and that many gaps remain in each of the topics we have considered. Such are the consequences when one's scope is broad, and space and time are limited. If, however, the reader leaves with a better appreciation of the complexity and importance of policy analysis, we shall have served a useful purpose. At a minimum, we hope to have drawn attention to the inadequacies and counter-productive effects of functionalist and systems approaches to educational policy. More significantly, if we have been able to communicate a sense of the subjectivity and commitment to pervasive and fundamental change required in an activity that seeks to empathetically understand and do something about social problems and human suffering, we shall consider this a major accomplishment. We hope that our treatment of critical theory and the 'new sociology of education' has raised the reader's consciousness about oppression and how schools reproduce and transmit the inequalities found in the society at large. Lest this sorry state leads to pessimism, we hope the reader has become aware that the consciousness that ensnares us also holds the potential for liberation. While we have suggested that educational policy serves to legitimate elite values and thus perpetuate inequality, we hope our account of a critical educational policy analysis helps the reader see some reason for optimism as well as some practical 'signposts' for change. We trust that the readings that follow, and the

annotated bibliography appended at the end of this monograph will help fill in some of the holes we have left gaping, and will stimulate the reader to explore further the possibilities of a critical educational policy analysis.

Notes

1. This discussion may be a bit difficult for persons with a limited background in the philosophy of science. If such is the case, the reader should not be dismayed, but is urged to continue on. If confusion remains, the reader is encouraged to consult the article by Morgan (1980) or the monograph by Burrell & Morgan (1979) where this topic is more fully discussed.
2. One of the theories, 'institutionalism' was not analysable. Neither Dye nor Anderson includes a bibliographic citation for this theory and Yeakey incorrectly cites Anderson as an institutionalist theorist. The overviews of institutionalism provided in these three accounts are far too sketchy to be analysed paradigmatically, and in the absence of references we have been forced to exclude institutionalism from this discussion.
3. We have noted earlier that to assume an 'objective' stance and leave unquestioned the morality of the school's relationship to society serves to endorse the status quo, and as such is very much a political act, albeit covert. The claim to neutrality covers up the political dimension and removes the interests served from open discussion in the political arena. There is no such thing as 'apolitical' policy analysis (Kramer 1975). The endemic political nature of the activity is either overt or covert.

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

1

Problem setting in policy research

Martin Rein and Donald A. Schon

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There is clear evidence of the growth of policy research and of its institutionalization. At the same time, there is also clear evidence of contemporary disaffection with it. Questions about its utility are coupled with a variety of proposals for its reform.

Much of the contemporary doubt rests upon a somewhat narrow view of what policy research can or should do.[1] The dominant conception of policy research today centers on its use within a framework of decision making and problem solving. Yet, to all appearances, policy research has not been strongly instrumental in public problem solving. If we examine the current patterns of its use for power and political positioning, for legitimation of action, and for reform, we come upon a range of uses that are neither envisioned by those who espouse the problem-solving framework nor accepted fully by members of the research community.

The problem-solving framework holds three crucial assumptions that, for most policy situations, we question.

First, the image of the process of policy development is incomplete. It assumes that policy development begins with a shared articulation of the problematic situation and defines the task of research as instrumental problem solving, where solutions entail discrete policy decisions. This formulation excludes, we believe, what is perhaps the most crucial aspect of the policy process. In policy development one seldom starts from a consensual definition of the problem to be solved, and research influences the climate of opinion even more than it influences concrete decisions. Therefore, a more reflective view of the policy world would indicate:

1. Policy development is essentially about a process of *problem setting*; it is concerned with developing new purposes and new interpretations of the inchoate signs of stress in the system that derive from the past.
2. Policy development must address the management of dilemmas as well as the management of tradeoffs; all possible courses of action have mixed positive and negative values attached to them; and some conflicts of values are intractable.
3. Policymakers use research as an instrument to legitimate action in the

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perpetual striving for consensus of belief and for organization of the fine structure of government action; policy may influence the research agenda more than research influences the direction of policy.

4. Interest groups outside of government, who also participate in policy development and implementation, also use research to further their aims, sometimes by contention and sometimes by cooperation.

If we take this larger view—that policy development is about problem setting, dilemma and tradeoff management, and consensus building *via* coalition formation—then we can find understandable and in a certain sense legitimate those uses of research data and social science theory that might otherwise seem illegitimate.

We believe that policy researchers can go further toward conflict management, and goal development if they attend systematically to problem setting. Problem setting is important because the questions we ask shape the answers we get.

Although we can argue for the importance of problem setting, there are serious impediments to its inclusion in policy research. The political and administrative settings in which policy research tasks tend to be defined are conducive to the definition of policy research as problem solving. In this case, for example, policy research, whatever its espoused purpose, serves the actual function of legitimating or discrediting particular courses of action. The very uses of policy research for legitimation, political positioning, or reform along preconceived lines causes most policy research to be cast in the mold of engineering or applied science. Accordingly, the administrative machinery for commissioning research makes it difficult or impossible to treat problem setting as an object of analysis.

Proponents of rigorous methodological standards for policy research take the view that rigor is a necessary condition for relevance, if the researcher wishes his analysis to enter into policy development. However, the pursuit of methodological rigor in officially sponsored research does not by any means assure the relevance of the research to considerations of policy. And there is the further danger that a narrow interpretation of rigor will favor quantitative studies that give the illusion of scientific precision while discrediting a probing qualitative analysis of issues as "soft headed"—that is, a mere expression of the researchers' preferences not grounded in "hard data."

Despite all of the administrative and organizational deterrents to the inclusion of problem setting in government-supported policy research and despite the reinforcement of these prejudices within the social scientific community, we believe that it is useful to attempt an exploration of the problem-setting processes. It is the purpose of this chapter to open this subject for analysis and to attempt in a preliminary way to develop some of the guides and strictures that can enable analysts to make problem setting problematic rather than given.

Let us start with a situation in which the traditional ways of formulating a problem are cast in doubt either because they can no longer usefully explain what people are worried about or because they no longer serve the most passionately supported normative ideals in society. When consensus has eroded and the nature of the problem is itself in doubt, then the exploration of problem setting becomes most urgent. In this situation, policy research becomes an important instrument for creating the conditions that then make it possible for a problem-solving perspective to enter policy analysis. Policy research then becomes an instrument through which researchers try to mobilize a belief that can lead to action. In this sense, we will call our approach *value critical.* But how are problems set in this period of doubt? We believe that problem setting requires the finding, building, or selecting of a framework within which uncertain situations can be organized.

Almost all the camps of contemporary cognitive psychology, from information processing to the current developmental analysis of the construction of reality, now perceive learning and knowing as beginning with the problem of construing the initially inchoate experience field – that is, as a matter of finding formats of perception through which to organize the bombardment of sensory events into meaningful aggregates. Similar developments have occurred in the sociological tradition, where students of the sociology of knowledge have convincingly argued that science is a social construction of reality. Nevertheless, this understanding, although widely accepted among philosophers, sociologists, and cognitive psychologists, has not been translated into policy research where such perspectives are regarded as an unwarranted intrusion into scientific analysis of values and preferences. The whole enterprise of policy research is predominantly value committed, and we think it cannot be anything else.

Toward a Methodology for Problem Setting

We would like to take a first step toward the development of a framework for policy-relevant research that we believe can draw together, in a nonformalistic way, the interplay between problem setting, policy and program design, and the translation of design into action.

Our main argument is that the transition from worries to problems cannot be made without the use of frames that distinguish the significant from the trivial. But frames can imprison the analyst just as they free him for creative work. To generate problems from our worries requires that we discover the tacit frames that organize our insights and then that we challenge them. It is an exercise in reflection designed to encourage doubt about frame adequacy. As such, it is a call for organized skepticism, as well as for the conscious selection and construction of frames. While this creative skepticism is a norm in scientific inquiry, it is not institutionalized where social science is applied to questions in the public arena. In part, the desire to be legitimate, according to prevailing

canons of legitimacy, has inhibited the application of this norm in the field of policy analysis.

This chapter is not another call for skepticism, but a discussion of how to be skeptical, and how to move from skepticism to the conscious selection and construction of frames.

The problem-setting process begins with a problematic situation. We experience a situation as problematic, according to John Dewey,[2] when it provokes in us a diffuse, intuited discomfort or irritation. In problematic situations, the knowledge we have accumulated does not enable us to cope with what bothers us now. We find ourselves initially without the capacity to make an orderly formulation of the problem.

Starting, as we do, with the instances in which traditional ways of formulating policy problems are cast in doubt, the predicament of the problematic situation appears more agonizing to us than it did to Dewey. Dewey saw in the quandaries and discrepancies of the cognitive process an invigorating, creative condition that could stimulate inquiry directed toward the creation of a moral, humanistic world with science at its core. We also want to capture that quality of problematic situations that takes the form of malaise and disorientation and that can be overcome only through laborious and uncertain steps.

The main task in problem setting is to work through the process by which worries, arising in problematic situations, can be converted into the orderly formulation of problems. Every student of policy research who has tried to do a study knows how frustrating this stage of inquiry can be, because of the difficulty in grasping precisely what is the problem. (This stage can be all the more frustrating when the researcher cannot, within the formal context of commissioned research, admit to the process in which he is engaged.) We believe that the discovery of the problems is perhaps the most difficult aspect of policy research. How do worries come to be problems?

In the context of public affairs, worries are often triggered by signals that are negative or are construed to be negative. Seemingly unrelated events may appear in a variety of settings. Statistical reports show an increase in an unsatisfied demand for housing. Opinion polls register discontent. In a large city, rents rise. People cannot find places to live at prices they can afford. Some units are dilapidated; others are abandoned. There is the overall environment of a housing shortage. People come to be worried about "the housing situation." The housing worries may or may not be connected to coexisting worries in other fields such as health, crime, the political process, and so forth. Depending on how such worries are aggregated into sets, various "housing problems" may be defined.

Problem setting is a judgment about the problematic situation—that is, a diagnosis that also contains the prescription of directions for action. We cannot make a judgment of this kind unless we apply a frame to a field of experience. This frame enables us to (1) highlight certain features of the situation, including

certain worries that we select as symptomatic, (2) ignore, or select out, certain other features of the situation, including certain worries, as noisy and irrelevant, and (3) bind together the salient features of the situation, including the relevant worries, into a pattern that is coherent and graspable. Frames help us to organize not only the worries we address, but also those we neglect.

In this sense, the process of *framing* is complementary to a process of *naming*. We cannot frame a field of experience without also generating a context for the naming of elements within the frame. And just as frames give us a way of seeing some things and of not seeing other things, so names call our attention to certain features of elements within a frame while they invite us to ignore other features of those elements. Whatever is said of a thing, denies something else of it. So, for example, within a broad frame of economic dependency and its related difficulties, we single out the feature "single parent" and use the name "single-parent families" partly because there has been such a sharp increase, among all families with children, in the proportion of those that are single parented, and partly because single parenting is assumed to be related to economic dependency. Naming this phenomenon "single-parent families" rather than "broken homes" suggests an important shift in values and therefore in the frame for constructing the problem. Similarly, the succession of terms, such as *backward, underdeveloped,* and *developing* countries, signifies an underlying frame associated with modernization.

The complementary processes of naming and framing mediate the transition from disaggregated worries and scattered perceptions of situations toward the cognitive experience of meaning and the work of creative problem solving.

Different frames, and their associated names, may be used to integrate experiences in different ways. Thus, one housing official, facing the worries we have outlined, might construe the situation as one of tenant disaffection leading to landlord's neglect. Another might permute much the same elements and judge that there has been landlord exploitation leading to tenant neglect. The two ways of interpreting the situation reflect frames that set the stage for different ways of allocating blame (though both share the property of allocating blame to someone) and different values, perhaps even moral perspectives, for the situation.

Both of these frames for the problem are relatively small in scope and bound the problem by those worries that are most immediate and salient. A third official, working from a larger frame, might see the worries as linked to a larger institutional problem: the culture of poverty. And still a fourth might see the housing worries as tiny expressions of a much larger set of problems conveyed in classical Marxist theory: outcroppings of the general erosive alienation inherent in capitalism. A final frame might enable a housing official to insist that none of the frames listed above go to the root of the problem because they neglect economic variables such as the cost of land, labor costs, the costs of money and materials, and the like.

Frames differ in scope, in the number and variety of worries and other features of the situation they subsume, and in the degree to which they reduce collections of worries to a mode of understanding consistent with a single direction of action. But all frames used to set problems must serve both explanatory and normative functions. They must enable the inquirer to group a distributed set of worries in terms of phenomena that are sequenced according to before-and-after, then-and-now. They must allow the inquirer to order events in the field of social experience so as to permit explanation of later events in terms of earlier ones—that is, they must permit the location of events in a causal space so that questions of "Why?" and "What if . . . ?" can be addressed to actions in this space with the possibility of a determinate answer. Moreover, frames must contain a basis for action. They must permit the inquirer not only to explain the phenomena associated with his worries, but to set the directions of actions designed to reduce them. In this sense, frames must facilitate what we have called the normative leap from findings to recommendations.[3]

Where do frames come from? For most people, most of the time, frames are transmitted from one person to another. A good deal of ordinary discourse among people traffics in frames, in ways of seeing phenomena, in ideas, in conceptions of the world. It is characteristic of the overlapping cultures embedded in society that they are reservoirs of frames on which members of the culture may draw. The frames available in cultural reservoirs change over time, however, according to rules that are poorly understood. At various times, in various cultures, particular ways of framing experience become powerful—become, in effect, ideas in good currency.[4]

The need for new frames arises frequently in the policy world when old frames seem to have lost their utility and having moved out of good currency, no longer seem to provide a consensual basis for action. This situation may happen because standards of explanation shift, so that old frames no longer seem to explain events as well as they once did; or because situations change, so that earlier ways of framing come to seem unacceptable as explanations or as normative guides for action. In such cases, we move toward the selection or construction of new frames. Although we discuss this process as an intellectual one, let us emphasize again that a new frame may emerge, after the fact, as the rationalization of a political act—that is, we may do something new, and then ask: "How did we get here?" "How may we justify what we have done?" In such an instance, action may give rise to the frame.

Generative Metaphor

Whatever their particular origins may be, the frames (whose application to experience sets policy problems) contain generative metaphors that enable us to reason from the familiar to the unfamiliar. Familiar concepts are brought to

unfamiliar situations and in the process transform the familiar, providing a way of organizing and understanding it, while they are themselves transformed.

Thus, the housing official we have been following might frame his worries in terms of a metaphor of disease and pathology. He might think in terms of "decaying housing stock," which he contrasts with "healthy stock." He might then search for means to "arrest decay" and to "protect healthy stock," and these notions might lead him to think in terms of rehabilitating old stock and in terms of the insulation of healthy neighborhoods from decaying ones.

That we are dealing here with a metaphor becomes clear when we consider that houses are not literally either healthy of diseased. Indeed, one man's "decay" may be another man's old world charm. That we are dealing with an operational, rather than a decorative metaphor, becomes clear if we observe that the housing official pays attention to just those phenomena that fit his metaphor and ignores the rest, and if we observe that the remedies he espouses, and considers obvious, are those that flow from the metaphor and would not seem obvious (indeed, might seem wrong) if considered from the point of view of a different metaphor. That we are dealing with a generative metaphor becomes clear if we observe that the metaphor sets the direction of remedial action in the very process by which it selects out events and explains them. Once we have been able to see houses as diseased or healthy, a whole set of prescriptions present themselves for action.

A great deal of contemporary policy tends to organize events in terms of a health metaphor in which worries are interpreted as outcroppings of social pathology. Thus, the housing stock may be seen as decayed: "sick" families may be seen as requiring both isolation and special treatment in public housing projects that may be seen, alternately, as hospitals or as dumping grounds; and finally, neighborhoods may be the elements chosen as sick or healthy, and may be so regarded depending on whether or not they have been scattered and isolated as a consequence of physical developments such as urban renewal. Each of these ways of bringing the health metaphor to the housing situation tends to give rise to a different order of explanation and to a different set of prescriptions.

Metaphors enable us to gain, and to convey, essential insights into patterns of phenomena and to tease out lessons. Generative metaphors provide a basis for making the normative leap by projecting onto unfamiliar situations familiar notions that are already evaluated. Because we believe that it is better to be healthy than diseased, the health metaphor is generative of directions of solution for the problem of housing.

Different kinds of metaphors are generative in different ways. For example, some metaphors permit us to frame problematic situations in terms of departures from a prototypical idea. The aim is to identify a correctable flaw, to cause the abnormal to revert to the normal. We move from a worry to a problem in this way when we can isolate the flaw that, in our minds, produces the departure from the ideal prototype.

In this manner, a housing worry becomes a housing problem when we can identify that single-parent families lack access to the credit market, which thus inhibits the capacity of that market mechanism to work as it should. Accordingly, the worry about the failure to attract investment in the ghetto is explained in terms of this "flaw" in the market mechanism. But the "flaw" so isolated is not coextensive with the set of all possible flaws that might have produced the same outcome. What other "flaws" can help us understand the situation? How do they overlap?

Similarly, the prototypical ideal may be identified with a representation of the situation "as it used to be." Neighborhoods "used to be" integrated and well cemented; now, due to the intrusions of urban renewal, they have come to be characterized by scatter and mutual isolation. Physicians used to have close personal relationships with their patients; now, because of the alienating effects of medical specialization, physicians are distant from their patients; the essential conditions of trust and closeness have been destroyed. The "problem" is how best to return the situation to the status quo ante.

Again, the generative metaphor may be one of "need." Here, the analyst will see the situation as one in which essential needs remain unmet; remedy will consist of devising ways to meet such needs. For example, people may be taken to "need" decent housing, according to certain standards of decency. Remedy may then take the form not only of measures to increase the supply of decent housing but of measures, such as rigorously enforced building codes, that restrict the supply of housing that is not decent.

Or the generative metaphor may be one of battle and victory. If it is possible in the situation to identify villains, victims, and heroes, then the problem setting may be construed in terms of doing battle with the villains and winning.

These types of metaphors do not exhaust the set. There may be many such metaphors, although, we believe, only a limited number of them will tend to be powerful enough for action within a given culture at a particular time.

We do not mean to imply that we must start with a generative metaphor already in hand and then move with it from worries to problems. It is often only in the course of inquiry that we come upon the metaphors that enable us to set the problem. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to find that insight into the metaphor that integrates our understanding comes only at the end of our inquiry, rather than at the beginning. Indeed, we may move through the whole process without gaining consciousness of the metaphor that guides our inquiry.

But this lack of awareness is a source of concern. The generative metaphors contained in the frames by which we set our problems may carry with them consequences we do not intend: prices we do not wish to pay. Thus, the "obviousness" of the explanations associated with such terms as *flaws*, *disease*, *needs*, and *battles* disappears the moment we subject them to conscious scrutiny; and the solutions that seemed to flow from them so obviously cease to appear

obvious at all. However, we cannot assess the prices paid for our metaphors, nor can we compare them to options, until we have become aware of them.

Our frames, along with their generative metaphors, tend to be tacit for us at the beginning of inquiry. Although values influence what we are prepared to accept as a fact, or as a solution, we are not usually aware of our values or beliefs. How can we learn what it is that we value and believe at the very early stages of inquiry? Our fundamental commitment is to creative skepticism in problem setting. We must surface and criticize our tacit frames. We must, in order to do this, entertain multiple frames for the organization of our experience. Through the critical comparison, selection, and integration of frames, and through a reflective awareness of the stands we wish to take, we can move to more nearly adequate problem setting. But before we can subject our framework to skeptical review, we need to make explicit the tacit frames we use to organize experience.

Story Telling

Story telling is at once a medium for problem setting and a way of discovering the tacit frames that underlie our problem settings.

We use the term *story telling* because the logical structure developed in this mode of analysis is much the same as that of the story. It contains "... a sequence of events, each of them leading to the next, and, like the story-teller ... he presents the story in terms of the behavior of a few major 'characters'. The succession of events is made to appear to be caused, at each step, by the actions of the characters; and the entire story is made to unfold according to some 'inner necessity'."[5] This account captures much of what is central to our idea of policy analysis as story telling, although it gives too much attention to the role of key characters and presents a deterministic view of events.

The main advantage of the story is that it uncovers the theoretical orientation of the storyteller and what he takes as important. This permits him to ask whether the same facts can be integrated around a different story line. What has he left out of his account? What new pieces of evidence must he gather if he wished to modify his story?

Story telling also lends itself to empirical support by the canons of good historiography—that is to say, we can criticize a story in terms of its truth value: Did the sequence of events occur as explained? Although we are interested in a correct diagnosis, not just a persuasive one, it is much more difficult to validate the interpretation of why the sequence of events occurred. Aside from the obvious edict that causally related events must occur in a time sequencing where consequences follow antecedent events, judging the interpretation of a story and the lesson to be learned from it is much more difficult. Nevertheless, stories do

permit partial objective social assessment and this allows a scientific debate to take place.

Perhaps a concrete example would be useful to illustrate the themes we have been discussing. Consider the situation in the field of social services for children. We start with a diffuse worry that things are not going well. The holding power of social agencies is weak, they seem unable to keep their clients for more than a short period of time. The outcome of their effort seems to have only doubtful utility. Lack of confidence in the effectiveness of social agencies is accompanied by a rising concern about neglect and abuse of children and the feeling that opportunities for advancement are not being exploited, as the educational attainment of children measured by national achievement tests seems to be declining. This scenario of worries is not uncommon. What is the problem?

One widely held view about the problem is that services are fragmented, poorly coordinated, so the varied needs of the same child cannot be met. The metaphor is contained in concept of fragmented services that suggests that broken crockery and social services have a shared pattern. Each was once whole and at one time was broken into fragments. Just as we can recement the shattered pieces of pottery so, too, can we coordinate or integrate fragmented social service programs. There is a very strong normative implication that fragments should be reintegrated and organized as wholes. The metaphor provides an interpretation about what is the problem and what future course of action should be taken in general. The story of how fragmented social services affect the difficulties in the development of children is not regarded as an idiosyncratic story because it can be generalized to many situations. The story of fragmented social services thus provides us with a plausible understanding of social processes and an imperative for action.

There are, of course, alternative interpretations. We can, for example, argue that the villain of the piece is not poor coordination but the poor quality of services. Coordination according to this view is wrongheaded because an integrated pattern cannot be stronger than its constituent parts. Here the central metaphor is "upgrading" rather than "recementing."

Maps, Theories, and Models

Maps, theories, and models may be understood as analytic devices that permit examination of the elements and relations in a story. In this sense, they are also vehicles for increased awareness of the tacit frames on which our problem setting rests. But maps, theories, and models may also be understood as steps toward increased formalization of problem setting. Then we may conceive of the problem-setting process as moving from the diffuse detection of a worry, to the telling of a story about the problematic situation, to the construction of a theory that makes explicit the causal linkages suggested in the story, to the

formulation of a model that displays the hierarchical interrelationships of the essential elements of the theory.

Problem setting does not often neatly fit this developmental picture, but the picture is useful, nonetheless, as a kind of ideal type in terms of which we can better understand the complexities of the actual process.

Mapping

We describe mapping as a first order attempt at the formalization of the story. A map rigorously identifies the variables that are operative in the situation, but it is loose about the dynamics of their interaction – that is to say, in a map we must specify the contours or the streets or the points of demarcation. Map making forces a commitment to these strategic variables and places them in context by specifying their relative values. Maps are indispensable for organizing conduct; they are the basic factor in learning about reality. Maps are what enables a person to move from a random, unfamiliar, informationless situation, in which he is paralyzed, to situations he can master. Mapping provides an orderly arrangement of landmarks and is a crucial step in a more formal attempt to organize evidence.

Although a map is sometimes less persuasive and more difficult to interpret to a community of policymakers than stories, partly because it doesn't tell them what to do, it is not entirely bereft of action implications. For example, we can impose a set of rules that say that when one sees such and such a landmark, then one acts in the following manner: turns right, or left, or perhaps stands still. When we impose a purpose on these visual patterns located in a space, such as a destination, then a map becomes a crucial tool for action, because it serves as an aid for helping us to get where we want to go.

Once we establish a map, we can then question whether we have selected the correct route, or whether we might prefer a different destination. Have we cluttered the map with irrelevant details or have we failed to add crucial landmarks, perhaps in the way people see the world in which they live? The map provides a representation of the way we structure in space our selective perceptions of reality.

Theories and Models

Models and theories are different from stories in that they attempt to provide a simplified picture of reality; they are different from maps in that they not only identify strategic variables, but specify how they dynamically relate to each other. Some models seek only to provide an accounting or description on how the variance of complex events can be partitioned. Here a model is like a map,

because it seeks to identify what are the crucial landmarks in charting a relatively unexplored terrain.

Stories, maps, and models are three interrelated ways of translating worries into problems. Each provides a different way to surface beliefs so they can be subjected to organized skepticism. They differ largely in terms of the degree of formalism of the key variables and their interrelationships rather than in the extent to which they rely upon explicatory metaphors to diagnose and by implication to prescribe a course of action. Many sophisticated theories are unadorned metaphors. For example, the theory of wage contours draws heavily on a mapping metaphor to describe the ripple effect of wage settlements on the same industry. For example, wage levels for automobile workers are high in Detroit (the center of the industry) and low in the South. There are theories of labor market queues that suggest that members of labor markets form a single line and those at the end of the lines do worse than those at the beginning; hence, the best way to improve the position of those at the end of the line is to alter their position within the queue by training. Other theories hold that labor markets are segmented and those caught in the secondary labor market are entrapped with little chance of getting out and that changing the characterization of workers will have little impact on their mobility between segments.

There is no sharp, rigid demarcation between stories, maps, theories, and models. Each is an attempt to arrive at an understanding about the nature of the problem. These media can reinforce each other. For example, a theory of genetic endowment or environmental determinism can be called upon in telling a story about service failures and individual malintegration. Sometimes the theory is tacit and a model uncovers the framework that is implicit in a story that is widely accepted.

Strategies of Problem Setting

Within the basic outline of naming and framing, of generative metaphors, and of stories, maps, theories and models, there remains considerable space for free movement in which inquirers may employ different strategies for the passage from worries to problems. Some of the more prominent of these are described below.

Disaggregating Worries

This approach proceeds on the assumption that worries are not of the same set; they must consequently be further subdivided into their component parts. Conceptual respecification of the same phenomenon from different perspectives provides us with a shifting angle of vision from which new insights can be drawn.

Single parenting is, for example, not a uniform condition: One way to disaggregate the phenomenon is in terms of the circumstances that created the single-parented situation. Thus, we find that some single-parent situations come about because of widowhood, others because the mother is unmarried, others because of divorce or separation. Each of these situations is quite different in terms of the rate of transition from a single-parent status into a married-couple status. Thus, widows are least likely to remarry, while unmarried women are likely to marry. It may be reasonable to characterize unmarried parenting as a traumatic situation, but of short duration; whereas widowhood is likely to remain a persistent difficulty.

Most attempts at developing typologies that are based on disaggregation often imply, for policy purposes, that a single strategy of intervention will not suffice. There is not one problem but many problems, each having different roots and different consequences and hence must be treated differently in turn. This aspect of the strategy of problem setting is not essential, but the logic of disaggregation invariably drives one to this perspective.

Aggregating Worries

The passage from worry to problem may take the form of a broadening of frame for construction of the problem so that worries not usually clustered are brought together. For example, concerns about shortages of decent housing may expand to include concerns about child health and well-being, about economic independence and upward mobility, about jobs and career development. This process is what has happened, for example, with the introduction of the term *housing services*. The physical house now comes to seem simply an element in an array of services that touch on nearly all aspects of human life. The "housing problem" has been remapped so that its scope becomes very nearly coincident with the growth and development of families. Within this frame, attention focuses now on self-help housing as a pivotal intervention aimed at achieving independent family growth and development.

Just as the strategy of disaggregation contains the assumption that "there are many problems," here we have the assumption that many problems ought really to be made into one.

Working Back from Action

According to this strategy, one discovers what is problematic by eliciting implications of a problem definition for action. One engages in thought experiments. What if this were the problem, where would it lead me in terms of the kind of action I might seek to take? If it leads in a direction that I do not

wish to go, because of my beliefs about what I judge to be undesirable, then I must reformulate the problem.

Various philosophical writings have described this approach to problem setting. For example, John Dewey, in a discussion of the standards that are used in making value judgments, explains: "We do not know what we are really after until a course of action is mentally worked out."[6] In other words, we truly know what we want only when the consequences of pursuing our ends are more fully evident. John Rawls discusses a similar strategy and calls it "reflective equilibrium."[7]

This way of approaching worries and transforming them into problem sets is very common. For example, a researcher might say he rejects the problem definitions that see the causal agents as largely resting in the victims themselves (the culture of poverty) and fail to take proper account of the role of institutions in bringing about unwanted social conditions. The assumption is that what is unpalatable cannot be true. Accordingly, if an urban problem is defined in terms of the intergenerational transmission of deprivation, then the problem must be misspecified, because it leads to a theory of causality and a policy of intervention that must be rejected on normative grounds. Problem specification is not purely a trial-and-error process. We often have strong value preferences; and these shape not only the way in which problems are set, but what we are prepared to accept as fact.

Many people have noted that we tend not to discover errors that confirm our predispositions. When we find what we want–when we discover a problem that requires an action that we find congenial–then curiosity tends to abate. A more skeptical approach would question a problem setting precisely because we find it congenial. We would ask just the questions that we are apt to regard as unaskable and that question what we desire most. Such a process asks not that we foresake our values but that we subject them to inquiry.

Criteria for Problem Setting

With strategies for problem setting, as with all of the processes we have so far discussed, there is a fundamental and unavoidable question of evaluation. Under what conditions ought we to say that a strategy is effective because it leads to the adequate formulation of a problem? What are the criteria for a good story? Under what circumstances may we say that one generative metaphor is better than another? What features of a frame make it adequate for problem setting?

The criteria for defining adequacy go deeply into the axioms on which social scientific inquiry rests. The adequacy of the problem formulation can be judged by two quite different standards. Consider, first, the *principle of consistency*. To what extent does the formulation of the problem draw together a large number of facts and relate them into a consistent framework? A good

problem is one that subsumes a large possible set of worries into a network of plausible causation (which Popper calls "the stage of conjecture"). Here, "plausibility" designates not only consistency of propositions within the problem formulation itself, but consistency of that formulation with other sets of beliefs held by the inquirer.

There is, however, a second principle for judging the adequacy of problems: namely, to what extent can my formulation of the problem be put in jeopardy by empirical investigation? Here the *principle of testability* governs problem adequacy—that is, the theory or model contained in the problem setting should be subject to empirical test; it should be capable of disconfirmation.

Ideally, these two principles should be mutually reinforcing and thus provide no conflict. A good problem is one that meets simultaneously the tests of plausibility and testability. Unfortunately, in practice, these two governing principles often conflict. For example, Freudian interpretations of problems are extremely plausible within the framework of their own assumptions; so too are Marxian interpretations. But these plausible arguments lack the kind of scientific specification that really permits them to be subject to refutation by appeal to observation. Neither of these approaches lends itself to the social experimentation that permits one to so arrange things that, whether one likes it or not, whether one wants to believe or not, one's problem set is subjected to refutation. By the criterion of testability, problems are gambles—risk-taking ventures in which we make an informed guess—but we must be prepared to be judged wrong by the evidence.

If we are forever challenging the ambiguities of conventional wisdom with respect to how problems are formulated, we will discover that much of our definitions rest on ambiguities and inconsistencies. To consistently challenge the official language can, from the point of view of action, be extremely disruptive. Of course, the great art is not only to challenge an established formulation of a problem but to transform it, or to substitute a different one that explains as much as the first as well as that which had remained unexplained.

Piven and Cloward have attempted to reformulate the problem of welfare in the United States by arguing that welfare is not a response to distress but to disorder. It follows that if public largess is to be liberalized, it can only do so not by establishing the need for aid, but by mobilizing discontent so that society will respond to the disorder that political activity has generated. In principle, this theory that society can be terrorized into being good is both plausible and testable. Yet, even if we can identify empirical examples where relief is a response to distress rather than disorder, the plausibility of the theory may not be challenged, because of the difficulties in establishing the line of causality and in understanding why events occurred as they did.

Perhaps the central dilemma in problem setting is that there is such a widely diverse range of generative metaphors that identify what is the problem, how the problematic situation came to be as it is, and how it might be set right. The

principles of consistency and testability provide only partial guidance in selecting among different problem frames. Aside from these, there are three other criteria that at least implicitly enter in the judgment of problem adequacy.

First is the question of the normative implications of the problem frame. Does the frame lead to a morally acceptable position? How conflicts between what is truthful and what is desirable are resolved is a fascinating question.

Secondly, frames differ in terms of their utility for action regardless of their normative implication. Here the imperative is that frames should lead to action, and while action should be broadly consistent with personal values, we often find it necessary to settle for much less, because we assign an even higher priority to the need to act: "Don't just stand there, do something." Of course, it is impossible to do nothing, because inaction is itself a form of action. The principles of testability and of utility for action may be closely interrelated. We might insist, for example, that the metaphor of fragmentation of services be subjected to rigorous evaluation by a social experiment. Accordingly, we would then require a much more fine-grained interpretation about the causal nexus of events and of their relations to desirable outcomes. We would need, then, to develop more formal procedures for refutation by moving from a story to a map, and then to a theory or model. If, however, there are formidable practical and political difficulties of achieving the coordination of agencies required for a social experiment, then the problem setting is for all practical purposes untestable.

Finally, there are those who are less attracted to value or action imperatives and are more concerned with the "beauty" that is inherent in the problem frame as revealed by the grace, subtlety, elegance, or interest with which the elements of the theory or story are put together.

In other words, there are different weighting schemes for judging the adequacy of a problem frame. We may judge such a frame by its plausibility and consistency, by its capacity to lead to action, by its value implications, by its "beauty," and finally, by its testability—its openness to learning through the correction of thought by experience.[8]

To make problem setting central to policy analysis is to expose latent ethical, political, aesthetic, and scientific differences, and this makes the task of relating thought and action more difficult. Nevertheless, we believe that in the long run, alternative problem frames facilitate a dialectic between perspectives and thus make it more possible to spell out and manage the dilemmas which are inherent in social policies. Not because such an exposure will lead them to disappear or to be finally resolved by an overarching criterion to which all would appeal. Rather, analysis may contribute to reducing symbolic posturing and hence to a more direct confrontation with things as they are, in their true complexity. The need to reenter a problematic situation—to see it from different perspectives and to develop different theories about why things happen and what can be done—is felt to be most urgent when theory is not settled and where

policy is uncertain. Of course, continued questioning and doubt and uncertainty can be disruptive as well as integrative, if they undermine faith in action and faith in the capacity to build a collective community of inquirers who can engage in a good dialectic over time. If conscious attention to problem setting makes us lose confidence in action and cooperative inquiry, then it can produce a negative effect. But this, in our opinion, it need not do.

The argument we have been developing does not attempt to displace a problem-solving framework but rather to subsume it within a larger view of policy research. Problem solving is a special case of policy research and should not be equated, therefore, with the entire field of inquiry.

Notes

1. See Martin Rein and Sheldon White, "Belief and Doubt in Policy Research," *Policy Analysis* (forthcoming).

2. John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York 1938).

3. Martin Rein, "The Fact-Value Dilemma," Working Paper No. 28, Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., September 1974.

4. See Donald A. Schon, *Beyond the Stable State* (New York: Random House, 1971), for a discussion of ideas in good currency.

5. Sidney Shoeffler, *The Failure of Economics: A Diagnostic Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 150.

6. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York: Modern Library, 1930), p. 36.

7. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 20.

8. That truth is not the only way to evaluate the quality of speculation is, of course, not a new idea. Lave and March in an interesting discussion of the issue argue that one never fully resolves the conflict between truth, beauty, and justice as criteria for judging theories and ideas. Charles Lave and James C. March, *The Social Science* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), Chapter 3, pp. 51-78.

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2

Why educational policies often fail: The hyperrationalization hypothesis

Arthur E. Wise

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1. The Bureaucratic Rationalization of Schools

American schools are now being subjected to a variety of influences which either presuppose a very rational view of schooling or are designed to induce a further rationalization of schooling. State legislatures, demanding accountability in schooling, are imposing managerial accounting schemes adopted from industry. State boards of education, concerned with the diffuse goals of schooling, endeavour to reduce the goals of education to basic skills. State courts, concerned with the ineffectiveness of schooling require that schools become "thorough and efficient" as mandated by their state constitutions. Congress, concerned about the lack of articulation between education and work, calls for career education. The executive branch, responding to concerns for equality, promulgates affirmative action procedures and goals. The federal courts, concerned with arbitrariness toward individuals, demand that schools observe due process. Unions, unsatisfied with the protections afforded by civil service and tenure provisions, seek additional procedural safeguards through collective bargaining. Educational researchers, unable to discover the effects which schools have, create models of efficient and effective schooling. In common, these influences are designed to make school more rational.

But schools are already bureaucratic and therefore "rational," as Max Weber put it long ago. Schools do have established procedures for handling their affairs. To the extent that more attention is given to procedures and to the extent that procedures are multiplied, schools become more proceduralized, more bureaucratized, more rationalized.

Rationalization, of course, has at least two meanings. In bureaucracies, rationalization is the purposeful organization of activities and goals; in fact, "rationalization" and "bureaucratization" are frequently used interchangeably. A second meaning of rationalization is to employ explanations that seem superficially reasonable and valid but actually are unrelated to the true explanation. Rationalization with both its positive and negative connotations seems to be operating in policy for schools.

That schools are bureaucratic and, therefore, rational seems evident. That external forces are operating to make schools even more rational seems also evident. *My conclusion is that the trend is so pronounced that it should be characterized as the hyperrationalization of education.*[1]

I attribute the hyperrationalization of schooling to policymakers outside the local school system who are endeavouring to influence the schools.[2] This essay is a preliminary effort to understand the motives of policymakers, to analyse the conception of education they hold, and to explain why their efforts at educational policymaking frequently fail. We will see how policymakers' efforts to reform school practices result from and in an excessively rational view of schooling and why this view of schooling fails to lead to real school reform. Some implications of the analysis for improved policymaking conclude the essay.

2. Some examples of hyperrationalization

The phenomena to be described are efforts by policymakers to rationalize the means and ends of schooling. Since a rational view of the world is "natural," such efforts appear, on the surface, to be an appropriate way to change schools. Often they are appropriate; often they manifest a serious deficiency. That deficiency is the procession from rationale to action without adequate reason or evidence. What appears logical becomes the basis for action. However, what appears logical may or may not have a connection to reality. Where the connection to reality is absent, a policy intervention will fail.

(*a*) *Excessive prescription.* Policymakers have several means of influencing a school system. They may prescribe the inputs to the system, the process the system is to employ or the outcomes the system is to achieve. Traditionally, policymakers restricted themselves to prescribing inputs such as the minimum expenditure, the required number of days of school and the minimum qualifications of teachers. Recently policymakers have begun to prescribe expected outcomes like reading level, functional literacy and citizenship skills. Other legislated innovations such as individualized instruction, objectives-based education and class size are intended to prescribe the process of education. Usually these prescriptions are contained in separate pieces of legislation. Often an outcome prescription is made without considering whether it is attainable given resource (or input) constraints. Numerous logical and practical inconsistencies are the likely result of efforts to prescribe input, process, and outcome controls.

(*b*) *Procedural complexity.* Procedural complexity is often the result of efforts to respond to demands for sharing power. It results when those in power wish to appear to share authority without, in fact, surrendering authority. The response is a procedural rather than a substantive change. For example, the past decade has witnessed efforts to decentralize school systems, to provide for community participation, and to allow community control. But, prior to the advent of any of these reforms, school systems have procedures for arriving at decisions. Frequently, existing procedures are not removed to make way for the new procedures; the new procedures simply are added to the old. A rational system of decision-making gives way to a hyperrational system as added procedures rather than redistributed authority becomes the response.

(*c*) *Inappropriate solutions.* Inappropriate solutions frequently are derived out of ignorance or an inability or unwillingness to deal with a problem. For example, a prevailing view is that schools exist to prepare a child to enter society. It is occasionally observed that schools are not adequately preparing students to enter society. This observation gives rise to the suggestion that schools should be better articulated with the needs of society. This suggestion leads to the creation of a programme or a curriculum to further that articulation. If high school graduates cannot find jobs, create a career education programme. If crime is on the rise,

create a moral education programme. Such programmes are often inappropriate because the problems which they are designed to solve have their genesis in social structure rather than in individual behaviour. The solution to the problem, in other words, may lie in reforming society or the school rather than in the creation of a specific programme or curriculum. The logic that connects the problem to the solution is faulty.

(*d*) *First-order solution.* A school problem is identified and the statement of the problem becomes the statement of the solution as a first-order analysis of the problem is made to yield the solution. Schools are not accountable, so create an accountability programme. High school graduates are incompetent, so create a competency-based high school graduation programme. Teachers are incompetent, so create a competency-based teacher education programme. The creation of a programme with the same name as the problem yields the appearance of coping with the problem. In fact, the problems referred to have solutions, if at all, at the very core of the education enterprise. Tinkering in superficial ways with the outcomes of schooling is very far from the real solution.

(*e*) *Wishful thinking.* When policymakers require by law that schools achieve a goal which in the past they have not achieved, they may be engaging in wishful thinking. Here policymakers behave as though their desires concerning what a school system should accomplish will, in fact, be accomplished if the policymakers simply decree it. The assumption appears to be that school officials are engaged in nonfeasance or malfeasance. For example, in 1965, the federal government enacted legislation designed to address the failure of schools to serve adequately the needs of some children, particularly poor children and children of certain racial minorities. School systems would receive federal funds to be spent on the education of poor children. The legislation required that school systems describe how those funds would be used to alter the education of poor children. The assumption was that change from preexisting educational practices could have beneficial educational consequences. School systems which presumably did not previously have the knowledge or will or wherewithal to affect such children would, with federal funds, discover the knowledge, gain the will, and have the wherewithal to solve the problem. Suffice it for now to say, these beneficial consequences have not quickly followed modest federal investment. One result, and a second example of wishful thinking, has been that state legislatures and state courts have been requiring by law specified levels of performance on the part of school-people and schoolchildren. Competency-based graduation requirements and rulings for "thorough and efficiency education" demand the schools to produce outcomes which they may not be able to achieve.

In apparent frustration and desperation, policymakers prescribe excessive controls, introduce complicated procedures, offer inappropriate solutions, devise simplistic solutions, and engage in wishful thinking. To buttress these interventions, policymakers often turn to educational and social science research. Yet research is seldom able to settle important policy issues. Despite this, policies often are rationalized by unverified or tentative research findings. Such inappropriate reliance on research may be going beyond science to scientism—yet another manifestation of hyperrationalization.

3. Rational educational management systems

The hyperrational approach to schooling is best seen in the continual invention of rational educational management systems. Perhaps we should refer to the *reinvention* of the rational educational management system for, as we shall see, when the jargon is stripped away, the systems are nearly identical. The period 1910 to 1929 described by Raymond E. Callahan in

Educational and the Cult of Efficiency could be characterized by a few phrases like "efficiency," "educational cost accounting," and "scientific management."[3] The years since then have seen an apparent sophistication in the application of industrial management practices to education. Now our vocabulary must include: (1) accountability, (2) planning, programming, budgeting systems (PPBS), (3) management-by-objectives (MBO), (4) operations analysis, (5) systems analysis, (6) programme evaluation and review technique (PERT), (7) management information systems (MIS), (8) management science, (9) planning models, (10) cost-benefit analysis, (11) cost effectiveness analysis, (12) economic analysis, and (13) systems engineering. Presumably these practices are ready for application; less ready for application but nonetheless applicable are: (1) operations research, (2) systems research, (3) simulation studies and (4) productivity research. Since the period Callahan studied, public management practices have joined industrial management practices as perceived useful models for educational management.

While all of these techniques are purely management techniques which are perceived to be applicable to education, the ideology which has given rise to their use has also given rise to derivative approaches which are the adaptation of management science to education. These include (1) performance contracting, (2) educational vouchers and (3) educational technology. Perhaps more important, however, the management ideology has focused concern upon the output of the educational system. That concern has manifested itself in two ways. First we have devised numerous systems for focusing attention upon outputs. These include: (1) competency-based education (CBE), (2) competency-based teacher education, (3) assessment systems (federal, state and local), (4) programme evaluation, (5) learner verification, (6) behavioural objectives, (7) mastery learning, (8) criterion-referenced testing, and (9) educational indicators. Secondly, we have devised rubrics for our minimum expectations for school output. We have sought to describe the nature of education which is designed to transform the output of the school system to the input of society. The term "functional literacy" best captures this transformation but other dimensions of education are captured by (1) basic education, (2) basic skills, (3) career education, and (4) moral education. Consistent with the management ideology, research on education must now be concerned with school effectiveness and teacher effectiveness.

It is not self-evident that these terms represent the only or best ways to think about education. Let us consider the cumulative effect of a few of these schemes upon the role of the teacher in a hypothetical school district in a hypothetical state. (Actually, if all the accountability laws on the books in California were implemented, it could be substituted for the hypothetical state.) The simple accountability system holds the teacher "accountable" for achieving prespecified objectives but allows the teacher discretion to determine how these objectives are to be achieved. The derivative systems build from the simple system and, in their elaboration, eliminate the discretion of the teacher to determine how the prespecified objectives are to be attained.

Competency-based education is the simple accountability system viewed from the student's perspective. The competencies which a student is to demonstrate are prespecified so that the teacher knows what is to be accomplished. Since the school system knows what it expects of its students, it hires teachers who demonstrate in advance that they can teach in the manner necessary to ensure that the students gain the desired competencies. Hence the school system hires only graduates of CBTE programmes and/or persons certified as competent by CBTC (competency based teacher certification) procedures. It is assumed that research will have identified those competencies of teachers which enable them to develop the desired competencies in students. (This must be assumed because research has not thus far identified such competencies in teachers.) All teachers entering the system will demonstrate the appro-

priate competencies; all teachers presently in the system will receive in-service education. By this process the range of teacher behaviour will be narrowed to the point at which the *method* of achieving student objectives will be prescribed. The operation of the general accountability system and its derivatives—CBE, CBTE and CBTC—have determined what and how the teacher is to teach.

However, in the event that accountability, CBE, CBTE and CBTC do not yield the desired result, alternative derivatives of general accountability theory provide redundant protection. "Learner verification," a less well known derivative of accountability theory, assesses the effectiveness of instructional materials. When this legislation is operative, a publisher will have to provide evidence that his materials have been tested with children and revised on the basis of this experience. An underlying assumption is that there is a best way to use the materials; the publisher must make that best way known through in-service education. Florida legislation, for example, requires that "such text revision . . . be interpreted as including specific revision of the materials themselves, revision of the teachers' materials and *revision of the teachers' skill through retraining*" (emphasis added). If the teacher's behaviour (1) has not been sufficiently defined by the expected objectives; (2) has not been properly trained by CBTE; and (3) has not been properly selected by CBTC, then the residual variability in his or her behaviour will be reduced by learner verification of the materials of instruction.

Should learner verification not complete the task, then a managerial derivative of accountability theory will. A planning, programming and budgeting system is a mechanism by which the administration of the school system sets and tracks the accountability process. Given a set of objectives, the administration plans their implementation, programmes the system, and budgets accordingly. Programming in this context can only mean programming the teacher.

Policymakers must be assuming a hyperrational view of the process of schooling with the school a closed, deterministic system. The relationship of the elements of the system are assumed to be known so that the manipulation of one element will have predictable consequences on the other elements. Said another way, given a set of educational objectives and a rational educational management system, the school is assumed to be under complete control.

4. The motivations of educational policymakers

Efforts to rationalize schooling are not new. Callahan has well documented the excesses which were wrought in the name of "efficiency" in the early part of this century.[4] Accompanying the early cult of efficiency was an emphasis on vocationalism. Rationalizing schooling has involved both the practice and the purposes of education. The new cult of efficiency, as H. Thomas James has dubbed it, is distinguished from the old by virtue of "rational planning models" having replaced "efficiency" and, it might be added, by "career education" having replaced "vocationalism."[5]

Under our structure of government, policymakers have the duty to set the goals for schools and the conditions under which the goals are to be achieved. Not only do policymakers decide what the schools are to accomplish, but they also may insist that no laws be broken and that schools be run efficiently. Hyperrationalization is the unfortunate result of legitimate efforts by legislators and other policymakers to improve schools. Some problems arise chiefly because the technology for accomplishing school improvement by policy interventions is inadequate. Other problems arise from efforts to avoid difficult decisions. For example, policymakers are anxious to reduce costs in education as elsewhere. Because education is still a relatively high public priority, policymakers cannot simply maintain or reduce spending levels. Because they cannot legislate rising costs away, they must rationalize decisions to keep budgets from

rising. This need gives rise to the demand for rational planning systems in the anticipation that the imposition of such systems will reveal ways to control costs. Evidence to date would suggest that rational planning systems are less effective means to control costs than the direct imposition of budget ceilings! Similarly, it has been shown that career education programmes are a less effective means to reduce unemployment than the creation of jobs! Hyperrationalization then often results when policymakers do not want to make difficult decisions.

While policymakers, desirous of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of schools, have created a demand for rational management models, a continuous supply has been forthcoming. While policymakers try to conceive of education as an industry, educational administrators and professors of educational administration try to conceive of educational management as industrial management. As new rational management models are invented in industry, educational administration, lacking an independent basis of expertise, adopts them. The existence of rational educational management models thus reinforces the propensity of policymakers to hyperrationalize education.

To create goals for education is to will that something occur. But goals, in the absence of a theory of how to achieve them, are mere wishful thinking. If there is no reason to believe that a goal is attainable—as perhaps evidenced by the fact that it has never been attained—then a rational planning model may not result in goal attainment. Rational planning models, as we shall see, do not contain adequate theories of education.

5. The essence of educational policymaking

Educational policy is created by legislative enactment, executive decree and judicial pronouncement. However created, its purpose is to affect the practice of education. Inevitably, then, an educational policy must be based upon some assumptions about educational practice. If these assumptions are correct, then the policy may have its intended consequence. If these assumptions are incorrect, then the policy will probably not have its intended consequences.

An educational policy contains two elements—an aim that the educational system is to achieve and a "theory of education" or set of hypotheses that explain how that aim is to be achieved. The aim may deal with the ends of education and may be drawn from religion, ethics, tradition, the law, or other normative sources. The schools must prepare students to read, to face the world of work, to accept their place in society, or to question the current social order. The aim may deal with the means of education and may be drawn from economic theory, the law, or other sources which prescribe how a society wishes to conduct its institutions. The schools must be efficient, treat all equally, provide due process, or secure order through force if necessary.

A theory of education may be drawn from common sense, professional lore or social science. From common sense, we know that a large organization cannot function effectively unless it has highly developed bureaucratic procedures! From professional lore we know that a teacher cannot function as effectively in a large class as in a small! From social science we variously know that integration works or that it does not! If the theory of education or hypothesis is correct, then the policy may work. If the theory of education or hypothesis is incorrect then the policy will probably not work. Needless to say, a policy may have unintended consequences. And a particular policy statement may or may not be explicit about its aims or its theory of education. But analysing an educational policy in this way reveals that its educational theory component may be examined by the canons of science and scientific criticism.

Most educational policies of the 1960s and 1970s share a common set of assumptions about schooling:

1. While many goals for education are imaginable, society must find a limited set upon which agreement is possible. The emerging consensus appears to be that the purpose of schooling is to provide the child with the basic skills necessary for effective participation as a citizen and as a member of the workforce. Establishing a limited goal for schools is thought to facilitate goal attainment.

2. This goal must be put in a form which will permit assessment of the extent to which the goal is attained. Most effort has been given to defining basic skills in reading and mathematics. Such definition is thought to facilitate goal attainment.

3. Tests are then devised to assess performance in reading and mathematics. When the scores are available they will be compared with other scores—districtwide, statewide or nationwide. Such comparisons are thought to facilitate student, teacher, programme, and school evaluation and improvement.

4. Some complexity is added by the realization that some children arrive at school less well prepared than others. For such children schools will variously either adjust expectations downwards or provide supplementary educational services.

5. Finally, education is to be conducted efficiently or in a cost-effective manner; the goal is to be attained at least-cost. Planning, resource allocation and test results are to be tracked by ever more sophisticated evaluation and accounting systems.

Absent from this set of assumptions about education is reference to the process of education —to how educational practice affects the child. Thus educational policy is designed to alter the practice of education without an understanding of how education actually occurs. There are three possible explanations. First, policymakers wish to leave the process of education to the professionals. This seems unlikely since the kind of policymaking described is designed to force remediation in professional practice. Second, policymakers have not yet been furnished the tools for legislating about the educational process. This seems plausible since they do employ the tools that have been furnished by educational research. Witness the alacrity with which criterion-referenced testing has been adopted. Third, policymakers may believe that it is sufficient to cause something to occur by legislating that it should occur. At the very least this explanation is not inconsistent with the behaviour of some policymakers.

6. The limits of the rational model

To those who believe that reform of procedures will lead to reform of education, the rational model of schooling looks unquestionably correct. If only the schools will tighten up this or that procedure, good educational results will follow. If only the schools are given clear objectives to achieve, then the objectives will certainly be achieved. However, since such changes do not inevitably lead to the predicted result, perhaps there is something wrong with the rational model—the model which provides the basis for the predicted relationship between the change and the result. Perhaps the self-evident rational model does not, in fact, match the reality of schools.

The failure of schools to conform to the rational model may be seen in the failure thus far to create models which help explain the process of schooling empirically. The collection of elements which comprise schooling obviously and by definition interact with each other and affect one another. The history of disciplined inquiry in education is a search to describe, analyse, and predict the effects of these interactions. Research on teaching has been a search for the effects which teachers have; research on schools has been a search for the effects which schooling has. Yet, as we know so well by now, research on teacher effects and school effects has failed to explain much of the reality of schooling.

The 1966 *Equality of Educational Opportunity Report* (*EEOR*) epitomizes the use of the rational model in the search for school effects.[6] In abstracting reality, the study accepts the basic input-process-output paradigm that has become the basis for thinking about education. It assumes that aggregate achievement test score maximization is the goal of the schools. It assumes that resources are effectively deployed. It assumes that efficiency principles operate in schools. Yet all of these assumptions are likely violated in the way schools operate. The point here is not to undertake another critique of *EEOR*. Rather, it is to suggest that it rests on assumptions that may be violated by reality. If this disjuncture between the model and reality exists, then improvements in measurement, methodology and research design will not yield great increases in the explanation of schooling. Moreover, efforts to increase explanation by means of experimental modifications of schooling would be beside the point; schooling as it now operates may defy the kind of logical assumptions which we are accustomed to make.

Further corroboration of the disjuncture between the rational model and school reality is to be found in the continual failure of the various rational management models. Accountability, PPBS and the like have not had much effect upon the schools. On the one hand, the rational management models may have been poorly conceived and poorly executed and better conceptions and better executions may work. On the other hand, the operation of schools may be inconsistent with the assumptions of the rational management models. In this case, there is no reason to expect the rational management models to have an effect upon schools.

A model—like the rational model—leads us to make predictions. When these predictions generally fail, it is not reality but the model which is at fault.

To conclude from the *Equality of Educational Opportunity Report* that variations in inputs are unrelated to variations in output is to conclude only that a multiple regression analysis did not reveal relationships. Because schooling cannot be explained in this manner is not to imply that schooling cannot be explained. The acceptance of this implication would be tantamount either to the belief that schooling is random or to the rejection of science.

7. One different description of school reality

Educational policymakers behave as though they believe that schools operate according to the rational model. That model postulates that schools operate by setting goals, implementing programmes to achieve these goals and evaluating the extent to which the goals are attained. The goal-oriented process is assumed to be effectuated through a bureaucratic distribution of formal authority and work responsibility. It is further assumed that the attainment of goals provides sufficient incentives to drive the system. Policies emanating from a belief in the rational model are designed to improve the operation of the goal-oriented process. Schemes which promise to increase accountability, efficiency and effectiveness are imposed on the existing bureaucratic structure of the school in the anticipation that they will improve the school, conceived as a rational organization.

Despite the possibility that schools may not conform to the rational model, it remains the dominant framework in the discourse of educational policymakers, organizational theorists and educational administrators. Interestingly, the rational model does not seem to have become the dominant framework for teachers' discourse on teaching, schooling and education. This difference between teachers and others concerned with schools suggests several questions. Are there other frameworks for describing schools? Do these frameworks come closer to capturing school reality? Do the frameworks embraced by teachers help explain the failure of educational policies? One alternative source of frameworks is provided by the humanistically-oriented reform literature.

A second alternative source of frameworks is provided by the ways in which teachers describe their work. One particularly useful formulation of how teachers see school reality is provided by Dan C. Lortie's analysis of interviews with teachers.[7] The picture that he paints bears little resemblance to that imagined by those who believe in the rational model.

Those who believe in the rational model assume that the process of education rests on an underlying order. Lortie found that teachers may not share this "scientific" assumption:

> A scientific approach, however, normally begins with the assumption that there is an underlying order in the phenomena under study. It is not clear that all or most teachers make that assumption about their world. Some see teaching outcomes as capricious and describe short-term results in almost mysterious terms. If that viewpoint is widespread, it is not surprising that teachers do not invest in searching for general principles to inform their work. If they suspect that classroom events are beyond comprehension, inquiry is futile.[8]

Not only does the rational model assume predictability in behaviour, but it also simplifies reality:

> Those trained in behavioral science are used to accepting short-run measurements as evidence of effectiveness; it would be easy to assume that these teachers do not want to confront the possibility of low impact on students. But one wonders: styles of thought which pervade science may not work for those who take personal responsibility for the development of children. Science moves ahead through deliberate and sophisticated simplifications of reality, but there is little to suggest that this is the approach of classroom teachers.[9]

While the rational model abstracts and simplifies reality, a teacher will not; he or she is responsible for the whole child.

Lortie argues that a powerful force on the orientation of teachers is their observation over the years of their own teachers. Conceptions of education are formed before exposure to teacher training. The rational model implicitly adopts a view of education drawn from the behavioural sciences:

> Teacher training is increasingly influenced by ideas drawn from behavioral science. Those trained in behavioral disciplines are inclined to conceptualize teaching in instrumental terms—to talk of "treatments" and "options" and to assess outcomes in terms of measurable and discrete objectives. One wonders how effectively such professors communicate with the many students who, it appears, see teaching as the "living out" of prior conceptions of good teaching. Students who conceive of teaching (consciously or not) as expressing qualities associated with revered models will be less attuned to the pragmatic and rationalistic conceptions of teaching found in behavioral science. The two groups—students and professors—may talk past one another.[10]

The rational model of education is alien to the teachers' prior conceptions of education.

The rational model makes important assumptions about how the school operates. For example, it assumes that the goals of education are set politically, transmitted through the school district and school hierarchies and then come to rest with the teacher for implementation. To what degree does this assumption accord with reality? To what extent do the formal goals of the school system guide the actions of teachers? According to Lortie:

> If teacher pride were ordered in strict adherence to organizational, formal goals, we would expect to find heavy emphasis on results

> attained with entire classes; school systems present themselves as concerned with the learning of all students. It is provocative, therefore, that fewer than one-third (29 percent) of the Five Towns teachers mentioned generalized outcomes with entire classes, and that most of these did so in an offhand manner. Such responses seemed to occur with teachers working in particular subjects and grades—the more tangible and visible the learning they were seeking to promote, the likelier they were to emphasize general gains with students. Examples are initial reading, physical education skills, typing, and skill subjects in home economics. A few elementary teachers linked pride to favorable outcomes on achievement tests, but they seemed hesitant to do so.[11]

Perhaps surprisingly, teachers do not naturally emphasize objective group results. Yet, the rational model assumes that the underlying objective of the teacher is to maximize aggregate achievement test scores. Advocates of the rational model will argue that accountability schemes are designed to focus the teacher's attention on output measures. And indeed, teaching for the test has occurred. However, whether the teacher has fundamentally altered his orientation is quite another matter. Until it can be understood why teachers do not now use tests as a gauge of successful teaching, policies which assume that teachers are trying to maximize test scores are not likely to improve education.

Formally stated goals will only affect students as they are mediated by teachers. Currently, teachers translate formal goals into personalized objectives:

> Educational goals are often stated in global, even utopian terms . . . [W]e observed that teachers "reduce" such goals into specific objectives they use in their daily work. This reduction apparently involves two conservative tendencies: relying on personal convictions and obtaining high satisfaction from outcomes that are less than universalistic. When teachers cannot use stated goals to guide their actions, organizational objectives give way to personal values; the personal values of teachers, as we saw . . . are heavily influenced by past experience.[12]

Unless the underlying reward system is altered to modify the behaviour of teachers the process of goal redefinition will likely continue. In short, the picture of school reality which emerges from interviews with teachers stands in stark contrast to the school reality envisioned by the rational model. Other research methods may reveal yet other frameworks for understanding school reality.

8. The disjuncture between the rational model and school reality

An important new concept—the idea that schools are "loosely coupled systems"—has entered the literature of organizational theory. The concept is meant to imply that the elements of the system of the school are not necessarily rationally or tightly related. Karl E. Weick has described loose coupling as conveying:

> the image that coupled events are responsive, but that each event also preserves its own identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness. Thus, in the case of an educational organization, it may be the case that the counselor's office is loosely coupled to the principal's office. The image is that the principal and the counselor are somehow attached, but that each retains some identity and separateness and that their attachment may be circumscribed, infrequent, weak in its mutual affects, unimportant, and/or slow to respond. Each of those connotations would be conveyed if the qualifier loosely were

> attached to the word coupled. Loose coupling also carries connotations of impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness all of which are potentially crucial properties of the "glue" that holds organizations together.
>
> Glassman (1973) categorizes the degree of coupling between two systems on the basis of the activity of the variables which the two systems share. To the extent that two systems either have few variables in common or share weak variables, they are independent of each other. Applied to the educational situation, if the principal–vice-principal–superintendent is regarded as one system and the teacher–classroom–pupil–parent–curriculum as another system, then by Glassman's argument if we did not find many variables in the teacher's world to be shared in the world of a principal and/or if the variables, in common were unimportant relative to the other variables, then the principal can be regarded as being loosely coupled with the teacher.[13]

The idea of loose coupling provides another challenge to the rational model of the school. It also provides a way to describe the disjuncture between the rational model and school reality.

In fact, the concept of loosely coupled systems helps to make explicit at least four aspects of hyperrationalization. First, it explains why manipulating some elements in the system of the school may have no consequences for other elements. Second, it directs attention to the possibility that the educational policymaking system may be loosely coupled to the operating educational system. Third, it reveals that researchers have frequently assumed in advance that schools operate as rational organizations. Fourth, it suggests that hyperrationalization may be evidence that loose coupling exists. Loose coupling is thus a complementary concept to hyperrationalization.

Efforts to rationalize the processes or the goals of schools frequently do not have the anticipated effects. Two mechanisms which couple some non-school organizations are technical core and authority of office. An automobile factory is coupled by its technical core as embodied in the assembly line. A military organization is coupled by the authority of office as embodied in the chain-of-command. The school may be coupled by neither of these and may, therefore, be loosely-coupled. New policies which hold schools accountable for attaining specified goals may have no effect upon the *processes* of education. Without changes in the processes, it is difficult to understand how new goals can be attained. A requirement that an individualized instruction plan be developed for every handicapped child will have no effect if it is not tied to budget and programme decisions. If budget and programme decisions continue to be made in the traditional way, the creation of individualized programme plans is a paper exercise.

If educational policymakers are inclined to embrace the rational model of the school and teachers are inclined to embrace less rationalistic models of schooling, then the policymaking system may not be communicating with the operating system. The policymaking system shares few variables in common with the operating system. Indeed, the different actors in the education scene hold different ideologies and believe in different theories of education. Policymakers create policies which are consistent with the rational model and which would work if the rational model were a good representation of school reality. Practising educators do not believe in the rational model and do not share its assumptions. The policies do not work because the rational model is incorrect. While policies may not work because practising educators believe that they should not work, this seems unlikely given the unrealistic assumptions contained in rationalistic policies.

The idea of loose coupling alerts us to the possibility that we may learn more about schools if we do not assume in advance that they are rational. Traditionally, researchers have constructed rational models of schools in order to study them; researchers seem to have reached a

limit in understanding school phenomena. Parenthetically, and ironically, the propensity of policymakers to view education rationally is reinforced whenever they turn to researchers for advice. Policymakers seeing that schools have been studied rationalistically believe that they can be made to conform to the researchers' model. In this fashion, research models prematurely become the basis for accountability and assessment schemes.

Weick has suggested that overrationalization (his term) may be evidence that loose coupling exists. When the couplings between elements receive excessive attention, it may be because they are loose. In this light, we can understand the monumental efforts occasionally undertaken by state superintendents of education to identify the goals of education. Arguably, because state superintendents lack influence over schools, they undertake ritual efforts to develop statements of goals for education. More recently, state legislatures, frustrated at the poor match between the competencies of high school graduates and the demands of society, have required the generation of lists of expected competencies for high school graduates. Efforts to rationalize in detail what the schools are to accomplish may reveal the loose coupling of the legislature and the school. Hyperrationalization is, then, the perceived antidote to loose coupling; that it does not work should not surprise us.

9. The drive towards hyperrationalization

The drive toward extensive proceduralization and hyperrationalization is the result of the desire by those outside the traditional decision-making structure of the local school system to influence the schools. When an aggrieved group cannot secure a desired change via the traditional decision-making structure, it turns to other potential educational policymakers. When the schools seem unable or unwilling to teach the basic skills, there is a turning to the state legislature for a mandate for proficiency testing. When the schools are unwilling to desegregate, there is a turning to the federal courts. When the schools discriminate on the basis of sex, there is a turning to the federal government. When teachers cannot gain sufficient influence, there is a turning to collective bargaining. The response by these other educational policymakers is often to require new procedures. In turn, the response of the schools frequently is to accept these new procedures without altering the procedures which already exist. The result is the proliferation of procedures and the appearance of change. But because the existing procedures are not altered, progress has not occurred.

There is perhaps no more potent force for hyperrationalization than the increased use of the courts to alter (and thereby create) educational policy. It is in the nature of the judicial process to rationalize the subject matter with which it deals. Courts review legislation to ascertain whether a practice is consistent with constitutional or statutory law. However, certain features of the law render problematic the enunciation of court created educational policy. First, a court's decision affects all schools within its jurisdiction. When it is the US Supreme Court, the jurisdiction is the nation. Yet local circumstances vary. Second, a court decision is theoretically forever. Courts have great difficulty in reversing prior decisions. Yet circumstances do change. Third, courts do not have great flexibility in the application of policy. A ruling must be of general applicability. Yet local circumstances vary. The criticality of these features has been accentuated by the changing nature of court rulings.

The traditional function of the courts was to determine whether a particular case presented a finding that was unlawful or unconstitutional. The court, having found that a particular practice violated the law, would require that it be remedied. The finding of a violation and the demand for a remedy was as far as the court would go. More recently, the courts have, *in addition*, specified the criteria which the remedy would need to satisfy, thus constraining the range of remedies which the court would find acceptable. As the courts have continued to

specify criteria, they have, in some cases, arrived at the point of prescribing the remedy. The problem is that the remedy may be wrong; or it may be superfluous in some circumstances; or it may be overrigid. Yet it blankets the jurisdiction and is difficult to reverse.

One effect of court action is to proceduralize actions which in the past have been accomplished by informal means. In fact, the court can dictate that its own procedures replace procedures which the local school has itself devised. In still other cases, a school may be led to have duplicative procedures. Often new procedures are mandated without full recognition of the functional consequences of the old procedures or of the dysfunctional consequences of the new procedures.

A dramatic example is provided by the District of Columbia schools which must assign teachers (and other educational resources) in consonance with a court order which requires that resources be distributed so that per pupil expenditures do not vary by more than 5%. The procedures for assigning resources must also conform to educational requirements, union contracts and various federal guidelines including the "comparability" requirement of Title I, ESEA, the latter being similar but not identical to the requirements of the court order. The effects of a school being subject to numerous policymaking bodies are apparent.[14]

A recent Supreme Court decision *Goss* v. *Lopez* created "the right of a student not to be suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due process hearing either before or promptly following the suspension".[15] Thus every school in the nation must "give notice and a due process hearing" whenever a student is to be suspended. It is possible in the future that a school may have to "give notice and due process hearing" whenever a serious decision concerning a student is made. As the dissenting opinion in *Goss* said:

> No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new "thicket" the Court now enters. Today's ruling appears to sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educational process. Teachers and other school authorities are required to make many decisions that may have serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, for example, how to grade the student's work, whether a student passes or fails a course, whether he is to be promoted, whether he is required to take certain subjects, whether he may be excluded from inter-scholastic athletics or other extracurricular activities, whether he may be removed from one school and sent to another, whether he may be bused long distances when available schools are nearby and whether he should be placed in a "general," "vocational," or "college-preparatory" track.[16]

The proceduralization of many discretionary school decisions constitutes the hyperrationalization of education.

The courts appear to be more avid consumers of research than the executive or legislative branches. The use of social science evidence has probably had more dramatic effects upon courts than has generally been recognized. Analysts have generally looked for explicit evidence that a court has based its decision upon scientific evidence introduced in the case. While evidence is frequently introduced, it often seems that the court reaches its decision on other grounds or that the court uses the evidence to reinforce its decision reached on other grounds. More important, however, is the prevailing ideology which surrounds an issue as it comes to the court. The courts seem to be influenced by the prevailing scientific opinion which surrounds the issue. That is, the assumptions which a judge knowingly or unknowingly brings to bear are coloured by prevailing scientific opinion. When such opinion is incomplete, tentative, or wrong, efforts to base policy upon it may be inappropriate. A court's propensity to rationalize decisions on the basis of unvalidated knowledge may constitute hyperrationalization.

One result has been that the courts, perhaps encouraged by some expert's testimony, set demands on the schools which are beyond the capacity of educational science or technology. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently required "thorough and efficient" education which it defined as "that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen, and as a competitor in the labour market".[17] Aside from the insuperable value judgments required by the decree, we likely lack the technical capacity to achieve it, for it seems to demand results that we so far have not found a way to achieve for some children.

10. Towards more effective educational policymaking

The concept of hyperrationalization helps to explain why educational policymaking frequently fails. As indicated at the outset, rationalization is synonymous with bureaucratization. Bureaucracies exist to rationalize the enterprises which they encompass. Educational bureaucracies have long served to rationalize the educational enterprise. Our thesis is that rationalization has reached the point at which further rationalization ceases to be functional. The forces of hyperrationalization are designed to remedy some group's perception of ineffectiveness, inefficiency, or unfairness in the schools. Yet there is a theoretical limit to the school's capacity to absorb new procedures without a fundamental redesign. The cumulative effect is burdensome ot the point of unmanageability. Moreover, the rational model of the school is at best a partial representation of school reality. Schools have probably reaped the benefits of improvements that result from the application of the factory metaphor.

What are the implications of the hyperrationalization hypothesis for more effective educational policymaking? First, some may see the idea leading to the debureaucratization of schooling. I am inclined to reject this suggestion because school bureaucracy has evolved precisely to mediate the interests of the child and the state. Unless the state's interest in education is diminished—a prospect which seems most unlikely—bureaucracy seems essential. Second, some may see the humanistically oriented reform literature as an antidote to hyperrationalization. The humanization of schools by *policy initiatives* would require the development of concepts to link the reform movement and the policy process. So far the policy process has exhibited a greater affinity for the rationalistic rather than the humanistic conception of education.

Third, and most immediately, a distinction can be drawn between rationalization and hyperrationalization. The hypothesis should sensitize us to distinguish between proper and excessive rationalization of schooling. An affirmative answer to the following questions may mean that hyperrationalization is in evidence:

1. Does the policy introduce new procedures without altering or deleting old procedures?

2. Does the policy prescribe output without taking cognizance of existing input and process prescriptions?

3. Does the policy imply that a structural problem can be solved by the education of the individual?

4. Is the policy to be implemented without considering organizational and group dynamics?

5. Are tentative research findings being used to defend the policy?

6. Are solutions being proposed on the basis of superficial, incomplete, or incorrect analyses of the problem?

7. Are unattainable or never before attained goals being set?

8. Are uniform solutions being proposed for non-uniform situations? Evidence of hyperrationalization may suggest that the policy will not have its intended consequence.

Fourth, and most importantly, the idea of hyperrationalization underscores the need for a new paradigm for thinking about the schools. Educational policies fail because they are premised on the idea that the school is a rational organization—like a factory—which can be managed and improved by rational management procedure. Indeed, much of the collective effort of policymakers, researchers and administrators is aimed at making school reality conform to the rational model. We then bemoan the fact that the schools fail to conform to the model. It just may be that we need a new paradigm.

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Source: A. E. Wise, 'Why educational policies often fail: The hyperrationalization hypothesis', *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1977, pp. 43–57.

3

Schools for democracy?[1]

A.H. Halsey

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INTRODUCTION

The reproduction of generations is everybody's business. If Everyman is a democrat, does it not follow that, for the upbringing of his children, he must provide schools for democracy? I have argued elsewhere the general thesis that Britain has democracy as its most valuable political inheritance[2] (its 'radical tradition') and that the further development of social democracy is an alternative future to the conventionally hackneyed forecasting of Britain in economic decline. If we see democratic reform as unfinished business, then schools come into view as a problem of government as well as of finance in educational policies for the nineteen eighties. The question can be put sociologically rather than politically. Sociologists of education influenced by Marx have, more or less crudely, argued a correspondence between the structure of the school and the structure of society (or at least capitalist society).[3] Provided that the functionalism of this notion is not so rigid as to conceive societies as internal combustion engines, and provided that causal directions are not locked into the straightjacket of orthodox Marxism, correspondence is to be expected. If so, a democratic society may in turn be expected both to practise democratic school government and to teach democracy to its children. But what kind of democracy? Direct or indirect? These questions can be raised in the form of a possible translation of Yugoslavian socialist self-management[4] into British social democracy.

The Government of Expanding Education

Traditionally the government of child rearing was largely left to the family. But in societies with a more complex division of labour, or in groups with specialised functions like priests, or social strata with special powers like aristocrats or warriors, quasi-familial or 'public' arrangements evolved: and in modern societies the development of vast state bureaucracies has become normal and dominant. The expansion of educational provision in first- and second-world countries, from roughly 1870 to 1970, was remarkable. It has been overwhelmingly a state enterprise, the conspicuously successful nationalised industry. Religious and private organisation of schools and colleges survives with varying degrees of social significance in most first-world countries. Indeed, in some a privileged private sector may be of re-emerging importance, and in the U.S.S.R. private tuition is among the more flourishing segments of the underground economy.[5] Nor was marketed education ever totally absent from the working-class districts in the factory towns of industrialising Britain in the nineteenth century. But the dominant influence from Victorian times, and the major source of financial support, has been the state. Educational systems everywhere are formidably bureaucratic, combining professional and administrative experts in hierarchical formations to link government at one end with students and pupils at the other.

Looking back from a British or first-world vantage point, it all appears as a hugely successful feature of the development of the welfare state. Industrialisation pulled and democratised politics pushed education into providing opportunities for entry into an increasingly skilled and 'non-manual' structure of occupations. The proletariat was being slowly but steadily abolished by cultural incorporation in schools to match political incorporation in democracy, and economic incorporation in a modernised industry. Education was widely seen as both the source of wealth (human capital) and the means of freedom: it was accordingly an important plank in the platform of liberal and progressive reform from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century. First, universal primary education was the typical goal of the nineteenth century. Then, in the early part of the twentieth century, came the drive to expand secondary schooling. In a third stage it became universal, and fourth, in what now looks like the final flourish of

educational enthusiasm, there was a massive development of higher education in the 1950s and 1960s.

Some countries, like the United States, Canada, and Sweden, travelled farther and faster along this path than did others: but the direction of the journey was everywhere the same, and progress along it defined modernity, even if in the later stages the policy of educational expansion had to be defended more as an adornment to economic growth than as a means to its achievement. Meantime, universal primary and secondary education - a ten-year period of compulsory freedom to learn - has become the norm with at least one-quarter, or in some cases more than one half, of secondary school graduates going on to some form of post-secondary education.

Yet this Western European and North American picture has been viewed from a different angle since the early 1970s - that is since Jencks' Inequality (Basic Books, 1972), the OPEC intrusions, the welfare state backlash, and finally the rise of such political figures as Thatcher, Reagan and Frazer. There is now widespread scepticism with respect to the wealth-creating capacity of education, and widespread resistance to its further financial support. Pessimism abounds concerning the power of education to equalise life-chances, between classes, regions, ethnic groups, or sexes - at least as a policy isolated from other egalitarian policies. The efficacy of bureaucratised schooling is challenged. Still more important, the whole historically-determined relation of education to work is contested. Marxists like Bowles and Gintis are able to produce a plausible caricature of the American school as a state apparatus selecting and training children for the class positions which await them in the factory or the office. Optimists, meanwhile, turn their attention to experiment and debate on the various forms of continuing education, or l'education permanente. They do so in uneasy awareness that the record of liberal expansion (with respect to its three avowed aims of individual opportunity, effective workers and a principled social distribution of resources) is painfully vulnerable to criticism from the left and the right.

Alternative Forms of Educational Organisation

So the traditional centrist reformers may well put to themselves the Leninist question: 'What is to be done?' The answer they seek will be one which best accommodates the three requisites of individual

choice, economic effectiveness and social justice. Four main answers seem to be on offer.

The first answer, which an unbridled contemporary Toryism would instate, is the market solution. Its appeal is strong. It belongs to liberal tradition. It promises individual liberty. It reflects the moral maxim that all decent parents will do their best for their own children. It tames the bureaucrat, and keeps the teacher on his toes, eliminating the one, and paying the other what he deserves. It makes the family responsible for its young. It rewards thrift and rational investment. It motivates people to learn because they pay, and they pay the penalty for ignorance. This is the case for the commercial schools: (we should stop calling them 'public' which is an archaic term perpetuating the outlook of Victorian upper class parents who sought alternatives to the private family nursery): and it is a powerful one.

Why, then, is it unacceptable? The reason is that it ignores the third requisite of social justice, substituting parental purse for filial wit as the determinant of educational outcomes. It would become socially acceptable only by educational voucher schemes which are too socialistic to be conceivable Tory policy, and which would in any case restore the bureaucracy. And even then it would be a dubious servant of the second requisite - that schools produce an effective work force.

The second answer, urged on by evidence of low worker-productivity, youth unemployment, and mismatch of labour supply to labour demand, is to fashion the schools and colleges in direct response to analysis of industrial needs. This, not too unfairly, can be called the Russian solution, for that country is the outstanding case of resolve and perhaps success in treating educational development as an inference from manpower planning. It need not detain us despite its utility in respect of the second, economic, requisite. For it rides roughly over the first value of individual choice, and yields a social distribution of educational opportunity which is no more acceptable than that of the western capitalist countries.

The third answer is to do nothing - to accept that it is the state bureaucratic system which history has bequeathed to us. This solution can be even more briefly dismissed, for the point is that we can do better.

The fourth solution is democracy. This principle of human association, extended to schools and

colleges, could, it is argued, optimally balance the claims of the individual, the economy and society. It must be said at once that, universal adult franchise, locally-elected County Councils, the N.U.T., and amateur School Governors notwithstanding, democracy in school government has yet to be tried. But democracy, skeptics may immediately object, is too vague and easy a slogan. Democracy of whom? Are infants to be enfranchised? Are producer co-operatives envisaged, and if so, who are the producers?; teachers?; students?; parents?; administrators? Democracy for what? Who is to decide the curriculum? HMI?; CEO?; Headteacher?; the Socialist Workers' Association? Clearly democracy is an ambiguous principle, and not an absolute one.

Yet a catalogue of advocacy can be compiled for democratically-governed schools which is at least as compelling as that given above on behalf of the market. It gives individuals a fair say in decisions taken about their lives. It is the proudest boast of the British political tradition. Unless subverted by the tenuous chain of parliamentary government and administrative hierarchy which is the present system, it makes a much reduced number of bureaucrats into public servants. It accords to the teacher the dignity of professional service to his or her community. It makes people collectively and equally responsible for the rational use of scarce resources.

A YUGOSLAVIAN ALTERNATIVE

Almost all history is against this solution and in favour of the nationalised industry: almost but not quite all. Yugoslavia offers an exception. In the peculiar context of escape from the Russian empire and a vigorous tradition of ethnic pluralism and intense local loyalties, Yoguslavia has developed a form of market socialism which flourishes as much in schools as in factories. There is no federal budget and no commercial schooling. The standard Western pattern, and indeed even more that of the Russian communist block, is of a system initiated, funded, administered, and controlled by the state. In the early years after the War, Yugoslavia followed the same path, and still today one can identify some of the same traditional features. There remains a federal system of law and administration, the former laying down a constitutional framework for schools, and universities, the latter monitoring and encouraging the realisation of nationally-agreed program-

mes for reform. But, in an important sense the 22 million inhabitants of Yugoslavia see themselves as having been collectively reborn in 1947 when the travail of early post-war reconstruction was ended and the first five-year development plan was adopted. A qualitative shift in the nature of Yugoslav society has taken place in the thirty-five subsequent years.

Much of what went before has been forgotten. Before the Second World War Yugoslavia was an underdeveloped country towards the top of the bottom quarter of the world in terms of GNP per capita. Over half of the Yugoslav people were illiterate. Three-quarters of them worked in agriculture. The average life expectancy was forty-five years. The republics and regions were politically fragmented and economically largely stagnant. But old battles, movements and emnities are as obscure now as the names of their proponents. Turkish and Austrian imperialism, Venetian dominance, Serbian hegemony, Radic's Croatian Peasant Party, pre-War politicians like Pasic, Masec, Kovosec, Davidovic, or Cverkovic, even King Alexander, Prince Paul and Mihailovic, have been over-shadowed by the immense figure of Josep Broz Tito, whose image appears everywhere in school classrooms, public buildings and popular books, marking the identity of a new Yugoslavia.

What is remembered is the liberation struggle of World War II, the formation of a socialist federal republic, the break with Stalin, the pursuit of non-alignment abroad and, above all, of rapid economic and social development at home towards a distinctive form of democratic and decentralised Communism. A transition towards socialist democracy on the principle of self-management has involved a series of reforms in the government of territories, enterprises, schools and public services. The result of numerous changes - culminating most recently in the Constitution of 1974 - is an elaborate complex of governing bodies at the local, provincial, republican, and Federal levels. To the newcomer, as no doubt to the indigenous child, they are at first baffling in their variety. But they are informed by concepts which, though unlikely to be found in an anthology of elegant phrases from modern literature, do have their place in any serious grammar of modern politics.

Socialist Self-Management

No discussion of society, the economy, government, or the schools in Yugoslavia proceeds without repeated references to the concept of "self-management". It is the most ubiquitous term in the Yugoslav political lexicon. It appeared on banners and flags to rally the partisans in World War II. It so permeates the society that understanding the idea and learning the skills to practise it are essential for any citizen. It is the fundamental notion which epitomises the independence and the self-directed nature of the Yugoslavian people. The essence of self-management is that all those who work in a factory, a business or a school share as equals in the running of it. Participatory decision-making includes determining what to produce or what services to offer, pricing those goods or services, setting wages, and selecting managers. Not every worker is fully incorporated into the self-managing economy for there remains a non-socialised sector, notably in small-scale farming. Nevertheless, the principle of self-management is intended - in theory at least - to be carried out at every level and in every operating unit of the society.

In the smallest and economically simplest unit, the concept of self-management translates into straightforward practice. The self-managing group of workers who run, for example, a restaurant, meet to decide the menu, the prices, the opening hours, and the division of labour between them. If people patronize the restaurant and the enterprise is successful, there will be a surplus of income over expenses which is then distributed to the workers as wages.

Organisation on such a small scale permits direct democracy. Operations of larger scale complicate self-management because every worker cannot in practice be consulted about all policies. Representative democracy must be built on direct democracy. If hierarchies are unavoidable, mechanisms must be devised to make them the servants rather than the masters of the workers in the enterprise. Complications also ensue as in the case of education, in which the relationship of the enterprise to the 'market place' is neither direct nor immediate. Prices in such sectors of the economy must emerge not from economic supply and demand but from a process of social persuasion and agreement.

The smallest self-managing institution, or basic organisation of associated labour (BOAL), is an elementary or secondary school. All the staff, whether teachers or ancillaries, form a Workers' Council. Then there is also a Governing Council which includes not only representatives of the school staff but also of local citizens and parents in the case of an elementary school or of local work organisations and of students in the case of a secondary school.

The university presents a more complex arrangement of self-management. It could be argued that self-management in European universities generally has a long history. At Bologna in medieval Italy it took the form of defining the constituency as the students. In Paris it was the teachers. However, the modern western university has typically evolved into a hierarchical structure of departments and faculties, bureaucratically administered, though with considerable power over internal affairs in the hands of the academics. Only Oxford in modern times approximates to the model of a self-governing democracy of dons. On a modern Yugoslavian view, an Oxford college would be a BOAL. The Governing Body or 'Workers' Council' of the college is where all decisions are made by an assembly following the principle of one don one vote. A difference is immediately apparent in that students are excluded from this franchise, and their interests are incorporated by a system of consultative committees. Nevertheless, the English 'medieval survival' and the Yugoslavian 'socialist experiment' have a further parallel in the high degree of autonomy of their colleges and faculties respectively. The university at Oxford, like any of the 19 universities in Yugoslavia, has been, at least until recently, a loose federation of physically and constitutionally separate colleges in the one case, and faculties in the other.

But here again, the parallel stops. Certainly the dons in their University Congregation can collectively and democratically decide Non Placet in the face of proposals from the Vice-Chancellor (Rector) whom they have elected from among themselves for a four-year term of office. But though dons fully and democratically control their several college properties and their administrative offices, the overwhelming fact of the environment of Oxford University is its 85% income dependence on the state, whereas Belgrade University, besides having an internal democracy of teachers and students, is

now firmly set in the environment of a free exchange of labour between itself and the users of its products of knowledge and knowledgeable people - the 'self-managing communities of interest' and the relevant organisations of associated labour.

The Federal state was eliminated from control of education by the Yugoslav revisions of the Constitution in 1974. The further drive towards establishing self management, which began in the factories in the 1950s, has now spread throughout the social fabric and both reflects and propels current developments in higher education. The consequence is that the BOALS and working organisations of the faculties and schools, linked together to form universities, are vitally dependent on the proposals and proddings of a large number of social, political and professional bodies, inside and outside their gates. They depend, in other words, not only on the state but on a large number of groups with a producer or user interest in the higher studies and in the supply of scientific and technological manpower.

The University of Ljubljana as an Example

The self-management system may be exemplified from the presentation of self which is published by the University of Ljubljana. Lubljana is neither the biggest nor the smallest, nor the oldest nor the youngest, nor the most nor the least famous of Yugoslav universities. A proud possession of Slovenia, it has late sixteenth-century antecedents in a Jesuit School and an eighteenth century Lyceum. But the establishment of the university proper had to await the fall of the Habsburg monarchy. It dates from 1919 when 5 faculties were set up (of Law, Philosophy, Technology, Theology and Medicine). It flickered and almost died during the years of Italian and German occupation from 1941-45, but then sprang again into life and vigorous growth to become, by the mid-1970s, an association of ten faculties joined by ten other higher schools and academies. The university now boasts over 1,000 professors and other teachers and researchers, and it contains more than 13,000 students.

Over the past twenty years Ljubljana, like all other Yugoslav institutes of higher education, has been learning self-management and unlearning the traditional 'administrative manner of decision-making'. The present arrangements were introduced by the Republic of Slovenia's University Act of

1975; but these also are undergoing further modification as the universities are drawn further into the developing system of vocationally-directed education. Again, like all other Yugoslav universities, Ljubljana is a community of working organisations including faculties, academies of art, vise skole (two-year advanced vocational colleges), four-year colleges and teacher training colleges. Twenty such working organisations make up the University of Ljubljana: three of the faculties are in fact sub-divided into BOALS (which were formally departments of a faculty). BOALS and other working organisations are the primary self-governing units of the university. But there are also groupings of students in each year of study which are similarly self-governing.

Each of these primary units, in addition to its assembly, has a Council to manage its affairs, composed of delegates of students, teachers and non-teaching staff, as well as of users. The users are other working organisations or BOALS, socio-political organisations and communities with interests in higher education. The worker, student, and user delegates each make up one-third of the total Council membership. All three groups are on an equal footing. A decision of the Council is not valid if a majority of any of the three groups does not agree with it. Each group, in other words, decides separately on such matters as the draft of a statute, the curriculum, the election of teachers, or the budget before the Council as a whole makes its decision. Further, the teachers and the non-teaching staff by constitutional right negotiate separately their own working conditions and personal incomes.

These governmental arrangements at the primary level are repeated at the level of the university where the essential organ of government is the University Council. It is composed of one delegate from among the workers, students, and users of every working organisation. It thus has 60 members, 20 from the staff, 20 from the students, and 20 from the users. Decisions of the University Council are carried out through various committees, commissions and professional enterprises. The Rector is the central coordinating administrator of the University. He serves for two years and can only be nominated once again for a further two-year period. The central administrative functions (professional, financial and technical) are in the hands of a Secretariat in the university led by a Secretary

General who is nominated by the University Council for a period of four years, and is eligible for re-nomination without limit.

To deal with the essential issue of academic appointments, there is a 'habilitation commission' of 21 members, 7 of whom are nominated by the Executive Council of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, and 14 are elected by the University Council on the recommendation of the Socialist Alliance of Working People from among the teachers, researchers, students and prominent professionals. The habilitation commission puts forward proposals for the election of professors, lecturers and their assistants. It is only from the Commission's lists that the Council of one of the relevant BOALs or working organisations makes its final decision on the appointment of a member of staff.

The income of each of the primary units is secured by a direct free exchange of labour with other organisations of associated labour, or through the self-managing communities of interest for education. Similarly income for research activity is acquired through the corresponding self-managing communities of interest for research. In cases where there is no community of interest the negotiation has to be made through the self-managing community of education for the Republic. Assemblies of such communities of interest have two chambers - the chamber of producers and the chamber of users. The first is composed of delegates from the faculties or other working organisations in higher education: the second is composed of the delegates of the relevant outside organisations of associated labour, mainly business enterprises. The chambers work on an equal footing to fix prices for educational activity which in turn determine the income of each of the educational units. Research is directly financed by contracts between the education organisations on the one hand and enterprises or communities of interest on the other. In short, self-management and free exchange of labour link workers and students, producers and users.

Internally BOALS are democratically self-governing in higher education as in the economy at large. Externally these social markets yield a bargain between the educational organisations and society as a whole where the latter is represented either by working organisations or by communities of interest. The state in such a system has retreated into what traditional liberals would have called the night-watchman role. In Marxist terminology, it is

withering away.

Self-Management and Continuing Education

Continuing education is the much discussed system which is advocated, nowhere more passionately than in Yugoslavia, as the next phase of development of a fully democratic arrangement for the education of a modern citizen. It is usually discussed in the context of social equality echoing a widespread concern in the failure, or at any rate limited success, of prevailing policies. Nevertheless, this is by no means the whole story, whether in OECD countries in general, or in Yugoslavia in particular. Another approach is to be had by first noticing that a worker in industrial society will commonly spend at least 100,000 hours of his life at work. The question of how to arrange the life cycle of education, work, leisure, and retirement is accordingly an intriguing calculation-cum-gamble for the free man or woman. The allocation of 100,000 hours is, to be sure, a vital question for egalitarian policy: but it can claim attention also from the point of view of individual liberty. Industrial men and women are doubtless freer from toil than their grandparents. Nevertheless, these libertarian trends cannot be presumed fully to have taken even the rich countries out of the world of unremitting toil or to have placed them satisfactorily in the world of social complexity which calls for maximum flexibility in the arrangement of their affairs.

The idea of a flexible contract between citizen and society, covering education, work, leisure and social security is now much discussed in western countries.[6] In Yugoslavia it is taken for granted that responsible government on behalf of individual liberty has to go beyond the enforcement of contracts voluntarily entered and the natural tendencies of men to conspire against the rigours of the free market. Nevertheless, Yugoslavian socialism claims to seek ways to increase freedom of choice for the individual in modern society. And, like any other modern society, capitalist or communist, Yugoslavia is committed to the efficient production of abundance, the maintenance of full employment, and the abolition of all unnecessary labour.

On these assumptions, if behind a different political rhetoric, Yugoslavia, like Sweden, seeks deliberately greater variation and diversity in the life patterns of education, work, leisure and retirement, in such a way as to transfer decisions

as far as possible from the bureaucracy to the individual. The underlying conception is of a new social contract. The individual has a lifelong bargain with society to work in exchange for material rewards. In such a society the individual, within a broad framework of agreed rules, would determine the phasing and pacing of the exchange, week by week, year by year and over the course of his whole lifetime. The sharp divisions of the life-cycle, bequeathed by the harsh necessities of pre-industrial society and entrenched in the rigid formulae of statutory school leaving ages, weekly hours, annual holidays and compulsory retirement ages, would go. Instead there would be 'flexi-time', study rights at personal discretion, vacation rights not tied to calendar years, sabbaticals and temporary retirements not tied to old age.

In order to effect these new freedoms, which are in any case gradually and patchily appearing in the rich countries, it is desirable (though not absolutely necessary) to systematise the piecemeal arrangements we already have for providing income to those who are not in paid employment because they are young and in school or unemployed or pregnant or sick or old and therefore retired. Collectively, a country has to decide on the generalised drawing rights to be allocated to each citizen. Of course, in a developed social contract, safeguards would have to be built in against those with undue preferences for 'a short life but a gay one' and not all state or community payments to individuals need be, or could be, included. But the general idea stands as a proposal for the reduction of bureaucracy and the enlargement of personal choice. As such it describes a major component of the Yugoslav intent.

The Yugoslavs see themselves now at the beginning of a third developmental stage where the first was statist, and the second was self-managing. In this third stage the distinguishing concept is that of continuing education. The radical character of the new concept is fully appreciated by the Yugoslavs. They are aware of both its libertarian and egalitarian implications. They understand, in other words, that their plans and hopes are both to maximise and to harmonise the free choice of individuals and the occupational and cultural needs of society. They see the future structure of education not as hitherto in four phases, but in two. The first phase of pre-schooling and elementary schooling is of a larger and common syllabus, followed by a second phase of vocationally-oriented secondary

and higher education integrated with work and life to form a diversity of opportunities which are never final because they are life-long. They understand, too, that the concept goes beyond schooling to involve the family, the work place, the political and social organisations, and the mass media as partners in a total scheme of learning. And they believe that the multiple partnership entailed requires and can be delivered only in an environment of democratic participation by both the producers and the users of knowledge.

EDUCATION, PROSPERITY AND FREEDOM: THE WESTERN REACTION

Reactions to all this in other countries will vary widely between the exhilaration of perennially optimistic educational progressives, and the disbelief of disillusioned educational pessimists. The principle of recurrent education has had widespread acceptance in the western countries. But practice dawdles behind principle. In 1979 an OECD report assessed events in recent years, using the phrase 'progress and stagnation', and concluding that:

> it is therefore not unduly cynical to pose the question whether recurrent education, originally conceived during the period of educational expansion, will face the fate of being one of those educational ideas that are verbally and policy-wise accepted and supported but with very little impact on educational practice. Such a scenario can certainly not be excluded as we are approaching the 1980s with serious uncertainties concerning the economy, employment and public expenditures. However, it might also be that this new and emerging socio-economic situation will accelerate the development of recurrent education.[7]

Is Yugoslavia on the way to a continuous education system irrespective of fashion or economic growth? Of course, in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, we are discussing principles and plans more than history and establishment. Yet the Yugoslav version of linking reform in education, work and social management certainly appeals as a coherent intellectual construction. On the other hand, even about the general conception there can be legitimate doubt. From the vantage point of individual choice, caution

suggests that the underlying assumptions are somewhat flattering to ordinary mortals. They postulate a world of individuals who are not only intelligent and calculating marginalists, but also people who would have the strength of their libertarian convictions and would thus be willing to accept the cruelties of life's uncertainty as well as the tragedies of youthful folly.

Such general theoretical caution is well taken. Nevertheless, at the level of practice the reality of individual choice is already an improvement over what Yugoslavia inherited from before the Second World War - a set of institutions like that all over traditional Europe which condemned the majority to an elementary education which was terminal, and a brief prelude to a life of manual work. The further plans in Yugoslavia can, at the very least, be expected to yield some further loosening of the traditional ties between social origin and occupational destination, even if they do not result in a maximally open society as defined by the most rigid theoretical conception.

Similarly, egalitarian critics may entertain their theoretical doubts. They are of two basic kinds. First, it may be questioned whether, notwithstanding the emancipation of learning opportunities from the strict confines of the formal school system, any social or political plans can encompass and discipline to the principle of equality all influence on learning. At some point equality of educational opportunity can only be obtained at the cost of freedom. This is true even where, as in Yugoslavia, formal private education is forbidden. It is massively and endemically true when it comes to parental teaching 'in the kitchen'. Second, even the most determined programme of 'positive discrimination', multiple and repeated educational opportunities, alternative routes or other devices, must find its limits in practicability and in the limitations of social and psychological science. After all, we simply do not know what is the optimal learning environment of individual A compared with individual B; yet that knowledge is a precondition of establishing full equality of opportunity between them. But again, the reply is similar. Both current practice and future plans in Yugoslavia are an improvement on the inequalities of the past. Though we must note the limitations of solidarity funding, the reply cannot be gainsaid. The argument is one of more or less. Experience, not theory, will be the ultimate test of the idea of continuing educa-

tion in its Yugoslav version.

It may well be argued that there is a general logic of continuous education in which all social organisations, informal as well as formal, are drawn into, or at least heavily influenced by, a conscious pedagogical policy. There are, to be sure, obvious dangers here of a new tyranny. It is always a basic problem of any revolutionary regime that it must ensure the allegiance of its citizens. Indeed, as the self-management movement amply demonstrates, a fundamental task of the revolution is to create social conditions which encourage people to develop those qualities of social personality on which the success of revolution depends. The Yugoslavs have recognised this in their provision for self-management courses in schools, and their arrangements for recruitment of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia by selection rather than election.

Yet prosperity and freedom also create space for other influences. In one sense the increase of money in private pockets, television in every household, shorter hours of work, etc., represent achievements of the revolutionary aims. But in another sense they change the conditions of freedom and control. Social and political consciousness become amenable to new forces. Consequently, either tacitly by inaction or purposefully by exercising some kind of political control, Yugoslavia or any other country, has a policy. It can be a policy of laissez-faire or, to put it pejoratively, of rampant individualism. Or it can be a policy of tight control or, to put it equally pejoratively, of political tyranny. No western country has placed itself at either of these extremes. But the exact position taken is everywhere subject to continual debate.

To illustrate from another country, there has never ceased to be contention in Britain as to how far the government should control the content of B.B.C. broadcasting. The dominant doctrine of the B.B.C.'s first and powerful director, Lord Reith, was that the cultural level of programmes should, as opportunity and response allowed, be tilted slightly in the direction of 'high' rather than 'popular' culture. The perennial criticism has been that this Reithian doctrine offends the principle of democracy. The defence has been that minority tastes need protection and that, since the demos has decreed educational expansion, the mass media must support by staying somewhat ahead of today's educational level in anticipation of tomorrow's tastes.

Taking a second example from Yugoslavia itself, I was struck by the absence of the pornography which is ubiquitous in western cities. The use of sexual titillation on advertisement hoardings and the display of pornographic magazines is not a feature of Zagreb or Novi Sad. And I was impressed in observing young people on the evening streets of Belgrade by a sense of relative innocence and decorum more reminiscent of inter-war Paris or London than present-day Hamburg or Amsterdam. These phenomena are not accidental. Our hosts reminded me that I was visiting at a time of international mourning for the death of Tito. Yet I would still insist on the contrast and, in any event, the example of public sexual mores serves to illustrate the point that, in a country which takes continuous education seriously, a very wide range of difficult decisions have to be taken about the scope and the method of educational intrusion into the totality of social life. The question is whether the Yugoslavs are thinking, or intend to think, systematically through the policy issues involved.

What they clearly are doing is to analyse the implied relation between continuous education and working life with its serious potential problem of finance. Self-management involves dependence on solidarity funds for equality of distribution, and on BOALS for linking education to work. Neither of these features is beyond question in the search for a financial underpinning of the idea of free individual choice and social equality. Both of these problems seem to us to be likely to persist even supposing that the general shortage of funds for educational activity is overcome. The problem is, in a sense, circular. It will require enlightened self-sacrifice on the part of BOALs and communities to freeze personal income and consumption to ensure both adequate investment in a changing technology and adequate funding of work-training. This itself challenges the educational sympathies of the participating workers. It puts democracy to a severe test. Moreover, beyond the direct interest of workers, continuing education makes large claims for the unemployed and the retired. The bonds of solidarity and fraternity will also be severely tested if the needs of these groups are to be satisfied. The observer, however well disposed, is bound to wonder whether a fully-developed continuing education can be supported by a financial system so heavily dependent on decisions in the workplace.

Yugoslavia has espoused a Communism which takes seriously the original Marxist idea of the withering away of the state and eventually even of the Party, leaving economic organisations and social activities to evolve and survive by free exchange of labour between groups which afford full participation in decisions to their members who elect delegates to represent them in negotiations with other groups.

A BRITISH TRANSLATION?

Can Britain learn from the Yugoslav experience? Obviously there could be no question of mechanical translation, and one lesson is entirely repugnant - the fact that 'propaganda against the regime' has led, and continues to lead, to imprisonment of some dissidents. A policy which does not guarantee freedom of speech and association to its citizens has no serious claim to be called a democracy. Nevertheless, imaginative translation of the idea of self-management in Yugoslavia to local democracy in Britain is an attractive possibility.

Without abrupt departure from the custom of mixed central and local taxation, we could, in British terminology, begin by making every school a direct grant school. School government could be simultaneously reformed along the lines recommended in the Taylor Report. A central national administration, but a slimmer one, would remain with three main tasks: to administer the direct grant formula, to collect and disseminate information on the performance of the educational system, and to inspect. The L.E.A.s and their apparatus of administration, advice, and control over finance and appointments, would go. School governing bodies would govern, and be answerable to their electorate in the local community and the school itself.

Native tradition, the warning of American school boards, and lack of confidence in the translation of Yugoslav solidarity funding all point to the retention of national financial support. But the direct grant formula, though based on a simple head-counting, could and should include a strong positively discriminatory element to ensure equal educational opportunity as between rich and poor school districts. Local variety also occasionally implies local disaster, and therefore implies provision for national rescue where minimum national standards are not met. Hence, the inspectorate would need an ambulance brigade in reserve to be deployed by the Secretary of State where local demo-

cracy was failing its children to a point of scandal closely defined by Parliament.

Local school democracy, moreover, would not have a simple structure. It would live within geographical boundaries set by catchment areas, but would include parents, teachers, and the older pupils and students who would be progressively enfranchised as apprenticed democrats. In each school the staff would be a democratic group electing its own head teachers (not for life), and its own representatives on the school governing body. A corollary would be that democracy, as the art of collective self-management, would occupy an indispensable place in the curriculum of every school. Any candid observer of a typical once-a-term school governors' meeting as hitherto constituted has to dismiss it as a ritual farce of democratic gossip about a trivial agenda. All serious matters of finance and curriculum are decided elsewhere. My colleague, Andy Hargreaves, is producing research evidence of admittedly more subtle processes of control over staff discussion within schools as they are presently run. The proposed changes in the internal life of schools would help to free them from the inhibitions of conventionally-received opinion - which Marxists call hegemony - and so encourage that more substantial democracy which is thwarted by present tacit understandings as to what is a possible agenda in a meeting of the governors or of the staff.

Reform in the direction of local democracy would produce local variety of response and therefore new inequalities of opportunity. But these would be more than compensated by the release and creation of new energies for education from parents, teachers, and children: and the antidotes in reserve are national minima, the discriminatory element in the direct grant formula, the inspectorate, and the educational ambulance service. Defenders of the status quo will appeal to our exhaustion from past upheaval. They will say that other problems of democracy, whether those of Margaret Thatcher or Michael Foot, must take precedence over worries about educational democracy. The answer is where I started. The reproduction of generations is everybody's business.

NOTES

1. This chapter is a much expanded version of my article on 'Democracy for Education' in New Society (March 1981) which in turn was based on a talk given to the North of England Education Conference in January 1981. I owe to OECD the opportunity of visiting Yugoslavia in 1980 as an Examiner of Yugoslav education. The full account is OECD, Review of National Policies for Yugoslavia, (OECD, Paris, 1981), and I have drawn heavily here on what I wrote for the OECD monograph.

2. See Halsey, A.H. (1981) Change in British Society, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, especially chapter 7.

3. E.g. Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1976) Schooling in Capitalist America, Basic Books Inc., New York.

4. For a general discussion of industrial democracy see Hirszowicz, M. (1981) Industrial Sociology, Martin Robertson, Oxford, chapter 10 and the works therein cited.

5. See Dobson, R.B., 'Social Status and Inequality of Access to Higher Education in the USSR'., in Karabel, J. and Halsey, A.H. (eds) (1976) Power and Ideology in Education, Oxford University Press, New York.

6. The prophet of flexibility in this context is Gosta Rehn, the Swedish labour economist. See Rehn, G. 'Flexibility in Working Life', in Mushkin, S. (ed) (1973), Recurrent Education (National Institute of Education, Washington.

7. OECD, CERI/CD(79)12. FD(79)16. p.5.

Source: A. H. Halsey, 'Schools for democracy?' in J. Ahier and M. Flude (eds), *Contemporary Education Policy*, Croom Helm, London and Canberra, 1983.

Annotated bibliography



Readings in the philosophy of science

Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. *Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life.* Heinemann, London, 1979.
An excellent metatheoretical analysis of the functionalist, interpretive, radical-humanist, and radical structuralist paradigms. The authors provide extensive reviews of the development of each paradigm along with a description of a wide variety of theories and schools of thought within each paradigm. Essential reading for students of organisation.

Kuhn, T. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.
This book is a classic in the philosophy of science. In it the author provides a historical account of how major breakthroughs in the natural sciences have taken place as a result of fundamental perceptual changes, or paradigm shifts, by researchers.

Lakatos, I., & Musgrave, A. (eds). *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.* Cambridge University Press, London, 1980.
This book of readings contains nine essays which were presented at a symposium dealing with Thomas Kuhn's influential work *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Here some of the fundamental issues involving 'normal science' and 'scientific revolutions' are discussed by some of the world's most respected philosophers of science, including Stephen Toulmin, Karl Popper, Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, and others. This book is heavy going, but will be rewarding for the serious reader.

Morgan, G. 'Paradigms, metaphors, and puzzle solving in organization theory'. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 4, 1980, pp. 605–22.
This article, which followed the book by Burrell and Morgan, reviews the major arguments made in *Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis* and places particular emphasis on the radical-humanist paradigm. This article also contains a very useful discussion of metaphors in organisational theory. The reader may wish to consult this paper prior to reading the larger monograph by Burrell and Morgan.

General readings in public policy analysis

Anderson, J. *Public Policy-Making.* 2nd edn, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1979.
This monograph is useful in gaining an initial overview of public policy and policy analysis. Topics considered include: problem formation, policy formation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. While Anderson's treatment of the policy process tends to be rather linear, his consideration of the political dynamics rescues the book from the clutches of pure rational comprehensivism. An annotated bibliography is appended to the monograph.

Carley, M. *Rational Techniques in Policy Analysis.* Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1980.
In this book the author tries to compensate for many of the shortcomings of the rational comprehensive approach to policy decision-making. By supplementing the rational model with political, bureaucratic, and value

elements, Carley claims to have constructed a 'balanced perspective' without having abandoned the essential properties of rationality. Substantive discussions on a variety of 'management information systems' such as cost-benefit analysis and social indicators are well presented.

Dye, T. *Understanding Public Policy*. 3rd edn, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1978.
Dye's book is a good place to start for those wishing to be acquainted with the breadth and complexity of public policy. Dye provides a good overview of many theories of the policy process and then goes on to illustrate their utility by providing case studies in such areas as welfare, civil rights, and education. The specific issues considered are all drawn from the United States.

Emy, H. *Public Policy: Problems and Paradoxes*. Macmillan, Melbourne, 1976.
This little book provides a readable and concise discussion of the field of public policy. Especially useful is the third chapter which specifically addresses Australian policy issues. The reader will also find an annotated bibliography which will be helpful in exploring specific policy issues in a variety of areas including education. This book is one in a series titled 'Problems in Australian Politics'.

Readings in educational policy analysis

Birch, I. *Forming Australia's Education Policy*. Macmillan, Melbourne, 1976.
In this book, Birch analyses the processes and outcomes of educational policy-making at both the state and federal levels in Australia. The analysis focuses on the restraints on Commonwealth policy with particular emphasis on the 1973 schools legislation. Three distinct processes are examined: opinion making, opinion transmitting, and decision making. This monograph is one in a series titled 'Problems in Australian Politics'.

Harman, G. Policy making in education: Some concepts and some theories. Paper presented at the conference of the Australian Council for Educational Administration, Sydney, 1978.
This paper presents a quite comprehensive, but uncritical, overview of the policy process. It is particularly useful for coming to grips with much of the terminology used by policy makers and analysts. The reader will also find concise summaries of some dozen policy-related theories. The reader will be disappointed if she or he expects to find much substantive discussion of education.

Mann, D. *Policy Decision-Making in Education: An Introduction to Calculation and Control*. Teachers College Press, New York, 1975.
This book is one of the most widely read in educational circles. The author views the policy process through two processes: calculation and control. The overall approach to policy in this book is heavily based in systems theory. Mann's discussion of decision-assisting technologies such as PPBS may help the reader understand why these techniques have been so popular among educators.

Nisbett, J., & Broadfoot, P. *The Impact of Research on Policy and Practice in Education.* Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1980.
This book offers a concise and quite readable account of the utilisation of research by educational systems. Employing a comparative perspective, the authors consider historical, organisational, sociological, and political dimensions of research utilisation in schools in North America and Europe. Also included are interviews with academics and those affected by policy.

Yeakey, C. 'Emerging policy research in educational research and decisionmaking'. In E. Gordon (ed.). *Review of Research in Education,* vol. 10, American Educational Research Association, Washington, DC, 1983, pp. 255–301.
This state-of-the-art article reviews a good deal of the theoretical and empirical literature on the policy sciences and education. This treatment is complemented by an examination of school policies in the United States relating to racial integration. This article is recommended to readers interested in gaining an initial overview of educational policy analysis.

Readings in critical theoretical treatment off educational administration

Bates, R. The function of educational administration in the processes of cultural transmission. Paper presented at the conference on the Origins and Operations of Education Systems, International Sociological Association, Paris, 1980.
This seminal paper was among the very first to explore the implications of critical theory and the new sociology of education in the domain of educational administration. Here Bates explores how knowledge is managed and control is exerted through an alliance of bureaucratic and professional conceptions of educational administration. This paper illuminates how such control is played out in school curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation, and results in the reproduction of inequality.

Bates, R. Administration, culture and critique: Towards a reflexive practice of educational administration. Revised version of a paper presented to the Annual Conference of the American Educational Research Association, New York, March 1982. (Forthcoming in T. Sergiovanni & J.E. Corbally (eds). *Administrative Leadership and Organisational Culture.* University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 1983.)
This paper presents a critique of traditional approaches to educational administration and argues for an alternative grounded in the new sociology of education and critical social theory. This paper is particularly helpful in showing how ritual, metaphor, and language in schools operate to obstruct human potential. Bates proposes an emancipatory alternative in which sources of domination are unmasked by critical, reflexive administrative practice.

Watkins, P. Scientific management and critical theory in educational administration. In R.J. Bates. *Educational Administration and the Mangement of Knowledge* (ESA841 Theory and Practice in Educational Administration). Deakin University, 1982.
This paper examines how educational administration has become a

technique of social control through its subscription to 'scientific management' from business and industry. Based upon this critique, the author suggests a re-alignment of educational administration with an emancipatory interest beginning with a demystification of the dominant social structures, processes, and ideologies.

Watkins, P. Undistorted communication and school democracy. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Australian Association for Research in Education, Canberra, 1983.
The author examines the recent Victorian Government initiative to devolve power and authority and to establish more democratic procedures in the determination of school policy. In this essay Habermas's concept of 'undistorted communication' is suggested as a way to ensure that the democratisation of Victorian schools can be realised. This paper provides a very practical example of the use of critical theory in educational administration.

Young, R., Pusey, M., & and Bates, R. (eds). *Australian Educational Policy Issues & Critique.* Deakin University, Vic., 1982.
This volume contains eight essays which treat a variety of conceptual and substantive Australian educational policy issues from a critical-theory perspective. Topics considered include policy theories, ontological crisis, early childhood education, multicultural education, assessment, structural change in the Victorian education system, teachers' coping with policy, and problems and prospects in educational policy studies.

About the author



John J. Prunty is a visiting lecturer at Deakin University. Before receiving his doctorate in Educational Policy-making and Administration from Washington University in St Louis, he had worked in conservation and had taught post-primary science. His academic interests include alternative education, school effectiveness, aesthetic education, ethnographic methodology, policy studies, and critical social theory and he has publications in these areas. He has recently completed a major study of innovation and change in American education with Louis Smith and David Dwyer, titled *Kensington Revisited*. In Australia he has been working with Richard Bates and Lawrie Angus on a study of the reorganisation of the Victorian Education Department.

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